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Abstract
The transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of
shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market
entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks
are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar
to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, we explicitly
model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles.
We start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools
from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses.
We show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hys-
teresis losses for producers. This could offer a reason for the implementation of
stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or - alter-
natively - reduce the sunk entry and exit costs. However, the explicit inclusion
of uncertainty (associated with an option value of waiting) is shown to reduce
economic hysteresis losses.
Based on theoretical considerations of hysteresis losses, this manuscript also
introduces a new measure (an indicator) to capture hysteresis losses empirically.
As examples, the most important German export sectors to the U.S. and Italian
wine exports to the U.S. are investigated. In both cases, the theoretical findings
of over-proportionally large hysteresis losses compared to the changes in forcing
variable could be approved.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Economics is “a delicate machine, the workings of which we do not really under-
stand”, as Keynes wrote in the context of the great slump of 1930 (Keynes 1930,
p. 126).
Nevertheless, economists busily observe the processes in economics and create
theories trying to approximate the complexity of the reality. They lean on certain
approaches to economics or even combine them to understand the economic pro-
cesses that are dynamic from the time perspective. The structure of the economy
itself as well as the economic relations between economic agents, and the nature
of shocks shaking the economies and in some cases leading to structural changes
incentivize economists to look for new ways in explaining these phenomena. Be-
sides mainstream economics, there always exist heterodox approaches that try
to strike a new path in the discipline. This manuscript presents a heterodox
approach of hysteresis in economics that has been attracting growing attention
in recent years as having the potential to explain consequences of the recession
that followed the financial crisis in 2008.
Cross (Cross 1993, p. 71) catches our attention by claiming that “there is
an irony that J. A. Ewing, who coined the term hysteresis, was Professor of
Mechanism and Applied Mechanics at Cambridge University from 1890 until
1916 and overlapped at Kings’s College with the young John Maynard Keynes.
There is, however, no record of an influence of Ewing on Keynes. Hysteresis
could arguably have provided Keynes with a useful metaphor in his subsequent
1
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“struggle to escape” from the non-hysteretic neoclassical doctrine”.
The events of recent years have made the world economy extremely uncer-
tain. Owing to various crises (both political and economic), wars and terror,
the world markets became unstable and world trade stagnated. It needs to be
mentioned that the China bubble burst, currencies of many emerging countries
(e.g. Russia) crashed, the global indebtedness strongly increased and thus the
fear of rising interest rates on the part of the U.S. became grater, the oil price
crashed and destabilized the income of commodity exporters. Moreover, a global
energy transition was announced at the end of the climate conference in Paris,
which is associated with high energy costs in the future (see Mu¨ller 2016). Fi-
nally, Brexit and Trump’s “America first” doctrine associated with isolationistic
foreign policy stances complicate economic policy and make the business envi-
ronment quite unpredictable. The higher global uncertainty directly influences
decision-making processes of worldwide-operating (exporting) firms in the form
of e.g. exchange rate fluctuations. As an example, the $/e -exchange rate has
fluctuated between 0.89 and 1.66 since the introduction of the euro, resulting in
high losses of exporters or even their market exit in the case of home currency
appreciation. This kind of uncertainty incentivizes exporting firms to be more
cautious and delay their decisions regarding the intensity of their business activ-
ity. In other words, firms tend to make use of the option to wait and see how the
economic environment will develop in the near future.
The option of waiting is even more important and valuable if the activity of
firms is associated with sunk adjustment costs. In many cases, firms must incur
sunk costs to enter new markets. Since these entry investments are firm-specific,
firms cannot recoup these costs if they exit. Analogously, a market exit results
in exit costs if production is stopped. These sunk entry and exit costs result in
a path-dependent behavior of firms, which is called “hysteresis”. Directly after
a firm has entered a market, firm-specific entry investments in fact have to be
treated as sunk costs, although this investment is not really lost, as long as the
firm continues to be active on the market. However, in case of a later market exit,
the sunk entry investment actually has to be written off and sunk exit costs must
be paid. In a complete market entry and exit cycle, both sunk entry and exit costs
finally have to be written off. Consequently, during the complete entry and exit
3cycle of a firm, a dynamic loss is generated comprising the sum of sunk entry and
exit costs that were paid. This is analogous to a phenomenon in physics called
the “hysteresis loss”, where heat is produced by magnetization-demagnetization
cycles. In contrast to the standard microeconomic market model, where welfare
effects (producer and consumer surpluses, deadweight losses, etc.) are analyzed
for static market equilibrium situations, this manuscript deals with both the-
oretical and empirical issues of dynamic losses directly caused by variations in
the economic environment during the adjustment process towards equilibria, or
by fluctuations around and switches between different equilibria. We model this
along the lines of the hysteresis loss in magnetization. We will show that – as in
the case of magnetism – these losses caused by a “loading-unloading” (i.e. mar-
ket entry-exit) cycle are proportional to the area inside the so-called “hysteresis
loop” (see Mayergoyz 2003, p. 50).
Shifting the focus from welfare effects in an equilibrium state - as is done
e.g. in the case of deadweight losses - to welfare effects of fluctuations around
equilibria given that adjustment costs are relevant is a promising topic.
This manuscript deals with the concept of hysteresis losses in a general price-
output constellation and later applies it in the special case of international trade.
As the term “hysteresis” (see e.g. Baldwin 1989) reveals, in our considerations
we treat the economy as a dynamic entity that develops and grows in time in the
context of history. Due to irreversible investments, the influence of history (or
memory of the system) and option value effects, we observe path-dependent out-
put (e.g. export) reactions leading to long-lasting effects of input (e.g. exchange
rate) changes to the output level, which represents the typical recession scenario.
We have ascertained that large economic fluctuations generate disproportion-
ately high dynamic adjustment costs, due to the over-proportionate effect of price
changes on the size of the dynamic losses. Especially the strong economic fluctu-
ations of recent years (in exchange rates, share and real estate prices, commodity
and oil prices, etc.) should have led to a dissipation effect for many sunk invest-
ments (that ultimately had to be written off), which are likely to show similarities
to the hysteresis losses described in this manuscript. From an economic policy
perspective, this could offer an additional reason for the implementation of sta-
bilizing measures and policies, first and foremost to prevent strong variations
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on markets. Examples of such stabilizing (dynamic loss-avoiding) policies could
be (stable) fixed exchange rates, financial market regulations or even two-price
buffer stock schemes on commodity markets. However, an alternative policy to
reduce the hysteresis losses would be to preserve flexible markets, i.e. to reduce
the sunk costs that act like barriers for market entry and exit.
The relevance of our analysis can be illustrated for agricultural and commodity
markets. As an example: agricultural markets exhibit a relatively high volatility
due to their strong links with natural shocks, associated with high costs for
the economy. A number of studies regarding the development of commodity
prices and their volatility state that the price volatility in the last decade was
higher than in the 1990s (e.g. see Huchet-Bourdon 2011; Von Braun 2012; Food
and United Nations 2011; OECD/Food and United Nations 2014; Bank 2015).
Existing literature regarding the welfare impacts of commodity price volatility
mostly deals with static welfare losses in terms of consumer income changes and
concentrates on the demand side (see e.g.Bellemare et al. 2013). By contrast,
we analyze dynamic losses of producers (farmers) caused by sunk adjustment
costs. The fact that the (food) price volatility in the past was high - and tends
to remain so in the future - underlines the relevance of the sunk adjustment costs
in the form of investments or disinvestments that producers have to face after
every price shock. The markets with high sunk costs are those with the greatest
barriers to entry and exit, while once the sunk costs are incurred, they cannot
be recovered. Together with the presence of uncertainty, the existence of sunk
costs significantly changes the “normal” economic behavior of producers, resulting
in hysteresis. Since hysteresis effects are an empirically-proven phenomenon in
economics, the consequences in terms of economic hysteresis losses resulting from
fluctuations are a relevant question.
This manuscript comprises nine chapters. Chapter 2 provides some historical
notes of the origin of hysteresis phenomenon in physics, illustrates the main prop-
erties of “strong” (macroeconomic) hysteresis and discusses the issue of hystere-
sis in different economic fields associated with different determinants. Chapter
3 explains the concept of sunk cost hysteresis starting with the microeconomic
foundation and presenting the simplest microeconomic consideration of firm-level
modeling of hysteresis, which is called non-ideal relay. It continues with the aggre-
5gation using the procedure of Preisach 1935 and ends with the macroeconomic
hysteresis loop. It is shown that being discrete at the micro level, the path-
dependent switches of the supply curve at the macro level become continuous
and the hysteresis loop takes the form of a lens. Additionally, the shape of the
hysteresis curve and the risk neutrality assumption are discussed. Subsequently,
chapters 4 and 5 build the core of this manuscript, whereby the dynamic hys-
teresis losses (with and without explicit modeling of uncertainty) are analyzed
in a systematic way, starting from the microeconomic level of a single firm and
explicitly modeling the aggregation to hysteresis effects on entire markets, us-
ing explicit tools from mathematical/physical hysteresis theory, which is novel
in economics. Chapter 6 deals with the linearized hysteresis curve, called play
hysteresis. It represents an approximation (simplification) of the Preisach model
that enables an empirical analysis. The behavior of a system illustrated in the
play-hysteresis model is mathematically captured by the play algorithm (Belke-
Go¨cke algorithm), which is explained in detail in the following section. Based on
the Belke-Go¨cke algorithm and the play hysteresis model, a new hysteresis losses
indicator is conceived using explicit mathematical/geometrical tools, which is also
novel in the economic hysteresis literature. This indicator enables an empirical
discussion of the hysteresis losses issue executed in chapter 8. Chapter 7 builds
on chapters 3 and 4 and adopts the general price-output-based concept to the
special case of international trade using exchange rate as the input and export
volume as the output variable. In this context, the effects of the exchange rate
elasticity of export prices and the currency of costs on the exports are incorpo-
rated. Chapter 8 investigates hysteresis losses empirically using the hysteresis
losses model of international trade (from chapter 7), the Belke-Go¨cke algorithm
and the hysteresis losses indicator (from chapter 6). Products from different ar-
eas and different countries of origin are considered. As a first example, German
exports to the U.S. in the most important industrial sectors are analyzed. Fol-
lowing this, Italian wine exports to the U.S. are investigated. In chapter 9, the
findings of the manuscript are discussed and political implications are proposed.
Parts of this manuscript were developed in cooperative work with other re-
searchers and presented in international conferences. The core of this manuscript
represented by chapters 3, 4 and 5 is based on the following paper: Matthias
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Go¨cke and Jolita Matulaityte1 (2015), “Modeling Economic Hysteresis Losses
Caused by Sunk Adjustment Costs”, MAGKS – Joint Discussion Paper Series in
Economics by the Universities of Aachen, Gießen, Go¨ttingen, Kassel, Marburg
and Siegen, No. 36-2015. A modified version of this paper is accepted for pub-
lication in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (forthcoming). This paper was
also presented in the following international workshops and conferences: INFER
Workshop on Heterodox Economics in Coimbra, Portugal; 17th INFER Annual
Conference in Luton, UK and 4th Annual Lithuanian Conference on Economic
Research in Kaunas, Lithuania.
Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 8.2 are based on the following paper: Jolita Adamonis
and Laura M. Werner (forthcoming), ”A New Measure to Quantify Hysteresis
Losses: the Case of Italian Wine Exports to the US”, which is accepted for pub-
lication in Macroeconomic Dynamics. This paper was presented in the following
international conferences: 18th INFER Annual Conference in Reus, Spain; 23rd
Enometrics Conference in Colmar, France and 56. Gewisola Annual Conference
in Bonn, Germany.
Section 8.1 is based on the paper: Jolita Adamonis (2017), ”Hysteresis Losses
in German Exports to the U.S.”. This paper was presented in the following in-
ternational conferences: 21st EBES Conference in Budapest, Hungary and 19th
INFER Annual Conference in Bordeaux, France. All the comments of the par-
ticipants and anonymous referees helped us to improve the papers and thus this
manuscript.
1My maiden name.
Chapter 2
Hysteresis in economics
2.1 Brief literature overview of modeling the
ferromagnetic hysteresis
Whereas the term “hysteresis” is not widely known and used in economics, it
is well known and important in the scientific field of its origin, namely physics.
The definition itself was coined at the end of the 19th century by the Scottish
physicist James Alfred Ewing, who investigated magnetic materials. The term
“hysteresis” stems from ancient Greek “hyste´re¯sis” meaning “a coming short, a
deficiency, a lagging behind” (Dictionary.com 2017). The same source defines
“hysteresis” as “the phenomenon exhibited by a system in which the reaction of
the system to changes is dependent upon its past reactions to change”. In other
words, hysteretic systems have memories. However, there is much more behind
the hysteresis phenomenon. In this and the following sections, we will provide
some historical notes to the science of hysteresis and discuss the properties of
hysteretic systems with some examples from physics. The underlying models in
the following discussion are the scalar Preisach models of hysteresis (see Preisach
1935, Mayergoyz 1986).
The phenomenon of ferromagnetic hysteresis was found and first described
by the physicists Weber 1852 and Maxwell 1881. The physicist Ewing 1881
pursued the idea of Maxwell and worked out a concept of ferromagnetic hysteresis
supported by simple calculations (see Jiles and Atherton 1986, p. 49). The
7
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physicists Weiss and Freudenreich 1916 developed a model of ferromagnetism that
was revisited by another physicist, Preisach 1935, who presented a geometrical
interpretation of the models (see Visintin 1994, p. 9). Preisach’s models of
ferromagnetism reveal the main properties of the hysteresis phenomenon and are
favored and widely used among scientists of the other fields, including economists.
This manuscript also applies the hysteresis phenomenon in economics using the
scalar Presach models.
The first functional approach of hysteresis was proposed years later by an
engineer, Bouc 1971. Other important names in the context of formal model-
ing of hysteresis are Krasnosel’skii and Pokrovskii 1989, a mathematician and a
physicist who conducted a systematic analysis of the mathematical properties of
the hysteresis operators and thus developed formal instruments within the scope
of the general systems theory (see Visintin 1994, p. 11). These instruments are
used in economics to model hysteresis at the microeconomic level. Finally, the
engineer Mayergoyz 1986 proposed mathematical models of hysteresis that are
quite general and applicable to the description of hysteresis of different nature.
2.2 Hysteresis as a property of a system
One of the most important characteristics of hysteretic systems is memory. More
specifically, hysteresis underlies the rate-independent memory, which is persistent
and scale-invariant (see e.g. Visintin 1994, p. 13). The rate-independent memory
effects lead to the so-called multibranch non-linearity of the system, which is
illustrated in fig. 2.1.
According to Mayergoyz 1986, p. 603, multibranch non-linearity is a branch-
to-branch transition (branching) that occurs after each input extremum. It con-
stitutes the essence of hysteresis. Since we are interested in the “static” hystere-
sis non-linearities, only past extremum values of input determine the branches,
whereas the speed of input variation between extremum values does not mat-
ter. The appropriate branch can only be chosen if the past input values and the
associated output realizations are known.
Multibranch non-linearity is associated with three other characteristics of hys-
teretic systems: path dependency (looping), remanence and coercivity. Path
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Figure 2.1: Multibranch non-linearity
Source: Mayergoyz 1986, p. 604.
dependency implies that the current state of output (the appropriate branch)
depends on the path that the input variable passes through, indicating certain
past output realizations. Thus, there are several output values that are possible
for one input level. Due to its persistent memory, the Post-Keynesian economist
Davidson 1993, p. 320, compared the hysteresis concept to the “proverbial ele-
phant that never forgets”. Fig. 2.2 illustrates two continuous hysteresis loops
of different physical materials that result after a magnetization-demagnetization
cycle and are associated with hysteresis regions (area inside the hysteresis loop) of
different magnitudes. The narrower the hysteresis loop, the smaller its hysteresis
region.
The hysteresis loops in fig. 2.2 illustrate the relationship of magnetization
(M) to the external magnetic field (B0), showing that the effects of an increasing
magnetic field are different from those of a decreasing field (see Young et al. 2012,
p. 945). When the external driving field magnetizes the material to saturation
(point S in fig. 2.2), a removal of the external field does not remove the magneti-
zation of the material; rather, a certain amount of magnetization remains (point
R in fig. 2.2). This captures the remanence property, which is the stronger the
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Figure 2.2: Continuous hysteresis loops of different physical materials
Sources: Myers 1997, p. 406, Young et al. 2012, p. 945.
larger a hysteresis region is. Remaining magnetization (remanence, marked with
R) is very strong in the left-hand side and low in the right-hand side graph in
fig. 2.2. In order to reduce the magnetization to zero, a certain external field
in the opposite direction must be applied (point C in fig. 2.2). The measure of
the reverse field needed to force the magnetization to zero after being saturated
is called coercivity (see Myers 1997, p. 406). It is again the higher the larger
hysteresis region is: coercivity (C) is large in the left-hand side and tiny in the
right-hand side graph. The material illustrated in the right-hand side graph can
be demagnetized from saturation to zero by a small external driving field. This
characteristic is desirable for transformer and motor cores to minimize the energy
dissipation that corresponds to the area of the hysteresis region inside the loop.
The energy is dissipated as a result of the heat development in the material dur-
ing the demagnetization process. In contrast to the right-hand side graph, the
material captured in the left-hand side graph has a large hysteresis region asso-
ciated with high energy dissipation during the magnetizing-demagnetizing cycle.
This makes it inappropriate for electrical applications but perfect for other pur-
poses - e.g. magnetic recording - due to its ability to retain a large fraction of the
magnetization after removing the magnetizing force. High remanence is desirable
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for permanent magnets and memory devices (see Young et al. 2012, p. 945).
Other important characteristics of hysteresis that are related to the aggre-
gation process (in terms of ferromagnetics this is associated with aggregation of
single iron crystals to the whole piece of iron) are discussed and illustrated in
section 6.1.
The application of hysteresis in economics underlies the same reasoning as in
physics. In economics, we analyze markets rather than physical materials and
investigate the output behavior instead of magnetization. The specification of
both output and the forcing input depends on the concrete market of interest.
For example, if we consider international trade between two countries, we analyze
the export behavior regarding the changes of the bilateral exchange rate. If we
consider the job market, the output of interest is (un)employment and the forcing
variable is the wage rate. In order to draw concrete policy implications, the
relationship between input and output must be rigorously examined. In case of
hysteretic systems, we observe persistent effects of temporary shocks on output
(e.g. permanently high unemployment after a financial crisis due to high sunk
hiring and firing costs) that require certain coercive forces to bring the output
back to the initial situation (e.g. unemployment rate before crisis). In many cases,
the standard political measures do not help much and alternative instruments are
required to fight the cause of permanent output changes (e.g. special training
programs for the unemployed persons).
An overview of different sources of hysteresis in economics is provided in the
following section 2.3.
2.3 Hysteresis in different economic fields and
related literature
Stemming from physics, hysteresis also appears in economics, chemistry, biology,
experimental psychology and other fields (see Visintin 1994, p. 1). Useful survey
articles about hysteresis in economic systems include Amable et al. 1992, Cross
1993, Cross et al. 2009 and Go¨cke 2002. The main economic applications of the
hysteresis concept are in labor economics and international trade. They will be
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briefly discussed in this section.
Fig. 2.3 provides an overview of potential hysteresis effects on a market that
are associated with different determinants/sources of this phenomenon. Thus,
hysteresis can occur on both market sides, namely supply or/and demand. In
addition, hysteretic behavior associated with delayed and permanent effects can
be exhibited by either quantities or prices.
Figure 2.3: Overview of hysteresis on different market sides
As a first example, we discuss hysteresis on the supply side of the market
occurring in quantities (marked with the red circle in fig. 2.3). This type of hys-
teresis is typically applied in international trade. Hysteresis and threshold effects
in international trade were first considered by Kemp and Wan 1974, followed by
Baldwin 1989, Baldwin and Lyons 1989, Baldwin 1990, Baldwin and Krugman
1989 and Dixit 1992. They all recognized that modeling the economic activity
of exporting firms - especially on markets with high barriers to entry and exit
- is more appropriate in many cases using the dynamic hysteresis framework,
which takes the firm’s economic past into account to determine the right current
equilibrium.
To enter new markets, firms often have to incur sunk costs, e.g. for gathering
information on the new market and market research, setting up distribution and
service networks, advertising or establishing a brand name or hiring new workers
and building firm-specific human capital, etc. Since these entry investments are
firm and market specific, the firms cannot recoup these costs if they exit. Such
firms will only enter the market if both unit variable and sunk entry costs are
covered by the revenues/prices, meaning that the individual price entry threshold
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of a certain firm is higher than its unit variable costs. Analogously, a market exit
results in exit costs - e.g. for severance payments for fired employees - if the
production is stopped. Consequently, a certain firm will not exit the market even
if its unit variable costs cannot be covered by its unit revenues. The exit only
takes place if the loss from continueing producing exceeds the sunk exit costs.
Therefore, the exit threshold price is lower than the entry trigger and lower than
the unit variable costs. Accordingly, the sunk entry and exit costs together with
uncertainty regarding the future price development result in a path-dependent
behavior of firms, which is called “sunk cost hysteresis” (see Amable et al. 1991,
Baldwin 1989, Baldwin 1990, Baldwin and Krugman 1989, Dixit and Pindyck
1994). It constitutes that a temporary exogenous shock in a forcing variable
- e.g. an increase in costs or appreciation of one’s own currency against the
trade partner’s currency - can lead to permanent effects on the firm’s production
(export) intensity. The sum of the sunk costs induced by a firm that entered
and subsequently exited the market represents the hysteresis losses, which are
comparable with energy dissipation in the form of heat as a result of a loading-
unloading process in physical materials (see section 2.2). At the macroeconomic
level, hysteresis losses are proportional to the hysteresis region inside the loop (see
fig. 2.2), whose extent depends on the functional form of the hysteresis curve.
This specific type of hysteresis that occurs on the supply side of the market is
what we focus on in this manuscript. We model hysteresis losses and build the
hysteresis losses indicator based on the idea of the sunk adjustment costs. The
concept of sunk costs representing the microeconomic foundation of hysteresis is
discussed in detail in section 3.1. Microeconomic hysteresis losses are modeled in
section 4.1.
One of the first attempts to capture hysteresis effects in international trade
empirically using dummy variables can be found in Baldwin and Krugman 1989
and Baldwin 1990. A review of different methods used to describe economic path-
dependence and structural shifts/breaks can be found in Belke et al. 2014. From
the authors’ perspective, the most important empirical models in this context
are based on “strong” hysteresis (see Amable et al. 1991). As noted by Belke
et al. 2014, there are two of them: a direct application of the Preisach 1935
aggregation method (the aggregation issue is discussed in sections 3.2 and 6.1),
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which is introduced by Piscitelli et al. 2000; and the play algorithm, which is
based on the linear play-hysteresis model and introduced by Belke and Go¨cke
2001. The latter is discussed in section 6.3 and used in the empirical part of this
manuscript. These two approaches are similar in that both of them calculate
an artificial forcing/input variable from an original input variable (e.g. exchange
rate), which is ultimately included into a regression framework. Useful empirical
contributions proving the existence of hysteresis in international trade include
Amable et al. 1995, Baldwin 1990, Belke et al. 2013, Belke and Volz 2015, Campa
2004, Dixit 1989,De Prince and Kannebley Jr. 2013 and Kannebley Jr. 2008.
Amable et al. 1992 and Amable et al. 1993 discussed the issue of hysteresis to
shed more light in the hysteresis literature due to numerous incorrect interpreta-
tions of the hysteresis phenomenon.
Supply hysteresis may also be caused by other factors, e.g. learning-by-doing,
which is associated with the permanent reduction of production costs. In the
absence of the sunk adjustment costs, a firm will enter the market as soon as the
production costs are covered by the revenues. Due to learning-by-doing effects
that occur after the firm’s entry, it will not exit the market at the same price level
at which it entered the market. Depending on the extent to which the production
costs have been reduced, the firm delays its exit to the new point associated with
lower production costs. In the presence of the sunk entry and exit costs, the
hysteresis effect becomes stronger due to learning-by-doing, since a firm delays
its market exit by a grater extent. The zone of delaying entry and exit decisions
(difference between price entry and exit triggers) becomes larger and the new exit
trigger is adjusted to the lower production costs.
Hysteresis may also occur in prices on the supply side of a market, since
hysteresis has an effect on quantities and thus on the simlutaneous equilibrium in
the quantity-price dimensions. In this case, a temporary exogenous shock leads
to permanent effects on the price level. For example, Fedoseeva and Werner
2015 found hysteresis in prices of German beer exports to different destination
countries caused by exchange rate fluctuations. One of the potential causes for
this type of hysteresis is learning-by-doing, due to which permanently lower prices
can be realized as a result of lower production costs.
Hysteresis may also occur on the demand (in both quantities and prices) side,
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being caused by e.g. demand carry-over effects that result due to imperfectly-
informed consumers. These effects are associated with experience after consuming
goods that the consumer did not previously try. As a result, the consumer will
be willing to pay more for such an experience good (Baldwin 1990, p. 130).1 In
case of substitutes, the consumer may then permanently change his consuming
behavior in favor of the newly-experienced good, especially if the prices of these
goods are similar. Permanent effects on consumer behavior can also be caused
by certain price developments of substitutes and complementary goods.
The oldest and most popular economic application of hysteresis can be found
in labor economics. As stated in Blanchard and Summers 1986a, p.1, the main-
stream theory of that time suggested that the “equilibrium unemployment is
determined by labor market institutions, moves slowly and is unaffected by ac-
tual unemployment”. However, this theory often failed to explain the equilibrium
unemployment level of the later 20th century, especially in times of permanently
high unemployment. This incentivized economists to develop alternative theories
to derive appropriate policy implications. Phelps 1972, Sachs 1986, Blanchard
and Summers 1986a and Blanchard and Summers 1986b were first to consider
hysteresis effects in unemployment. All of them proposed an approach incorpo-
rating the idea that the equilibrium unemployment rate is path-dependent, and
depends on the path that the actual unemployment passes through in the con-
text of history with the focus on the relationship between unemployment and
wage setting. On the one hand, the membership theories distinguish between
insiders and outsiders and state that wage setting in a firm is influenced by its
employees rather than the unemployed workers. On the other hand, duration
theories distinguish between the short- and long-term unemployment of workers,
whereby the long-term unemployed have little influence on wage setting due to
e.g. lower productivity as a result of losing their job skills while unemployed. In
combination these theories are able to explain high persistent unemployment (see
Blanchard and Summers 1986b, p. 2). The intuition of unemployment hysteresis
is that: hiring workers and acquiring the firm-specific human capital is associated
with high costs that are sunk, since the firm cannot recoup them if it lowers pro-
1In a static price-quantity-diagram, this is associated with an upward shift of the demand
curve.
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duction intensity or shuts down. The demand of the production factor labor not
only depends on labor productivity but also on its costs, i.e. wage. The higher
the wage, the lower the labor demand. Now let us assume an economic downturn,
e.g. a recession accompanied by a decreasing demand for goods and services. As
a result, firms have to reduce their production intensity, fire their workers and
pay them severance payments, which in turn are sunk costs. Similar to sunk cost
hysteresis applied to international trade, two threshold wages as forcing factors
of microeconomic labor demand result: a lower wage for hiring and a higher wage
for firing the employees. Moreover, the employed workers have wage bargaining
power and might force the firm to increase their wage as the recession is over. In
case the labor productivity remains the same, the production costs for this firm
increase due to higher wages and the firm’s ability to employ new workers is re-
duced. Furthermore, as time goes by the unemployed workers lose their job skills,
become unproductive and potentially depressed. This lowers their chances of be-
ing employed. As a result, the difference between hiring and firing wages becomes
larger, which in aggregation leads to permanently higher unemployment owing to
an economic downturn. Path-dependent behavior of the (un)employment reveals
that political measures solely aiming to promote demand are insufficient to lower
the unemployment rate. Special programs for unemployed workers are needed to
motivate and help them to get their job skills back or acquire new ones.2 Fur-
ther useful contributions discussing hysteresis in (un)employment include Ayala
et al. 2012, Belke and Go¨cke 1999, Belke and Go¨cke 2001, Belke and Go¨cke 2005,
Cross et al. 2005, Cross and Allan 1988, Lindbeck and Snower 1986, Mota and
Vasconcelos 2012 and Mota et al. 2012.
Hysteresis is usually modeled considering just one market side, either supply
or demand. An interesting contribution to hysteresis literature is Go¨cke and
Werner 2015. Here, the hysteresis phenomenon is modeled in a market model
with both market sides assuming that hysteresis is exhibited on one of the market
2An example of such programs is a project in Lithuania called “Supporting the employment
of the long-term unemployed”, which started in August 2014 and ends in December 2017. The
project is financed by the European Union Structural Funds and Lithuanian government. The
program aims to help the unemployed to acquire and/or improve their job skills and integrate
them in the job market (see LLE 2017). A number of persons have made use of this program
and are now fully integrated in the job market despite their relatively old age.
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sides and caused by an external demand or supply shock (graphically captured as
a shift of the particular non-hysteretic curve). In their model, the input variable
- which is price - becomes endogenous. As a result, both quantity and price
hysteresis can be modeled.
To sum up, there are many determinants of hysteresis, including sunk costs,
uncertainty, learning-by-doing, demand carry-over effects, secular unemployment
associated with losing skills for workers and many more.3 For modeling hysteresis
losses, it is very important to differentiate between the sources of hysteresis in the
particular market. In this manuscript, we model the losses caused and generated
by sunk cost hysteresis and thus measure the hysteresis losses in monetary units.
The hysteresis losses associated with e.g. unemployment hysteresis have another
dimension and modeling such losses requires some modifications of our model,
which is worth discussing yet lies beyond the scope of this manuscript.
3Other potential causes for weak export reactions - e.g, hedging of exchange rate uncertainty,
exporters profile and price elasticity of exports - are briefly discussed in Belke et al. 2013.
Chapter 3
Sunk costs and the concept of
hysteresis
This chapter is based on the following papers: Go¨cke and Matulaityte 2015, and
Adamonis and Go¨cke forthcoming.
3.1 Sunk costs and hysteresis at the firm level
3.1.1 Hysteresis band and the non-ideal relay
First, the simplest form of hysteresis - called “non-ideal relay” (Krasnosel’skii
and Pokrovskii 1989, p. 263) - is considered. In general cases as well as the
special case of international trade, this hysteresis phenomenon occurs due to
sunk entry and exit costs (see Baldwin 1989; Baldwin 1990), which induce a
“band of inaction” related to changes in the economic environment. A firm
observes the development of a forcing variable (e.g. the price level, or - in the
special case of international trade - the exchange rate) and does not change its
economic behavior – i.e. its state of market (in)activity – until the price (or
exchange rate) changes significantly and passes certain trigger values specific to
each (heterogeneous) firm. In other words, a firm delays its entry and exit due
to sunk entry and exit costs. Moreover, once the economic behavior of firm j
has changed (due to large past price changes), it will not completely return to
the initial state, even if the forcing variable (price or exchange rate) returns to
18
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its initial level (see Go¨cke 2002, p. 168). This kind of after-effect is called the
remanence property (see Go¨cke 2002, p. 171). It plays an important role in our
subsequent analysis of the dynamic losses associated with sunk adjustment costs.
Fig. 3.1 illustrates the decision process of a one-product firm j, which can
be described as a “non-ideal relay”. The following explanation of microeconomic
hysteresis follows Belke and Go¨cke 1999. The ordinate in fig. 3.1 captures the
state of activity of firm j or its supply in current period t. The abscissa reflects the
net price received by firms on the market for one unit of the good sold. Depending
on the size of sunk costs, the threshold value for an exit is on the left-hand side
and the threshold value for an entry is on the right-hand side of the variable/unit
costs (marked as point F in fig. 3.1). There are also two potential equilibria
between the exit/entry thresholds. The currently valid equilibrium can only be
determined if the state of activity of a previous period is known. Between the
two triggers, there is a “band of inaction”, since only a move outside this band -
passing one of the triggers - will result in a switch in the state of activity. Thus,
if the market price varies within the hysteresis band, firm j remains in its state,
which can be either active or passive.
Figure 3.1: Non-ideal relay under certainty
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
Thus, the economic behavior of a price taker in period t depends not only on
the price development, but also the previous state of its activity. There are two
states of activity that a firm may have had in the previous period (t-1), namely
passive or active. A passive firm does not produce any goods, so its production
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level is zero (yj,t−1 = 0). An active firm produces one unit of goods (yj,t−1 = 1).
If a firm was passive, it can choose to remain passive or enter the market in a
current period and become active. The firm remains passive as the market price
varies in the interval between zero and the entry trigger. Thus, the supply curve
of a previously passive firm j corresponds to the line OAB in fig. 3.1. However,
if the price rises further so that the entry-trigger value is passed, the firm enters
the market (paying sunk entry costs) and is active. After the entry, the supply
of firm j corresponds to the line EDC (see fig. 3.1) and remains at the same
level as long as the price varies between the exit trigger and infinity. In this case,
the firm does not change its behavior and continues producing. However, as later
on the price falls below the exit trigger, the firm shuts down (pays exit costs),
becoming passive again. The cycle ABDEA represents a complete hysteresis
loop, which can also be described as a switch between different (path-dependent)
supply curves of the firm. In the next section, this adjustment pattern is modeled
explicitly for a simple case of a one-period optimization of a single firm.
3.1.2 Sunk costs in a discrete one-period model
A one-period model - with the firm’s time horizon reduced to the current period
- is the simplest microeconomic perspective on the hysteresis phenomenon. It is
used to formalize and illustrate a firm’s economic behavior taking the changes of a
forcing variable into account. The forcing variable in this model is the price. The
drivers of e.g. food price changes are different supply and demand side shocks,
speculation in commodity prices, exchange rate changes or even tariff and non-
tariff barriers. A firm is able to produce and sell just one product (i.e. it is a
single-product firm) and the sales volume always equals one unit (single-unit).
A real firm producing several units can be seen as fictitiously disaggregated into
single units. Each of them is characterized by a non-ideal relay if sunk costs
are relevant to changing the activity state of the respective unit. Entering and
exiting the market is associated with the sunk entry (kj) and exit (lj) costs. This
induces a difference between the entry and exit threshold prices (pentry and pexit,
respectively). Depending on both the previous and current state of activity, the
following unit cost function of firm j is assumed for the current period t (the
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subsequent explanations in this subchapter follow Go¨cke 2002, p. 170 et sqq.):
Kj,t =

cj, if yj,t = yj,t−1 = 1,
cj + kj, if yj,t = 1, yj,t−1 = 0,
lj, if yj,t = 0, yj,t−1 = 1,
0, if yj,t = yj,t−1 = 0,withcj, kj, lj > 0
(3.1)
cj represents the unit variable costs of firm j, yj,t is the production and sales
volume of firm j within the current period and yj,t−1 is a measure for the sales in
the previous time period. In the case of activity of firm j, the output is normalized
to 1. kj quantifies the sunk entry costs that must be paid for an increase in sales
by this additional unit of production. lj denotes sunk exit costs that must be
paid if sales are reduced by this unit. Consequently, the following output function
of firm j can be written depending on the previous level of production and the
current price level (pt):
yj,t =

1, if yj,t−1 = 1, pt ≥ cj − lj
1, if yj,t−1 = 0, pt ≥ cj + kj
0, if yj,t−1 = 1, pt ≤ cj − lj
0, if yj,t−1 = 0, pt ≤ cj + kj
(3.2)
If firm j did not sell in the previous period and remains inactive in the current
period, there are no costs (fourth line in eq. (3.1)). As eq. (3.2) states, in this
case firm j does not sell as long as the price does not exceed the threshold for an
entry (pentry), which is the sum of the variable and sunk entry costs (fourth line
in eq. (3.2)). However, if firm j encounters a price change stimulating an entry
into the market in period t (second line in eq. (3.2)), it has to pay sunk entry
costs and the variable costs (as described by the second line of eq. (3.1)). After
the entry, it will not exit immediately if the price falls below the entry-trigger
value. Firm j keeps selling unless the price falls below its exit threshold value
(pexit), which is the difference between variable and sunk exit costs. Firm j pays
variable costs cj if it remains active in period t. If the price level decreases below
the exit threshold, the third line of eq. (3.2) becomes valid and firm j leaves the
market, paying only the sunk exit costs (third line in eq. (3.1)).
Thus, firm j has two threshold prices. Market entry results for p > pj,entry =
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cj + kj, and the firm exits the market, if p < pj,exit = cj–lj. Every heterogeneous
firm with its specific cost structure can be characterized by a combination of its
individual thresholds (prices) inducing market entry and/or exit. The distance
between the entry and exit threshold values equals the sum of the sunk entry
and exit costs (kj + lj). This zone is called the “band of inaction” and it is wider
the higher the sunk costs. The firm’s profit maximization problem is solved by
minimizing its costs and contemporaneously optimizing the production intensity,
taking the previous volume of production into account.
The non-ideal relay model illustrated in fig. 3.1 allows for an analysis of only
one element of an aggregate economic system, which comprises a multitude of
heterogeneous units sold on the entire aggregate market. Below, we will present
an adequate aggregation procedure to derive the path-dependent behavior (and
adjustment/hysteresis losses) of an entire market.
3.2 Aggregated hysteresis loop for heterogeneous
firms under certainty
As stated above, every firm j has a specific cost structure that implicates hetero-
geneity in entry and exit thresholds (this means that every firm has an individual
non-ideal relay operator (γˆj,pentrypexit)). In the mathematical Preisach-Mayergoyz-
Krasnosel’skii aggregation procedure (see Preisach 1935; Cross 1993, pp.85; May-
ergoyz 2003, pp. 1; Mayergoyz 2006, pp.293), the non-ideal relay is the elemen-
tary hysteresis operator (Mayergoyz 1986, p.604). It illustrates a micro element
of an aggregate macro system. Based on the Preisach-Mayergoyz-Krasnosel’skii
procedure, we aggregate the supply of heterogeneous firms or sum up firms en-
tering and/or exiting the market following a certain price change. The following
explanations of the aggregation procedure are based on Amable et al. 1991.
Fig. 3.2 contains two entry-exit-trigger diagrams, each with the exit threshold
price variable on the abscissa and the entry price trigger on the ordinate. Each
heterogeneous unit/firm is represented by an individual (pentry; pexit)-point in such
a diagram. The 45°-line represents firms without any sunk adjustment costs, for
which the entry trigger equals the exit threshold value (“non-hysteretic” firms,
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Figure 3.2: Cumulated output changes induced by a positive and a subsequent
negative price shocks
Source: Own representation based on Amable et al. 1991.
with pentry = pexit). The area above the 45°-line captures all of the firms with sunk
adjustment costs (
”
hysteretic“ firms) since for these firms the entry-trigger price
is higher than the exit trigger. The area below the 45°-line represents impossible
combinations of the entry and exit threshold values, since pexit > pentry. The
behavior of every hysteretic firm is assumed to be a non-ideal relay, as illustrated
in fig. 3.1. Given that the output of every active firm is one, the aggregate
output volume corresponds to the number of active firms on the market. Real
firms producing more than one unit can be considered as artificially disaggregated
into single-unit firms, each represented by a point in the diagram. We assume
that all of the firms have the same time horizon and cannot re-enter or re-exit
the market. As a simplification, a continuous uniform distribution1 of firms in
the upper triangle area of the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram is assumed, whereby each
geometrical area in the diagram is proportional to the number of represented
firms.
The left-hand diagram of fig. 3.2 illustrates the cumulated output change
induced by a positive price shock and the right-hand graph shows the effect of a
subsequent negative shock. In case of a positive price change, starting at 0 and
1The distribution of firms in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram determines the curvature of the
aggregated hysteresis loop.
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going up to a maximum M1 (0 → p′ → M1), the triangle area F1 is generated,
representing the cumulated output increase or the number of firms that have
entered the market due to the favorable change of the forcing variable. The
numeric value of the triangle area F1 is:
F1 = ρ · 1
2
· (p′ − 0)2 = ρ · 1
2
· (p′)2 (3.3)
with ρ as a density parameter of the firm distribution inside the area above
the (pentry = pexit)-line and p
′ as a price change if the price increase starts at
0. M1 is the maximum price where the initial price increase has turned around.
The right-hand diagram of fig. 3.2 captures the effect of a later price reduction,
which follows the price increase to M1. Thus, the triangle area F2 represents the
cumulated output reduction or the multitude of firms that have exited the market
after the subsequent price fall from M1 to p
′ (with an absolute price change equal
to a):
F2 = ρ · 1
2
· (M1 − p′)2 = ρ · 1
2
· (a)2 (3.4)
Fig. 3.3 illustrates the aggregate output or the sum of active firms depending
on price changes (0→ p′ →M1 and M1 → p′ → 0).2 This constitutes a complete
aggregate/macro hysteresis loop. The aggregate hysteresis loop has the form
of a lens and comprises an upward- (B1(p
′)) and a downward-leading (B2(p′))
branch. Each part of the macro hysteresis loop in fig. 3.3 corresponds to an
area in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram in fig. 3.2. The upward branch captures the
quantitative effects of a positive price change, whereby every point on this line
can be calculated by means of eq. (3.3). The downward branch captures the
impact of the subsequent negative price change. Each point on this curve can
be quantified via eq. (3.4). Given the uniform distribution of firms, this effect is
again equivalent to a triangle area (as in the case of the initial increase), and the
following relation results:
F2 = B2(M1)−B2(p′) = B1(a) (3.5)
2For a detailed aggregation procedure, see Amable et al. 1991; Go¨cke 2002.
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Figure 3.3: Macroeconomic hysteresis loop resulting from price changes M1 →
0→M1 or 0→M1 → 0
Source: Own representation based on Amable et al. 1991.
The upward branch captures the aggregate output change by increasing prices
and equals the area F1 from fig. 3.2. Thus, the maximum of this upward branch
(point M) resulting from the price increase from 0 to M1 equals:
B1(M1) = ρ · 1
2
· (M1 − 0)2 = ρ · 1
2
·M21 (3.6)
If the price level subsequently falls from M1 to p
′, the number of exit firms or
aggregate supply reduction equals the area F2 in fig. 3.2. The aggregate output
changes resulting from a negative price shock are captured by the part of the
downward branch, going down from point M to B (in fig. 3.3). At point B, the
following level of production results:
B2(p
′) = B1(M1)−B1(M1 − p′) = ρ · 1
2
·M21 − ρ ·
1
2
· a2 (3.7)
In sum, if the price rises from 0 to M1, the aggregated output change is
illustrated by the upward branch going from 0 to B1(M1). The aggregate output
reduction due to the subsequent price fall from M1 to p
′ is captured by the part
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of the downward-leading branch falling from B1(M1) to B2(p
′).
3.3 The shape of the macroeconomic hysteresis
loop
The aggregation procedure illustrated in section 3.2 is based on a uniform dis-
tribution of firms in the Preisach triangle in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram. The
constant density of firms in this triangle is reflected by ρ. The uniform distribu-
tion of firms leads to the hysteresis loop, whose branches are quadratic functions,
since the loops are derived from the areas of triangles. If we further assume a
symmetric course of the hysteresis loop and use z as an additional distribution
density parameter that allows capturing different densities in the Preisach tri-
angle, the upward-leading branch B1(p) in a general case can be formalized as
follows (see eq. (3.6)):
B1(p) = ρ · 1
2
· p2+z (3.8)
In case of a uniform distribution, z = 0. For example, if the density of
firms becomes different in certain parts of the Preisach triangle due to changes
in uncertainty, risk awareness or the extent of the sunk adjustment costs3, z
takes either a negative or positive value depending on the extent and direction
of changes in density. In the following, two different cases will be illustrated: an
increasing and a decreasing density of firms that differently form the hysteresis
loop. In contrast to section 5.3, a case of a complete “depopulation” of firms in
the Preisach triangle leading to a shift of the hysteresis branches is not analyzed
in this section to focus only on the shape of the loop. However, a combination of
both - different distribution densities and the “depopulated” part in the Preisach
triangle is conceivable and - in case of a decreasing density moving from the
45°-line towards the ordinate - more realistic.
As a first scenario, increasing (higher) price entry and decreasing exit trigger
values are considered, resulting in a rising density of firms going orthogonal from
3For a detailed description of the uncertainty effects on firms’ location in the (Pentry/Pexit)
diagram, see section 5.3 and the effects of adjustment cost changes are illustrated in section 9.
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Figure 3.4: Increasing density of firms in the Preisach triangle
the 45°-line towards the ordinate in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram. Such effects can
be caused by e.g. an increase in uncertainty, risk aversion or risen sunk adjust-
ment costs. If the density of firms in the Preisach triangle rises rather than being
constant (as assumed in section 3.2), z takes a positive value (z > 0) (see illus-
tration in fig. 3.4). For example, in a case that z equals 1, the hysteresis loop
becomes a cubic function (see eq. (3.8)). Higher values of z induce higher power
of the loop-functions leading to a more humped shape of the branches.
The second scenario can be caused by e.g. reduction of market entry and exit
barriers, reduced price volatility or risk-seeking among economic agents, leading
to lower market entry and exit triggers and thus a decreasing density of firms
going orthogonal from the 45°-line towards the ordinate. z can take any value
from the interval (-1; 0) inducing a power of loop-branches from the interval (1;
2). The decreasing density of firms in the Preisach triangle is illustrated in fig.
3.5. In the case that with the orthogonal distance from the 45°-line, the density
of firms declines by factor 0.5, the distribution density parameter z equals −0.5
and induces less humped shape of the hysteresis branches.
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Figure 3.5: Decreasing density of firms in the Preisach triangle
3.4 Risk neutrality assumption
The modeling of hysteresis losses in benchmark models in chapters 4 and 5 is
based on the risk neutrality assumption, meaning that the preferences of economic
agents are not affected by uncertainty. The use of this assumption simplifies
the model, but still allows us to identify the main links between certain market
parameters.
Chapter 5 deals with hysteresis losses under uncertainty and shows that solely
due to the stochastic nature of market prices the “band of inaction” of each firm
becomes wider in comparison to the model without risk (see fig. 3.1). This
points to the fact that firms make more cautious decisions, even if we maintain
the risk neutrality assumption. However, such a behavior of risk-neutral firms
is quite comprehensible since each of them has an option to wait and observe
the development of price levels, which is also valuable. In section 5.1, the effects
of uncertainty on the microeconomic “band of inaction” are discussed in further
detail. The main message of this section is that in case of uncertainty not only
the unit variable as well as sunk entry costs but also the option value of waiting
(opportunity costs of the entry decision) must be covered to give firms stimulus to
enter the market. Analogous to this, a firm has an incentive to leave the market
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if the market price is at such a low level that the loss from activity is higher than
the sum of sunk exit costs and the option value of waiting (opportunity costs
of the exit decision). Section 5.1 covers the calculation of the expected present
value of the option to wait for both - active and passive firms. The probability
of a single positive (or negative) price change in the next period is assumed to
be 0.5.
Thus, the cautious behavior of firms results from a quite simple profit calcu-
lation taking both implicit and explicit costs into account. In other words, taking
option value into account (beeing cautious in desicion making) is a consequence of
a risk-neutral maximization of an expected value with the presence of an option.
Chapter 4
Hysteresis losses under certainty
This chapter is based on the following papers: Go¨cke and Matulaityte 2015, and
Adamonis and Go¨cke forthcoming.
4.1 Hysteresis losses in a discrete one-period
microeconomic model
The non-ideal relay model (see fig. 3.1) is now applied to determine the loss
caused by price dynamics that changes the activity state of a firm. This loss
arises due to the sunk costs that a firm has to bear if it changes its production
volume. The entry investment (from a previous period) cannot be used further in
case of an exit and has to be written off. Additionally, sunk exit costs have to be
paid. Thus, the hysteresis loss induced by a complete entry-exit cycle becomes
effective with the market exit. Therefore, starting from a low price level, we need
following price changes to complete a full loading-unloading cycle: a significant
price increase inducing the firm’s entry into the market and a subsequent drastic
price fall passing the exit threshold. I.e. a closed hysteresis loop, such as ABDEA
in fig. 3.1 is required for a hysteresis loss to occur.
The assumption of a single-product and single-unit firm still holds. Therefore,
after every change of activity of firm j, an output change of one unit is observed
(|∆yj|= 1). The area enclosed by the hysteresis loop ABDEA can be quantified
as follows:
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[cj + kj − (cj − lj)] · |∆yj|= kj + lj (4.1)
According to eq. (4.1), the area within the hysteresis loop in the non-ideal
relay model equals the sum of the sunk entry and exit investments. Thus, the
geometric area enclosed by the hysteresis loop - i.e. the area between the triggers
in the non-ideal relay - represents the dynamic loss of a complete entry-exit cycle
in a one-period model under certainty.
4.2 Hysteresis losses in a discrete multi-period
microeconomic model
Following Belke and Go¨cke 1999, the threshold values that stimulate an expansion
or reduction in production are now calculated based on a multi-period optimiza-
tion. The non-ideal relay model presented in the previous sections is used again.
The present value (Vj,t) from the activity of firm j in the current period and
expected for the infinite future is now a sum of two components – the profit in
period t (Rj,t) and the present value of annuity due to future revenues - whereby
the latter is discounted by the factor δ = 1
1+i
with an interest rate i (Belke and
Go¨cke 1999, pp. 265):
Vj,t = Rj,t +
1
1 + i
· Vj,t+1 (4.2)
The operating profit in the current period (Rj,t) can be calculated as the
difference between revenue and operating costs (see eq. (4.3)). The latter depends
on the sales volume of firm j, which can either be higher (lower) than in previous
period (t − 1) and include the sunk entry (exit) costs in addition to the unit
variable costs, or it can be unchanged compared to the past production and
contain no sunk adjustment costs. Given that firm j can either produce one unit
or be inactive, the following current profit results in:
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Rj,t =

pt − cj − kj, if yj,t = 1 > yj,t−1 = 0
pt − cj, if yj,t = yj,t−1 = 1
−lj, if yj,t = 0 < yj,t−1 = 1
(4.3)
We assume that firm j expects the same price as in the current period for the
entire infinite future, whereby the time indices for price and operating costs can
be omitted. Thus, the present value of future profits can be calculated as follows:
δ · Vj,t+1 =
{
δ·(p−cj)
1−δ , if yj,t−1 < yj,t = yj,t+1, with δ =
1
1+i
0, if yj,t < yj,t−1
(4.4)
Eq. (4.4) captures two scenarios: [1] entry in t, followed by a positive (ex-
pected) present value of future profits, which is the discounted value of operating
profit as an annuity; or [2] exit in t followed by zero future profits. Therefore,
in case of an entry in t, the benefit of firm j is the sum of the operating profit
and the present value of future profits in t + 1 (see first line in eq. (4.5)). The
operating profit of a firm entering the market is defined in the first line of eq.
(4.3). If a previously-active firm j remains active in t and t+ 1, it does not have
to pay sunk adjustment costs in any period and the annual profit of firm j is
defined in the second line of eq. (4.5). If firm j exits the market in t, it has
neither an operating nor any future profits. However, it experiences sunk exit
costs (see the last line in eq. (4.5)).
Vj,t = Rj,t + δ · Vj,t+1 =

p−cj−(1−δ)kj
1−δ , if yj,t−1 < yj,t = yj,t+1
p−cj
1−δ , if yj,t−1 = yj,t = yj,t+1
−lj, if yj,t−1 > yj,t
(4.5)
Firm j enters the market or expands in production at time t (first case of eq.
(4.5)) if the present value from activity (Vj,t) by entry in t is positive:
p−cj−(1−δ)kj
1−δ > 0 ⇒ pentry = cj + (1− δ)kj (4.6)
Thus, on the one hand, for a previously-inactive firm a price above pentry (see
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eq. (4.6)) stimulates an expansion in production at time t. On the other hand,
firm j leaves the market if its loss from continuing production exceeds the loss
from shutting down. Therefore, the exit threshold is calculated by:
p−cj
1−δ < −lj ⇒ pexit = cj − (1− δ)lj (4.7)
If the price falls below pexit (see eq. (4.7)), firm j reduces its production. If we
look back at fig. 3.1 and substitute the trigger values from the one-period model
by the trigger values defined in eqs. (4.6) and (4.7), a modified hysteresis band
results. In the one-period model, it was shown that the hysteresis loss equals the
geometric area inside the non-ideal relay loop between the triggers. This area
can be computed as follows:
(1− δ)(kj + lj)· | ∆yj |= (1− δ)(kj + lj) (4.8)
This expression can be interpreted as the interest costs on the sunk entry
investment and exit disinvestment. Compared to the sum of sunk costs (kj + lj)
as the actual dynamic loss if an entire entry and exit cycle is run through, the area
inside the non-ideal relay loop now is not equivalent but only proportional to the
hysteresis loss: the geometric area inside the loop has to be divided by (1–δ) ≈ i,
or multiplied by 1/(1–δ) ≈ 1/i. The multiplier typically has a value higher than
1. Thus, due to multi-period optimization, the hysteresis loss is typically larger
than the area inside the hysteresis loop.
4.3 Aggregation of hysteresis losses with het-
erogeneous firms in entry-exit cycles
The aim of this section - as one of the most important contributions of this study
- is to cumulate the hysteresis losses (lj + kj) of all exiting firms j = 1, 2, . . . , N
during a price cycle 0 → (p > pentry) → (p < pexit). For reasons of simplicity,
the interpretation of the aggregation procedure is based on the one-period model
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introduced in section 3.1. The assumptions made in section 3.1 still hold.1As
stated above, the sunk entry and exit costs are presumed to be written off after
the market exit has come about. Thus, only the effect of a subsequent negative
shock following a previous positive shock is relevant for calculating hysteresis
losses based on the cumulating procedure. The dynamic loss in economics can
be modeled in a similar way as the hysteresis loss in magnetization (Mayergoyz
2003, pp. 50). The basis for this is the feasibility of a geometric interpretation of
the sunk entry and exit costs as depicted in fig. 4.1. The latter has a structure
similar to fig. 3.2: the ordinate captures the entry trigger and the abscissa the
exit trigger. The 45°-line represents the “non-hysteretic” firms, while
”
hysteretic“
firms are all located in the triangle above the 45°-line. Point A illustrates the
non-ideal relay of a particular hysteretic firm j with the sunk entry and exit
costs (kj and lj respectively), the variable costs cj and the resulting entry and
exit price triggers pj,entry and pj,exit. A (hypothetical) non-hysteretic firm with
entry/exit trigger cj is represented by point B if it has the same variable costs
as the hysteretic firm j but no sunk costs. The existence of the sunk entry costs
(kj) leads to the shift of a firm’s vertical position upwards by an extent of kj and
results in a higher entry-trigger value (pj,entry > cj). This is illustrated by an
upward arrow starting at point B. Due to the sunk exit costs (lj) the horizontal
position of a sunk exit cost firm is shifted to the left by an extent of lj. This is
illustrated by the solid arrow starting at point B and pointing to the left. This
shifts the hysteretic firm’s point A to a lower exit price trigger (pj,exit < cj).
Thus, the inclusion of sunk (dis)investments allocates firm j from point B to
A. The higher the sum of the sunk costs, the further from the 45°-line a firm
is located and the larger the difference in its economic behavior in comparison
to the “non-hysteretic” firms located on the 45°-line. Consequently, both the
vertical and the horizontal distance between point A and the 45°-line equals the
sum of sunk entry and exit investments. This distance can also be calculated as
the difference between the entry and exit triggers of the firm j. It is the hysteresis
loss of this firm, if a price cycle leads to an entry and later an exit of this firm:
1One-product and one-unit firms with the same time horizon and no possibility to re-enter
or re-exit the market are assumed.
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Figure 4.1: Sunk costs of firm j in the Pentry/Pexit-diagram
pj,entry − pj,exit = cj + kj − (cj − lj) = kj + lj (4.9)
However, if the multi-period model forms the basis of the aggregation, a pro-
portional correction factor based on the interest cost rate ( 1
1−δ ) has to be applied
to determine the hysteresis losses (see eq. (4.8) in section 4.2) of exit firms. Since
we want to keep the aggregation process as simple as possible, the one-period mi-
cro model is used in the following to interpret the aggregation procedure results.
Fig. 4.2 comprises two graphs, where the right-hand diagram is used to inter-
pret a part of the left-hand diagram. The (Pentry/Pexit) diagram illustrates firms
exiting the market owing to the price reduction from M1 to p
′ as a scatter plot.
Every vertical point line in the left graph in fig. 4.2 (e.g. point line RS) represents
a continuum of firms with a different extent of hysteresis loss (pentry − pexit) and
an exit trigger that is larger than p′. The right-hand graph in fig. 4.2 captures
the relation between the hysteresis loss and the entry trigger. Point S in this
graph corresponds to point S in the left-hand diagram. The dashed area in the
right-hand graph represents the cumulated hysteresis loss of all firms located on
the line RS in the left-hand (Pentry/Pexit) diagram. The quantitative expression
for the dashed area is:
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F = ρ ·
∫ M1
p′
(M1 − p)dp = ρ · 1
2
· (M1 − p′)2 (4.10)
Thus, in order to sum up the hysteresis loss of all heterogeneous firms on a
certain vertical line in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram, a “vertical integration” over
pentry must be executed.
Figure 4.2: Cumulation of hysteresis losses in Pentry/Pexit diagram after a price
reduction M1 → p′
The cumulated hysteresis loss H of all firms located on any vertical line in the
left-hand graph in fig. 4.2 can be calculated using the same expression as in eq.
(4.10) for different levels of p. In this example, all of the relevant p-values are in
the interval [p′;M1] (see fig. 4.2). Therefore, in order to calculate the hysteresis
loss of all firms in the area F2 (see the left-hand graph in fig. 4.2), a subsequent
“horizontal integration” (over pexit) of all vertical lines in (Pentry/Pexit) diagram
over different prices (p) in the aforementioned interval has to be executed:
H =
∫ M1
p′
ρ · 1
2
· (M1 − p)2dp = ρ
6
(M1 − p′)3 (4.11)
Now we return to the hysteresis loop derived in section 3.2 and illustrated by
fig. 3.3 to graphically interpret the hysteresis loss calculated in eq. (4.11). Fig.
4.3 depicts the aggregated output depending on price variations. The illustrated
loop is the closed loop generated by the price changes 0 → M1 → p′ → 0. The
right-hand graph is simply an optically-enlarged upper part of the hysteresis loop
on the left-hand side. If the system passes through the complete hysteresis loop,
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the hysteresis loss H is graphically represented by the geometrical area enclosed
by the loop (see Mayergoyz 2003, p. 50) as illustrated in fig. 4.3a.
Figure 4.3: Hysteresis loss as an area enclosed by the maximum (extreme) loop
Source: Own representation based on Amable et al. 1991 and Mayergoyz 2003.
However, if the loop is not closed given that the forcing variable does not
completely change back to the initial level 0 but only decreases to the level p′
as illustrated in fig. 4.2, the hysteresis loss can be graphically interpreted by
fictitiously assuming an artificially-closed “inside” loop. This can be done if a
subsequent fictitious prices increase from p′ back to the maximum M1 is assumed.
As a result of this fictitious price cycle M1 → p′ → M1, a small (inside) loop is
generated enclosing the area H1, which represents the hysteresis loss induced by
the price change 0 → M1 → p′. According to eq. (3.5), the parity of the areas
F3 and F5 can be claimed, where F3 and F5 are the squared areas and F4 is the
whole dashed area in fig. 4.3b. Consequently, the lens-shaped hysteresis loss (H1)
can be computed as the difference between F4 and F3. The area F4 is an integral
of the downward-leading branch B2(p) in the interval [p
′;M1] minus the area of
the rectangle Ap′M1C. The downward branch B2(p) corresponds to the area F2
specified in eq. (3.4).
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F4 = [
∫ M1
p′
B2(p)dp]−B2(p′) · (M1 − p′) = ρ
3
· (M1 − p′)3 (4.12)
The area F3 can be quantified as an integral of an upward branch B1(p) in
the interval [0; a]. The upward branch B1(p) corresponds to the area F1 specified
in eq. (3.3).
F3 =
∫ a
0
B1(p)dp =
∫ M1−p′
0
(ρ · 1
2
· p2)dp = ρ
6
· (M1 − p′)3 (4.13)
Therefore, the area H1 in fig. 4.3 is quantified as follows:
H1 = F4 − F3 = ρ
3
· (M1 − p′)3 − ρ
6
· (M1 − p′)3 = ρ
6
· (M1 − p′)3 (4.14)
The equality between eq. (4.11) and eq. (4.14) confirms the correctness of
the hysteresis loss interpretation as an area inside the hysteresis loop. Fig. 4.4
provides an example with three price changes of different extents: M1 → p1,
M1 → p2 and M1 → p3.
As stated above, in order to determine the hysteresis loss graphically, we have
to imagine an artificially closed inner loop. This can be achieved by adding the
fictitious loop that leads back to the initial maximum M1. By doing so, fictitious
inner loops (lenses) are generated for every potential price reduction. Thus, H1
is the lens capturing the hysteresis loss in case of a price reduction to p1, H2
represents the lens with a hysteresis loss after a price change to p2 and H3 is the
hysteresis loss resulting from a price reduction to p3. If the price fell completely
back to 0, the whole area inside the outer maximum loop would describe the
hysteresis loss of this complete (0→M1 → 0) cycle of the price level.
As is obvious from eq. (4.14) and the illustration of the hysteresis loss lenses
in fig. 4.4, the size of this loss - as a cubic function of the price variation (M1–p
′)
- increases by degree 3 if we assume a uniform distribution (ρ) of firms in the
(Pentry/Pexit) diagram. For instance, doubling [or tripling] the size of a price
cycle (p′ → M1 → p′) results in an increase of the generated hysteresis loss by
a factor 8 [or 27]. Thus, large economic fluctuations generate disproportionately
high dynamic adjustment costs.
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Figure 4.4: Hysteresis losses generated by different price changes under certainty
Source: Own representation based on Amable et al. 1991 and Mayergoyz 2003.
4.4 Macroeconomic hysteresis losses and the shape
of the hysteresis loop
If we combine what has been worked out in sections 3.3 and 4.3 (see eqs. (3.8) and
(4.14)), we are able to discuss the extent of hysteresis losses taking distribution
density of firms in the Preisach triangle into account.
Fig. 4.5 illustrates three cases with different density of firms in the Preisach
triangle: a decreasing density with −1 < z < 0, a uniform distribution with z = 0
and an increasing density with z > 0.
In fig. 4.5b, we see a hysteresis loop resulting from the assumption of a
uniform distribution in the Preisach triangle (z = 0) as in the benchmark model
in sections 3.2 and 4.3. Here, the hysteresis branches are quadratic and the
resulting dynamic losses are cubic functions of the price variation (M1 − p′) (see
eq. (4.14)).
A decreasing density of firms in a Preisach triangle is illustrated in fig. 3.5 in
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Figure 4.5: Hysteresis losses depending on different distribution of firms in the
Preisach triangle
Note: z captures an additional distribution density parameter that allows
capturing different densities in the Preisach triangle; n reflects the exponent of
the hysteresis branches B1(p) and B2(p).
section 3.3. The negative value of z leads to an exponent of branches that can
take any value from the interval (1; 2) which is lower than in our benchmark case
with uniform distribution and z = 0. The lower exponent is associated with a less
humped shape of the branches. As a consequence, hysteresis branches with lower
exponent enclose smaller areas (hysteresis regions) and generate lower hysteresis
losses after negative price changes, since hysteresis losses are proportional or in a
very special case with one-period optimization under certainty even equal the area
inside the hysteresis loop (analogous to magnetism in physics) (see Mayergoyz
2003, p. 50). The case of decreasing density of firms is illustrated in fig. 4.5a.
Fig. 4.5c illustrates hysteresis losses in case of an increasing density of firms
in the Preisach triangle with distribution density parameter z > 0 (see fig. 3.4).
In this particular case, the exponent of hysteresis branches is higher than 2 and
encloses larger areas than in case of a uniform distribution due to the more
humped shape of the branches, leading to very high hysteresis losses.
This section makes clear that influencing the shape of the hysteresis loop - or
more precisely, the distribution density of firms in the Preisach triangle - enables
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us to control the extent of hysteresis losses. At the micro level this indicates the
influence on the width of the “band of inaction” of each (potentially) active firm.
Such economic policy is discussed in detail in chapter 9.
Chapter 5
Hysteresis losses under
uncertainty
This chapter is based on the following papers: Go¨cke and Matulaityte 2015, and
Adamonis and Go¨cke forthcoming.
5.1 Effects of uncertainty on the width of hys-
teresis band in a one-period microeconomic
model
In the previous sections, it was assumed that the firms ignore the uncertain
stochastic nature of the future price level when they decide about market entry
or exit. However, if the price is stochastic, a real option approach applies. For
example, an inactive firm deciding on a present entry has to consider the alterna-
tive option of a later entry. A current price level that covers costs may decrease
in the future, and by remaining passive the firm can avoid future losses for this
potential future situation. Moreover, a current entry eliminates the option to en-
ter later and “wait-and-see” whether the future price will prove favorable. As a
result, in addition to the sunk costs, an option value of waiting has to be covered
to trigger an entry. Thus, uncertainty implies an upward shift of the entry-trigger
price. The opportunity of a market entry is analogous to an American call option,
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which can be defined as a right to buy a stock at a present strike price (see Dixit
1992). In our model, the sunk entry investments represent the “strike price” of
the market entry. Intrinsically, the option has a value of waiting, called a “hold-
ing premium” (Dixit 1992, p. 116). Entering the market eliminates this option
and causes the loss of the “holding premium” representing the opportunity costs
of the entry decision. This only offers an incentive to enter the market if this loss
is covered by future profits. Analogously, a disinvestment (market exit) is com-
parable with an American put option (Belke and Go¨cke 1999, p. 263). Therefore,
the existence of uncertainty requires a correction in modeling the hysteresis losses
that takes these option effects into account. Dixit 1989 models entry and exit
decisions in a stochastic situation assuming a Brownian motion of a price level,
which is a standard assumption in the option pricing theory. Even more simple,
we assume that in the next period a single change in the price level will happen,
which can either be positive (+ε) or negative (–ε) with the same probability of
0.5. Rest of this chapter follows Belke and Go¨cke 2005. The firm only antici-
pates the effects of stochastic variations on the next entry (or exit) decision. A
later re-exit (or re-entry) due to ongoing stochastic fluctuations is not considered
for reasons of simplicity. The option value for an individual firm j depends on
its previous state of activity. Thus, we have to analyze the behavior of both a
previously-active and -passive firm. In the first case, a previously-active firm j
has to decide between an immediate exit in t and staying active in t with an
option to exit in the future (t+ 1) if the price change is unfavorable ([−ε] - real-
ization). Using the same notation as in previous sections, the following expected
present value of a “wait-and-see” (value of a put option) strategy results:
Et(V
wait
j,t |yj,t−1 = 1) = (p− cj)− (
1
2
· δ · lj) + (1
2
· δ · p+ ε− cj
1− δ ) (5.1)
The first expression in parentheses is the current profit from remaining active,
the second captures the probability-weighted and discounted sunk exit costs in
case of a [−ε] – realization (leading to an exit in t+1) and the last one represents
a probability-weighted present value of the annuity resulting from a future con-
tinuation of activity in case of a [+ε] – realization. A firm is indifferent between
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an immediate exit and waiting if the expected present value equals the payment
resulting from the exit costs (–lj). Solving this equation results in the following
exit trigger:
puj,exit = cj − (1− δ) · lj −
δ · ε
2− δ (5.2)
By combining eqs. (4.7) and (5.2), the relationship between the exit trigger
values under certainty and under uncertainty become obvious:1
puj,exit = p
c
j,exit −
ε
1 + 2i
(5.3)
If we now consider a previously-passive firm j that has to decide between an
immediate entry in t and remaining passive in t with an option to enter in the
future if the price change is favorable ([+ε] - realization), the following expected
present value of a “wait-and-see” strategy results:
Et(V
wait
j,t |yj,t−1 = 0) = −(
1
2
· δ · kj) + (1
2
· δ · p+ ε− cj
1− δ ) (5.4)
The first expression in parentheses captures the probability-weighted and dis-
counted sunk entry costs in case of the [+ε] – realization (leading to an entry in
t + 1), while the second one represents the probability-weighted and discounted
annuity value resulting from an entry in t+ 1.
The expected value of an immediate entry in t is:
Et(V
entry
j,t ) = −kj +
p− cj
1− δ (5.5)
The firm is indifferent between remaining passive and entering the market if
both expected present values are equal [Et(V
wait
j,t ) = Et(V
entry
j,t )], resulting in the
following entry-trigger value:
puj,entry = cj + (1− δ) · kj +
δ · ε
2− δ (5.6)
Combining eqs. (4.6) and (5.6), the following relationship between the entry-
trigger values under certainty and uncertainty results:
1The discount factor δ equals 1(1+i) .
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puj,entry = p
c
j,entry +
ε
1 + 2i
(5.7)
5.2 Hysteresis losses in a discrete multi-period
model
As the simple model has shown (see eqs. (5.3) and (5.7)), the presence of uncer-
tainty and the associated option value effects shift the entry trigger upwards/to
the right and the exit trigger downwards/to the left (see fig. 5.1). This widens
the “band of inaction”. Fig. 5.1 (which is an extension of fig. 3.1) illustrates two
complete hysteresis loops: one under certainty (with threshold values pcj,entry and
pcj,exit) and one under uncertainty (with p
u
j,entry and p
u
j,exit).
Figure 5.1: Non-ideal relay and hysteresis losses under (un)certainty
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2005.
Under certainty, the area inside the loop is proportional to the hysteresis loss.
In case of uncertainty, we derive a different result. If we define the stochastic part
of each trigger value as u ≡ ε
1+2i
, (see eqs. (5.3) and (5.7)), the area enclosed by
the uncertainty loop FU (which is the whole area between puexit and p
u
entry in fig.
5.1 equals:
FU = (1− δ) · (kj + lj) + 2u = (1− δ) ·H + 2u (5.8)
Thus, the inclusion of stochastic effects increases the area inside the non-ideal
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relay loop relative to the sum of the sunk costs H. Since a “wait-and-see” strategy
in a stochastic environment sometimes prevents sunk entry and exit costs from
actually being written off, option value effects reduce dynamic hysteresis losses
H in relation to the area inside the hysteresis loop. The area inside the loop is no
longer proportional to the hysteresis loss. In this regard, our model differs from
the original (non-stochastic) case of hysteresis losses in ferromagnetism.
5.3 Aggregated hysteresis loop of heterogeneous
firms under uncertainty
In this section, the effects of uncertainty on the aggregation of heterogeneous firms
(see fig. 5.1) are shown following Belke and Go¨cke 2005. In order to illustrate this
problem, again we will use (Pentry/Pexit) diagrams capturing all hysteretic firms
in an area above the 45°-line (see fig. 5.2). For reasons of simplicity, in order
to illustrate the principal effects of uncertainty on the aggregation procedure, we
explicitly analyze only a simplified situation: we assume that all firms are affected
by sunk costs, whereby there are no firms on the 45°-line. Moreover, all firms
are assumed to be affected by uncertainty in the same way, resulting in the same
widening effect on the band of inaction for all firms. Fig. 5.2 is an extension of
fig. 3.2 and illustrates the aggregate effects of an inclusion of the option value
effects (as calculated by the simple stochastic model above). Widening the “band
of inaction” of each firm by 2u (see fig. 5.1) due to uncertainty means that the
coordinate system of the entry-exit diagram with all hysteretic firms has to be
shifted to the left by u and upwards by u to account for the “outward” shifts
in both triggers. This results in a horizontal shift of the 45°-line by 2u or an
orthogonal shift by u
√
2. The resulting area between the 45°-line and the shifted
triangle area is now “depopulated” (i.e. there are no hysteretic firms that would
enter or exit the market if the market price varies within this area).
If we compare figs. 3.2 and 5.2, it becomes obvious that under uncertainty
both positive and negative output changes of the same extent as under certainty
require a larger price change, or - vice versa - for a given price change the output
reaction is weaker. For example, under certainty, the maximal output gain F1 (see
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Figure 5.2: Cumulated output changes induced by price changes under uncer-
tainty
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2005.
fig. 3.2a)) results if the price rises from 0 to M1. However, if the stochastic nature
of prices is taken into account, a price increase from p = 0 to p = M1 results in an
output change under uncertainty FU1 which is comparable to the reaction under
certainty for a price increase only up to p = (M1–u) (see squared triangle in fig.
5.2a). The reaction of a subsequent negative price shock under uncertainty is also
weakened by option effects. For example, for a subsequent price decrease from
M1 to p
′ the output reduction is described by the small squared triangle area
FU2 instead of F2, as in the case of certainty (see fig. 3.2b)). For a small price
decrease (smaller than the option value effect u), there would even be no negative
reaction of the output. The aggregate reaction shows similarities to “play” (or
“backlash”) phenomena (as known from mechanics or engineering).
The output gain under uncertainty after a price increase from 0 to M1 (see
fig. 5.2a)), described by triangle FU1 , and adjusted by the density parameter ρ is:
FU1 = ρ ·
1
2
· (M1 − u)2 (5.9)
If the market price subsequently falls from the local maximum to p′, the
output loss under uncertainty equals the density-adjusted triangle area FU2 (see
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fig. 5.2b)):
FU2 = ρ ·
1
2
· (M1 − 2u− p′)2 (5.10)
Fig. 5.3 schematically illustrates the effects of uncertainty on the aggregated
behavior of firms (hysteresis loop) for all prices in the interval [0;M1]. The
aggregation procedure is analogous to that described in section 3.2. As a result
of the inclusion of uncertainty, the downward-leading branch (B2(p)) shifts to
the left and the upward-leading branch (B1(p)) shifts to the right, each by the
absolute extent of u. The dotted lines illustrate the hysteresis loop in the case
of certainty and the solid lines represent the hysteresis loop under uncertainty if
option effects are considered.
Figure 5.3: Macro hysteresis loop including option value effects
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2005.
5.4 Aggregated hysteresis losses of heterogeneous
firms
As fig. 5.4 in combination with fig. 5.2 illustrates, a price increase from 0 to M1
now changes the aggregate output by y = ρ · 1
2
(M1 − u)2, which is remarkably
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smaller than in the case of no option value effects. Fig. 5.4 provides some exam-
ples of hysteresis losses associated with a subsequent price decrease of different
extents: M1 → p0, M1 → p1 and M1 → p2. If the price falls only slightly from
maximum M1 (by less than the option value effect of uncertainty u) to p0, there
are no hysteretic firms in this “play” area that exit the market. Firms only start
to leave the market if the market price falls below p0 (i.e. by more than u).
The resulting hysteresis losses under uncertainty can be calculated analogous to
hysteresis losses under certainty (see section 4.3). Assuming a price fall from M1
to the level p′ (corresponding to p′ in fig. 3.3, 4.2 and 4.3) the following function
capturing the hysteresis losses results:
H =
{
ρ
6
· (M1 − 2u− p′)3, if (M1 − 2u− p′) > 0
0, if else
(5.11)
As the second case of eq. (5.11) captures and fig. 5.4 illustrates, (analogous
to “backlash” in mechanics) “play” areas for price changes of an extent of 2u
arise due to option value effects. In such areas, no hysteresis losses occur, since
due to a wait-and-see strategy no firm will actually leave the market. However,
if a positive price shock is followed by a price reduction larger than 2u (in fig.
5.4 for a market price lower than p0), hysteresis losses are generated and can
be graphically illustrated and interpreted analogous to fig. 4.4. However, in
the case of substantial uncertainty effects, the resulting hysteresis loss areas are
considerably reduced, due to the trimming by the “play” area (by 2u).
Even, if the market price for their products is negative (which is theoreti-
cally conceivable), some firms will remain active in the market because the firms
consider an expected potential positive price change, hoping not to experience
hysteresis losses.
In sum, an inclusion of uncertainty effects results in a “play” area in which
no hysteresis losses (and actually no quantitative output reactions) are generated
due to waiting. The size of this inaction area is positively correlated with the
degree of uncertainty (in our extremely simple model, the size of play 2u is even
in a linear way related to the size ε of the stochastic shock). In other words,
when the stochastic nature of prices is taken into account, firms become more
cautious and delay their entry and exit decisions. On the one hand, declining
50 CHAPTER 5. HYSTERESIS LOSSES UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Figure 5.4: Hysteresis losses generated by different price changes under uncer-
tainty
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2005 and Mayergoyz
2003.
prices generate smaller hysteresis losses since the exit triggers are lower under
uncertainty, but on the other hand, a certain output gain requires a higher price
increase, which makes economic reactions under uncertainty more “sticky” at the
micro and the aggregate level.
Chapter 6
Linear hysteresis curve, its
dynamics and hysteresis losses
indicator
6.1 Preisach triangle and dynamics of the hys-
teresis curve
In this section, the Preisach aggregation procedure is discussed in further detail
and in a slightly more complex context than in section 3.2. The aim is to stress
important properties of hysteresis that are related to the aggregation process,
discuss the dynamics of the hysteresis curve and build the basis for the linear
approximation of the hysteresis loop. The aggregation is proceeded assuming a
certain economic environment. Rather than using only two price changes like
in section 3.2 due to simplicity, in the following several price changes of dif-
ferent extents and directions are considered. The method used for aggregation
of micro hysteresis is again based on the Preisach model of hysteresis, whose
idea/assumption is that an economy comprises many heterogeneous agents that
react discontinuously to the shocks as illustrated in section 3.1.
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Figure 6.1: Active and inactive economic agents under volatile a price level
Source: Own representation according to Amable et al. 1991
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Following Belke and Go¨cke 2001, pp. 184 et seq., an example with five changes
of the input variable p(t) is considered.1 The following price changes are assumed:
p0 → p1 ↑→ p2 ↑→ p3 ↓→ p4 ↓→ p5 ↑. Fig. 6.1 comprises five Pentry/Pexit dia-
grams, each capturing single price changes. Altogether, they provide a geometric
interpretation of how the activity of heterogeneous economic agents is aggregated
if the market price varies from p0 to p5. As a result, a macro hysteresis loop is
generated capturing the aggregated output of all active firms (see fig. 6.3).
We start the aggregation procedure in an initial situation with the price level
p0 and assume that the number of initially active firms can be interpreted as a
hatched area of a triangle captured in fig. 6.1a. and marked as S+. At first, the
market price rises to p1 meaning a positive albeit quite moderate change of the
input variable and thus inducing a weak reaction of economic agents, whereby
only a small set of firms additionally enter the market (this set corresponds to the
grey triangle marked as S+1 ). As a result, the number of active firms rises from
S+ to (S+ + S+1 ). In the next period, the market price keeps rising to the level
p2 dominating the previous price change and persuades additional firms whose
entry thresholds are favorably passed to enter the market (see grey area in fig.
6.1b., marked with S+2 ). The sum of both - hatched and grey areas captures the
number of all currently-active firms.
Part c of fig. 6.1 illustrates the price fall from p2 to p3 inducing the exit of
firms located in the blue triangle S−3 . The result is a lower number of active
firms (corresponds to the remaining hatched area). If the price level drops to
p4 as captured in fig. 6.1d., a very high fraction of all active agents in the
Preisach triangle leave the market (S−4 ), which results in a low aggregate output
represented by the hatched area.
The last diagram captures a positive yet quite weak economic reaction due to a
small subsequent price increase to p5.
2 The red line in this diagram represents the
so-called interface (L(t)) of the Preisach triangle, which is shaped by extremum
values (both - positive and negative) of an input pt during previous periods. As
already mentioned in previous chapters, information about the past is essential
to determine the right actual equilibrium. L(t) contains information about all
1Please note that this section builds on section 3.2.
2For further explanations, see Amable et al. 1991, p. 10 ff.
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non-dominated past extremum values of the input variable and determines an
instantaneous value of output.
This mathematical Preisach-Mayergoyz-Krasnosel’skii aggregation procedure
obviously does not accumulate all (extremum) input values; rather, some of them
are wiped out if they are dominated by following extremum values of the same
direction (wiping-out-property of hysteresis) (see Mayergoyz 1986, p. 605). In the
latter example, the price change to p1 was dominated by the subsequent change
in the same direction to p2 and thus wiped out. The price decrease to p3 was
dominated by an even higher subsequent decrease to p4. Therefore, neither p1
nor p3 play a part in contributing to the shape of the interface (Lt).
In case of an aggregation process based on more price changes and more local
extremum values, an interface L(t) with more stairs would result, as schematically
illustrated in fig. 6.2a. Here, T denotes the Preisach triangle. The area above
the interface captures inactive (S−(t)) and the area below it illustrates active
firms or the aggregate output (S+(t)). In order to have a simple initial situation
as illustrated in fig. 6.1, the staircase interface can be approximated by a linear
one, as shown in fig. 6.2b.
Figure 6.2: Aggregated activity of heterogeneous economic agents
Source: Own representation according to Amable et al. 1991
Economic reactions illustrated in fig. 6.1 that depend on the historical devel-
opment of output are summarized in a familiar price-output diagram in fig. 6.3
with the price variable on the abscissa: A is our initial situation; a price change
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p0 → p1 ↑ is accompanied by a weak supply reaction A→ B, which we quantified
as S+1 in fig. 6.1a.; a further price increase p1 → p2 ↑ induces a strong output
reaction B → C, which corresponds to the area S+2 in fig. 6.1b.; a following price
fall p2 → p3 ↓ evokes a small decrease in output C → D and p3 → p4 ↓ causes
a huge drop in supply (D → E), for comparison see correspondingly S−3 and S−4
in fig. 6.1. The reaction of a moderate positive price change to p5 only generates
a small positive output reaction (E → F ). As a result, a macro hysteresis loop
ABCDEF is generated.
Figure 6.3: Macroeconomic hysteresis loop under volatile price level
Source: Own representation according to Belke and Gros 1998.
In sum, macro hysteresis exhibits two qualitative properties, namely previously-
mentioned wiping-out and congruency properties. According to Mayergoyz’s the-
orem, these properties constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
hysteresis transducer to be represented by the formal model in eq. (6.1) and
geometrically interpreted as in fig. 6.3. The form of the hysteresis loop - which
is illustrated in fig. 6.3 - is based on the congruency property of a hysteresis
transducer. This indicates that “all hysteresis loops corresponding to the same
extremum values of input are congruent” (see Mayergoyz 1986, p. 605.)
Thus, during the aggregation procedure we sum up individual reactions (pentry; pexit)
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of an infinite set of economic agents (γˆj,pentry ;pexit) on input (pt) over time (t), using
an arbitrary weight function µ. The model can be formally expressed as follows:3
f(t) = Γˆu(t) =
∫∫
pentry≥pexit
µ(pentrypexit)γˆjpentrypexit
p(t)dpentrydpexit (6.1)
The required condition for this function is pentry ≥ pexit, which means that
the entry threshold value of price (pentry) must be at least as high as the exit
price value (pexit). Geometrically, it means that we aggregate output of those
firms located in the Preisach triangle (between the ordinate and the 45°- line in
the first quadrant of the coordinate system).
Based on the positive or negative nature of external shocks, respectively active
(γˆjpentrypexit = 1) or passive (γˆjpentrypexit = 0) states of an economic agent are
induced if we still use the one-product and one-unit microeconomic model (see
section 3.1). As a result, eq. (6.1) accumulating the overall output can be
expressed as follows (Mayergoyz 1986, p. 605):
f(t) = Γˆu(t) =
∫∫
S+(t)
µ(pentrypexit)γˆjpentrypexit
p(t)dpentrydpexit (6.2)
S+(t) again captures a set of active economic agents that are placed under
the interface L(t) in the Preisach triangle T in fig. 6.2.
6.2 Play hysteresis
Along the lines of mechanical play in physics, Belke and Go¨cke 2001 worked
out a linear approximation of the macroeconomic hysteresis dynamics capturing
strong and weak economic reactions, the so-called play hysteresis. The aim was
to simplify the macroeconomic hysteresis approach and to make it feasible for
an empirical analysis. Based on play-hysteresis, an algorithm was developed,
allowing an empirical investigation of hysteretic systems by implementing it in a
3Mayergoyz 1986, p. 604 derives a mathematical model to describe macro hysteresis in
ferromagnetism. Amable et al. 1991 and Cross 1993 import this model to economics and apply
it in an analysis of foreign trade.
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regression framework. The following explanations of play hysteresis and Belke-
Go¨cke algorithm are based on Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
Figure 6.4: Play hysteresis: linear spurt lines and constant play width
Source: Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
Fig. 6.4 illustrates a geometric interpretation of play hysteresis with a con-
stant distance between the two steep lines (area of weak reactions). The model
contains two steep lines: an upward-leading spurt up and a downward-leading
spurt down, as well as many flatter lines, which have constant length and are
located between the two steep lines in the “play area”. Both spurt lines induce
strong reactions of supply on even small price changes, whereas only a moderate
reaction can be observed in the play area, which is the result of wait-and-see
strategies of individual firms (see chapter 3.1).
Let us return to the example with five price changes as discussed in section
6.1. Our initial situation is point A with price level p0. As fig. 6.4 shows, we
are in a play area where no significant effects of price changes on supply can be
observed. As a result, the price change on p1 generates a moderate increase in
supply. As soon as the price exceeds the latter price level, the system reaches
the upward-leading spurt line and consequently is very sensible for following even
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small price increases. This is illustrated with the supply reaction to the second
price increase to p2 associated with point C. If the price stops rising and starts to
move in an opposite direction instead, the system leaves the upward-leading spurt
and penetrates the play area located on the left-hand side of the upward-spurt. It
remains on the particular play line and exhibits a lazy reaction to price changes,
as long as the price varies between p2 and p3 (the pain threshold). If market price
later exceeds p2, the system switches back to the upward spurt. However, in case
of a price drop below p3, the pain threshold is passed inducing the switch to the
downward spurt and thus a strong negative reaction of supply on price changes
is observed. In our example, during the fourth change of the input variable the
price level falls below p3 to the level p4. This induces the switch to the downward-
spurt line and thus a strong negative reaction of aggregated supply. As soon as
the price development changes direction and it starts to rise, our system enters
the play area again and remains there as long as the price varies between p4 and
p5. If the price level returns to its initial level (p0), a new equilibrium on the
spurt-up-line is generated (point G with y6), where supply is much lower than in
the initial equilibrium (point A with y0).
Hence, the remanence property of hysteresis addressed in section 2.2 becomes
obvious. In this example, it can be quantified as a remaining effect on output of
the extent corresponding to the difference between y0 and y6, which is negative.
However, the remanence effects may also be positive.
If the initial supply level (y0) is ambitioned, a price increase up to a level close
to p1 is indispensable. If the aim of the economic policy is to bring the economy
back to its initial equilibrium A with p0 and y0, first a price increase to p1 is
required to reach the right play line and a following price decrease to p0 must
take place due to reaching the initial output and price level in point A.
From section 3.4 and chapter 5, we know that even risk-neutral economic
agents make cautious decisions if the option value of waiting is taken into account.
As a result of aggregation, fig. 5.3 illustrates the creation of a play area that
is positively correlated with uncertainty. The same logic applies to the play
hysteresis model, resulting in a higher width of the play area and thus “outward”
shifts of the spurt lines.
The other issue regarding the play-hysteresis model is the variable play width
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induced by changes in forcing variable pt. The play width is determined by and
positively depends on the contemporaneous uncertainty. As stated in Belke and
Go¨cke 2001, p.187, in the play hysteresis model only one spurt line can be shifted
at the same time. The spurt line that captures the recent economic reactions is
fixed and serves as an anchor for the shift of an opposite spurt line to adjust the
play width to the degree of uncertainty. For example, if our initial situation is
in point C on the spurt-up-line and the degree of contemporaneous uncertainty
rises (corresponds to higher play width), the spurt-down line must be horizontally
shifted to the left-hand side by the extent of the change in play (see fig. 6.4).
However, if the initial situation is in point E, an increase in contemporaneous
uncertainty induces a horizontal shift of the upward spurt line to the right-hand
side. A reduction in uncertainty leads to shifts of respective spurt lines in opposite
directions.
The concept of a variable play can also be captured by the play algorithm
developed by Belke and Go¨cke 2001 and discussed in section 6.3.
6.3 Belke-Go¨cke algorithm describing
path-dependence
This section concerns how to formally describe economic path-dependence based
on the linear play-hysteresis approach. It explains in further detail what has been
worked out in Belke and Go¨cke 2001. Fig. 6.4 illustrates a play hysteresis model
that comprises play and spurt lines or, respectively, weak and strong reactions of
output. Changes in the forcing variable (pt) can take place in one or even both
areas, leading to corresponding output reactions.
Following Belke and Go¨cke 2001, we start in an initial state on one of the
spurt lines, e.g. point C in fig. 6.4. Assuming that a change in the forcing
variable (pt) leads to entering the play area and (by occasion) switching to the
opposite spurt line, a change in variable pt can be formally expressed as follows:
∆psj = aj + ∆sj (6.3)
j captures the number of switches between the upward- and downward-leading
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spurt lines; aj denotes cumulated movements in the play area; ∆p
s
j is a price
change higher than the width of the play area, leading to the j-th switch of the
spurt line; ∆sj captures the fraction of the spurt area in which part of the price
change ∆psj takes place and it can be formalized as follows:
∆sj =
{
sign(∆psj) · (|∆psj|−d), if |∆psj|> d
0, if else
(6.4)
sign(∆psj) captures the direction of the price change and thus specifies the
right spurt line. For example, if the price change is larger than the width of the
play area (d) and negative, a fraction of it takes place in the area of the downward-
leading spurt, and exhibits an extent of difference between the complete price
change and the width of the play area (d). However, if the price change is smaller
than d, the forcing variable only moves within the play area and ∆sj = 0.
Depending on the area in which the forcing variable moves, weak and/or
strong reactions of output are considerable:
∆ysj = αaj + (α + β)∆sj, |α|< |α + β| (6.5)
α captures weak economic reactions (defines the slope of play lines, e.g. DC,
AB and EF in fig. 6.4); (α + β) is the slope of spurt-lines capturing strong
economic reactions. Thus, β denotes the difference in slopes of play and spurt
lines.
Movements on the spurt lines induce shifts of the play-lines. This can be
illustrated using the latter example from fig. 6.4 with subsequent price changes
p2 → p3 ↓→ p4 ↓→ p5 ↑→ p2 ↑, and choosing e.g. point C as an initial state. In
case of the price reduction from p2 to p3, only weak output reactions in the play
area can be observed with no shifts of the actual play line DC. A negative price
change from p3 to p4 taking place in the spurt area leads to a movement on the
downward-leading spurt from point D to E and consequently a shift of the play
line from DC to EF . A price increase from p4 to p5 leads to entering the play
area (line EF ) but not to any shifts of it. A following change from p5 back to p2
induces a strong and positive output reaction (movement on the upward-leading
spurt from point F to point C) and a contemporary vertical shift of the play line
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from EF to DC.
In order to capture the current placement of the actual play line, all of its
historical shifts must be cumulated corresponding to all previous movements on
both spurt lines:
Vj−1 = β
j−1∑
i=0
∆si (6.6)
Output reaction to the current price change can be formalized composing both
- historical play shifts Vj−1 (we know current location of play) and actual output
reaction (∆ysj ):
yj = C¯ + Vj−1 + ∆ysj (6.7)
Inserting eqs. (6.5) and (6.6) into eq. (6.7) and combining with eq. (6.3)
results in the following output reaction:4
yj = C¯ + β
j−1∑
i=0
∆si + αaj + (α + β)∆sj = C¯ + β
j∑
i=0
∆si + α∆pj (6.8)
By adding and subtracting a certain expression
j−1∑
i=0
∆pi, eq. (6.8) can be
transformed in a following one:
yj = C + α
j∑
i=0
∆pj + β
j∑
i=0
∆si = C + αpj + βsj (6.9)
Here, the constant C corresponds to the difference between the original con-
stant C¯ and the artificially-added expression
j−1∑
i=0
∆pi. In the final analysis, the
output reaction can be defined as a simple linear relationship between the real
input variable pj and an artificial variable sj capturing only the historical and
current movements on the spurt lines or - in other words - all strong output reac-
tions. sj is essentially an input variable pj without small changes corresponding
to movements within the play area, while the latter values are simply “filtered
4For a graphical interpretation see Belke and Go¨cke 2001, p. 189.
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out”. In order to run regressions with the time series of interest, accumulation via
indicator j can be replaced by the time structure and indicator t. Moreover, the
output function becomes more realistic adding some other explanatory variables,
all of which are summarized in variable zt in the following equation:
yt = C + αpt + βst + γzt (6.10)
In the following, the procedure of filtering out the movements of the input
variable in the play area and thus constructing the artificial spurt variable st is
discussed in further detail (see Belke and Go¨cke 2001, p.190f.). For this, three
facts about the economic environment are indispensable: [1] the current state
of the system, [2] the extent and direction of the current price change and [3]
the width of the play area. In order to define the current state of the system,
additional information about previous price changes is required. As illustrated
in fig. 6.5, an economic system may be located in one of the four areas of
play hysteresis: on upward- or downward-leading spurt and on “upper” (AC)
or “lower” (DF ) play. Even if both positive and negative price changes can take
place in the play area, we have to distinguish between the latter play lines to
capture the right direction of movements in the previous period. In other words,
it is important from which spurt line the system penetrated into the play area.
Each potential state of the system is determined using a dummy variable,
which can take the value of either 1 or 0. Variable M↓1 captures the location of
the economy on the downward-leading spurt line (e.g. in point D in fig. 6.5) and
can be formalized as a following function:
M↓t =

1, if ∆st−1 < 0
1, if (∆st−1 = 0) ∩ (∆pt−1 = 0) ∩ (∆at−1 = 0)
0, else
(6.11)
Eq. (6.11) states that the system is located on the downward-leading spurt
if the previous price change was negative and higher in absolute value than the
width of play area leading to entering the downward spurt and thus switching to
the opposite spurt-line (corresponds to ∆st−1 < 0). M
↓
t can also take the value of
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of the Belke-Go¨cke algorithm
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
1 even if no price changes have been observed in a previous period. Such a case
captures the circumstances under which the economy exhibits no reaction due to
∆pt−1 = 0 but is still located on the downward-leading spurt if ∆pt−2 took place
in the spurt-down area. Otherwise, the dummy variable M↓t equals 0, meaning
that the system is in one of the remaining three play areas.
Dummy M↑t determines the upward-leading spurt as a current location of the
system (e.g. in point A in fig. 6.5):
M↑t =

1, if ∆st−1 > 0
1, if (∆st−1 = 0) ∩ (∆pt−1 = 0) ∩ (∆at−1 = 0)
0, else
(6.12)
M↑t = 1 in case the previous price change was positive and larger than the play
width dt, leading to a switch between spurt lines and hence to entering the upward
leading spurt area (corresponds to ∆st−1 > 0). Again, if there were no changes in
the input variable, the system might eventually be located on the upward spurt
if it “stopped” moving in the latter area due to ∆pt−1 = 0. In sum, if the input
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variable exhibits no changes in the previous period, the economy might be located
on one of the spurt lines, depending on the area in which it stopped reacting.
This case is insofar important since it plays a role by constructing the algorithm.
Taking the value of 1, dummy variable Bt captures that the system is currently
located in the play area and the arrows specify a prevailing (reference) spurt line
from which the play area was entered. B↓t = 1 captures the location of the
economy on the “lower” play line (corresponds to the line DF in fig. 6.5) with
the downward-leading spurt as the reference spurt line. This is the case if the
previous price change induced movements in the spurt-down area (∆st−1 < 0) or
if the system was already located on the “lower” play in t− 1, as summarized in
function (6.13):
B↓t =

1, if ∆st−1 < 0
1, if (∆st−1 = 0) ∩ (B↓t−1 = 1)
0, else
(6.13)
The system is currently located on the “upper” play line (B↑t = 1), meaning
that the last strong reactions took place in the spurt-up area if the opposite
circumstances could be observed than formalized in eq. (6.13):
B↑t =

1, if ∆st−1 > 0
1, if (∆st−1 = 0) ∩ (B↑t−1 = 1)
0, else
(6.14)
Only one of the four location variables can take the value of 1 in a certain
period, while the other three dummies must be equal to 0.
In the following, the extent of price movements in the play area (at) are
defined. We want to filter them out of the price to generate an artificial spurt
variable inducing only strong economic reactions. For this purpose, an auxiliary
variable bt must be generated capturing price changes in t that depend on the
current state of the system (captured by dummy variables: M↓t , M
↑
t , B
↓
t and B
↑
t )
and previous movements in the play area (at−1):
bt = B
↓
t−1(1−M↓t )(at−1 + ∆pt) +B↑t−1(1−M↑t )(at−1 −∆pt) (6.15)
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As mentioned above, only one of the dummy variables can take the value of 1
at the same time. If eitherM↓t orM
↑
t equals 1, the auxiliary variable is 0 regardless
of how high or low the price change is. Eq. (6.15) states that in principle two
potential situations are relevant for bt: the current location of the economy on
the “lower” play and not on the spurt down (e.g. in point E and not in D in
fig. 6.5); and the location on the “upper” play and not on the upper spurt line
(e.g. in point B and not in A in 6.5). The current position in point E illustrates
the following dynamics: the system previously moved on the downward-leading
spurt line and due to an opposite price development penetrated into the “lower”
play by an extent of a↓t−1. Due to a positive price change in t, the extent of
movements in play becomes larger or the price change even crosses the threshold
and enters the opposite spurt line (upward-leading), resulting in a positive value
of bt (movement to the right-hand side from point E). However, if the price falls
in t, the systems moves to the left-hand side from point E and the extent of
movements in play is reduced due to (at−1 + ∆pt) or even the “pain-threshold”
is passed, leading to entering the spurt down and resulting in a negative value of
bt. The second part of eq. (6.15) captures the current location of the economy
in e.g. point B, which illustrates the following dynamics: the system previously
moved on the upward leading spurt line and due to an opposite price development
penetrated into “upper” play by an extent of a↓t−1 (see fig. 6.5). A positive current
price change moves the system to the right-hand side from point B, leading to a
reduction of movements in play or - in case of larger increase in price - entering
the upward-spurt line again. As a result, the auxiliary variable dt is positive. A
negative price change results in movement of the system to the left-hand side,
penetrating the play area by a larger extent or even passing the “pain-threshold”
and entering the downward-leading spurt. Entering the spurt down leads to a
negative value of bt. The extent of movements in play area is measured as a
distance between the location of economy and the reference spurt line.
Calculating the extent of current movements in play (at) results after com-
paring the auxiliary variable bt with the width of play area (dt). Eq. (6.16)
summarizes values that at can take depending on the current state of the sys-
tem and price change (both kinds of information are important - direction and
extent):
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at =

bt, if 0 < bt ≤ dt
∆pt, if (M
↓
t = 1) ∩ (∆pt > 0) ∩ (∆pt < dt)
−∆pt, if (M↑t = 1) ∩ (∆pt < 0) ∩ (−∆pt < dt)
(6.16)
According to eq. (6.16), cumulated movement in play equals a value of bt if
the latter is positive and not higher than the play width dt. This is associated
with the current location of the system in the play area (e.g. either on the line CA
or DF in fig. 6.5) and price changes (both - positive and/or negative) that do not
enter none of the spurt lines. The second and third rows of eq. (6.16) state that
at is of the same extent as actual price change ∆pt if the economy is currently
located on one of the spurt lines and a price change in the opposite direction
is observed, leading to a penetration into the play area but not to entering the
opposite spurt line due to ∆pt < dt and −∆pt < dt.
The next step is calculating movements in spurt areas. The latter procedure
is formalized by eqs. (6.17) and (6.18). The first row in eq. (6.17) captures
the case in which the economy is currently located on one of the play-lines with
a certain extent of movements in the latter area (at−1) and the current price
change leads to movements towards the reference spurt line and entering it by
some extent (corresponds to negative value of bt). The second row means the
same location of the system, albeit the current price change leads to movements
in play towards an opposite spurt and entering it (corresponds to bt > dt). From
the construction of the auxiliary variable bt (see eq. (6.15)) it follows that the
extent of movements in spurt in this particular case equals the difference between
bt and the play width dt.
∆st =
{
bt[B
↓
t (1−M↓t )−B↑t (1−M↑t )], if bt < 0
(bt − dt)[B↓t (1−M↓t )−B↑t (1−M↑t )], if bt > dt
(6.17)
Eq. (6.18) captures the current placement of the system in one of the spurt
areas. The first row means that due to a current price change in the same
direction as in the previous period, the system remains on the spurt and the
complete price change corresponds to the extent of movements in spurt. The
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second and last rows capture current price changes in the opposite direction than
previously, leading to entering the corresponding play line. Due to the higher
extent in comparison to the width of the play area, a fraction of price changes
takes place on the opposite spurt and it is equal to the difference between the
price change and the play width if ∆p > 0 and the sum of the latter measures if
∆p < 0.
∆st =

∆pt, if [(M
↓
t = 1) ∩ (∆pt < 0)] ∪ [(M↑t = 1) ∩ (∆pt > 0)]
∆pt − dt, if (M↓t = 1) ∩ (∆pt > dt)
∆pt + dt, if (M
↑
t = 1) ∩ ((−∆pt) > dt)
(6.18)
Only one measure remains undefined thus, namely the width of the play area
dt. As explained in previous chapters the extent of dt positively depends not only
on sunk adjustment costs but also the degree of uncertainty. Whereas the extent
of sunk adjustment costs is difficult to observe from a statistical perspective,
one can measure the anticipated degree of uncertainty using e.g. price variance.
Hence, Belke and Go¨cke 2001 model play width as a linear function of uncertainty
denoted with a proxy variable ut:
dt = µ+ σut (6.19)
The constant µ corresponds to sunk adjustment costs that are typical for a
certain market. Gathering such kind of information would help to define the
width of the play area quite precisely and lead to very convincing empirical
results. Calculating the so-called “pain-thresholds” (leading to exit of firms)
using typical sunk adjustment costs in certain markets is a very promising topic.
Given that exports play a very important role in terms of balance of payments of
each country, preventing passing the “pain-threshold” is an important political
question.
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6.4 Calculation of hysteresis losses indicator by
means of the Belke-Go¨cke algorithm
This section is based on the paper: Adamonis and Werner forthcoming.
In this section, we aim to calculate an indicator for hysteresis losses that
is proportional to the real extent of the losses. Calculating a hysteresis losses
indicator underlies a two-step filtering procedure. In section 6.3, the Belke-Go¨cke
algorithm and thus the first step of the twofold filtering procedure of the input
variable was discussed in further detail. The first step of filtering aims to capture
only strong reactions of the output to input changes. In the following, the second
step of filtering is executed to capture only strong negative output reactions
associated with hysteresis losses. Following this, the indicator is calculated using
the linear play-hysteresis model and replenishing the Belke-Go¨cke algorithm with
some additional calculations.
Aggregation of hysteresis losses over heterogeneous firms has shown in section
4.3 that these dynamic losses are proportional to the area inside the lens-formed
hysteresis loop. Using the same logic, we further on argue that hysteresis losses
are also proportional to the area inside the approximated linear hysteresis curve
(see fig. 6.6). It is obvious that no hysteresis losses are generated if price changes
take place either in play or in the upward-leading spurt area. Consequently, two
conditions must be fulfilled to generate hysteresis losses: price changes must be
negative (∆pt < 0) and they (or a part them) have to take place in the downward-
leading spurt area (∆st < 0). The following spurt values have to be considered:
∆st =

bt(B
↓
t (1−M↓t )), if B↓t = 1 ∩∆pt < 0 ∩ −∆pt > at−1
(bt − dt)(−B↑t (1−M↑t )), if B↑t = 1 ∩∆pt < 0 ∩ (at−1 −∆pt) > dt
∆pt + dt, if M
↑
t = 1 ∩∆pt < 0 ∩ −∆pt > dt
∆pt, if M
↓
t = 1 ∩∆pt < 0
(6.20)
Eq. (6.20) illustrates the second step of the twofold filtering procedure in
which the positive changes in input variable as well as the movements in the play
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area are filtered out. Eq. (6.20) also makes clear that depending on the current
state of the system different extents of price reduction are necessary to induce
strongly negative reactions of the system (price movements in the spurt-down
area (∆st < 0)), generating hysteresis losses as a result. Calculating a hysteresis
losses indicator by means of the linear play-hysteresis model is straightforward
and achieved using some basic geometric rules.
Figure 6.6: Calculation of hysteresis losses indicator in a linear play-hysteresis
model
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
Fig. 6.6 serves as the basis for the calculations and illustrates a two-period
play-hysteresis model with constant play width (d), the current location of the
system in point A and negative price changes with movements in the spurt down
area in both periods (∆p1 = ∆s1 < 0 and ∆p2 = ∆s2 < 0) are assumed. g0,
g1 and g2 denote the play lines that are equal in extent due to a constant play
width (d) and build the basis of parallelograms ABEF and BCDE; c1 and c2
illustrate respectively strong reactions of the output due to negative price changes
in periods t = 1 and t = 2; h1 and h2 are respectively heights of parallelograms
ABEF and BCDE; ωs is the angle of slope of the spurt lines, ωp is the angle of
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slope of the play lines and ω is the difference between the two. Thus, the system
moves from point A to B in the first and from point B to C in the second period.
Due to ∆p1 = ∆s1 < 0, hysteresis losses are generated that are proportional to
the area of the parallelogram ABEF . The value of the hysteresis losses indicator
generated only in period t = 1 (∆HLI1) can be quantified as follows:
∆HLI1 =
d
cos(arctan(ωp))
·
√
∆y21 + (−∆s21) · sin(arctan(ωs)− arctan(ωp))
(6.21)
Analogously, the area of the parallelogram BCDE (see fig. 6.6) that corre-
sponds to the value of hysteresis losses indicator generated only in the period
t = 2 (∆HLI2) can be computed as follows:
∆HLI2 =
d
cos(arctan(ωp))
·
√
∆y22 + (−∆s22) · sin(arctan(ωs)− arctan(ωp))
(6.22)
Thus, an increase in the area that is proportional to hysteresis losses in a
particular period t can be generally formalized as follows:
∆HLIt =
d
cos(arctan(ωp))
·
√
∆y2t + (−∆s2t ) · sin(arctan(ωs)− arctan(ωp))
(6.23)
The hysteresis losses indicator cumulates all of its values that were generated
during a particular sample. In our example, the sample encompasses only two
periods and both of them are associated with the strongly negative output reac-
tions leading to hysteresis losses. Thus, the value of hysteresis losses indicator in
period t = 2 is represented by the sum of indicator values additionally generated
in both periods, which corresponds to the whole area ACDF (see fig. 6.6):
(6.24)HLI2 =
d
cos(arctan(ωp))
·
√
(∆y1 + ∆y2)2 + (−(∆s1 + ∆s2)2)
· sin(arctan(ωs)− arctan(ωp))
The function for cumulated hysteresis losses indicator takes the following form:
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HLIt =

∆HLIt, if HLIt−1 = 0
HLIt−1 + ∆HLIt, if HLIt−1 > 0
0, if else
(6.25)
Thus, in the case that the price increased in previous periods, leading to
more exports and zero dynamic losses, a price decrease in period t results in
hysteresis losses generated only in the current period (∆HLIt). The value of the
losses indicator then corresponds to the value that was calculated for period t.
However, if the price change was negative in the previous period (t− 1) leading
to some hysteresis losses (HLIt−1 > 0), and it keeps decreasing in period t, we
cumulate the value of hysteresis losses indicator of both periods. Ultimately,
we can calculate hysteresis losses indicator for the whole time span in which the
price was decreasing or moving in the play area. If the price development changes
direction in the meantime, crosses the play and penetrates the spurt-up area, no
hysteresis losses are generated and the losses indicator simply keeps the value of
the previous period.
In order to gain an appreciation about the extent of hysteresis losses indicator,
we can build a relative measurement that compares the extent of hysteresis losses
indicator with a certain export value (e.g. export value in a selected year):
HLIt =
∑
∆HLIt
Exportj
· 100% (6.26)
In order to illustrate the calculation procedure of the hysteresis losses indica-
tor, see the empirical parts of the manuscript 8.1 and 8.2.
The other possibility to create a hysteresis losses indicator is to use the
Preisach aggregation procedure, which is briefly described in section 6.1 and was
implemented empirically by Piscitelli et al. 2000. In order to calculate another
hysteresis indicator, we could simply plug in the formula of hysteresis losses de-
veloped in section 4.3 (see eq. (4.11)) into the Preisach framework provided by
Piscitelli et al. 2000. However, since the hysteresis losses formula from eq. (4.11)
only includes the values of the input variable (e.g. price, exchange rate), the
interpretation of hysteresis losses indicator in relative terms becomes quite diffi-
cult. At this point, the hysteresis losses indicator provided in eq. (6.26) seems
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to be more advantageous in comparison to the indicator based on eq. (4.11). In
addition, due to many factors that cannot be measured or observed, e.g. firm
distribution in the Pentry/Pexit diagram, uncertainty level, expectations of the
economic agents, exchange rate elasticity of foreign prices, etc., the calculation of
the real hysteresis losses is not possible. Thus, both hysteresis losses indicators
are only approximate measures of proportionality under a simplifying assump-
tion of constant density in the Pentry/Pexit diagram. For these reasons, no other
hysteresis losses indicators are provided in this manuscript as having no potential
to improve the measurement.
6.5 Over- and under-estimation areas of the HLI
From a mathematical perspective, the calculation of the hysteresis losses indicator
by means of the linear play-hysteresis model is quite simple. The challenge at this
point is to integrate these calculations into the Belke and Go¨cke (2001) algorithm
and reflect the results reasonably. For the calculations, we only need the slopes
of the play and spurt lines (α and α+β, respectively), which we can calculate
using the algorithm, and the historical information about output changes (∆yt)
as captured in eqs. (6.9) and (6.10). Please note that the slope of the spurt
line associated with the angle ωs illustrated in fig. 6.6 corresponds to the sum
of coefficients α and β, since β captures the difference between the slopes of the
spurt and play areas. The slope of the play line associated with the angle (ωp)
corresponds to the coefficient α.
As mentioned above, the basis for the hysteresis losses indicator is the linear
play hysteresis model which represents an approximation of the curved Preisach-
loops. Fig. 6.7 illustrates over- and under-estimation areas of the hysteresis losses
indicator in comparison to the hysteresis losses captured by the original Preisach
model. It captures the relationship between hysteresis losses and the extent of
the price change (corresponds to its decrease). The dashed curve schematically
captures the hysteresis losses as e.g. area ABCD in the play-hysteresis model
(see fig. 6.8) and the solid curve represents the losses as an area in the Preisach
model as illustrated in fig. 4.4. Since the lens-formed hysteresis curve is con-
sidered to illustrate the more appropriate dynamics of the system (with certain
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Figure 6.7: Over- and under-estimation areas of hysteresis losses captured by
play-hysteresis in comparison to the non-linear original Preisach model
density of firms in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram) and the play hysteresis is the linear
approximation of the hysteresis curve, we can capture some intervals of over- and
under-estimation of hysteresis losses by means of the approximation by the linear
model in comparison to the non-linear approach. Thus, the price starts falling in
its maximum M1 (see figs. 4.4 and 6.8). According to the play hysteresis model,
there is little or no reaction of the system, since price changes take place in the
play area (M1 → p1) in which no hysteresis losses are generated. In contrast to
this, the lens-formed hysteresis curve shows some negative output reaction leading
to hysteresis losses by the extent of area H1. In this interval, the hysteresis losses
indicator under-estimates the dynamic losses. After penetrating the spurt-down
area (∆p > d), we slightly over-estimate the losses. However, if negative price
changes are of a very large extent, the area within the lens becomes larger than
the area in the play-hysteresis trapezoid. This again leads to an under-estimation
of hysteresis losses. By interpreting the values of the indicator, we are able to
recognize the intervals illustrated in fig. 6.7, since the width of the play area can
be estimated using the play algorithm. However, given that some determinants
of hysteresis cannot be measured (e.g. the level of uncertainty), the calculated
hysteresis losses in both models can only be interpreted as indicators.
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The main point of criticism regarding the hysteresis losses indicator is the
fact that the hysteresis losses indicators can only be interpreted as proportional
to negative welfare effects if we assume that the level of uncertainty as well
as the risk-free interest rate do not vary over time, which is quite unrealistic.
Changes in uncertainty and/or interest rates shift the entry and exit triggers of
individual firms leading to changes in the width of their band of inaction. At the
macro level, these microeconomic changes induce modifications in the location
and curvature of the hysteresis loops and result in quantitatively different areas
inside the hysteresis loops.
Figure 6.8: Play-hysteresis: linear spurt lines, constant play and hysteresis losses
Source: Own representation according to Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
Chapter 7
Hysteresis losses in the special
case of international trade
This chapter essentially builds on chapters 3 and 4, and shows how to interpret
hysteresis losses graphically in the model of international trade, where the trade
partners use different currencies. As mentioned in section 3.1.1, the non-ideal
relay can also be used to illustrate hysteretic behavior of an exporting firm if
we look at the exchange rate as a forcing variable. Therefore, the next section
briefly discusses the role of the exchange rates in international trade, before the
subsequent sections deal with export supply hysteresis forced by exchange rate
changes.
7.1 The role of the exchange rate
According to Mankiw and Taylor 2006, p. 647, exchange rates represent prices
for international transactions and therefore, they play a vital role in foreign trade,
especially for economies with strong openness such as Germany, the U.S., China
and many others. Hence, exchange rates are among the most commonly-watched
and -analyzed economic measures.
We distinguish between nominal and real exchange rates, which - of course -
are closely related. While the nominal exchange rate is the price of the currency
of one country in terms of another (bilateral rate) or a group of another countries
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(effective rate), the real exchange rate represents the rate at which economic
agents can trade the goods and services of one country for the goods and services
of another or a group of another countries (see Mankiw and Taylor 2006, p.
648-9). Thus, the real exchange rate is adjusted for the effects of inflation and
shows the purchasing power of a currency in comparison to another. In addition,
given that nominal exchange rates may deviate from their natural equilibrium
rates due to over- or under-valuation of the currencies (e.g. as a consequence of
governmental exchange rate manipulations), real exchange rates represent a more
powerful measure for the research purposes. For these reasons, we also use the
real exchange rate in our empirical analyses.
The exchange rates are important for the economies, since they are associated
with advantage gains in international trade. They affect a country’s terms of
trade whereby a depreciation of the home currency against another indicates a
worsening of its terms of trade, since the relative price of exports in terms of
imports decreases and vice versa. The worsening of terms of trade is undesirable
for the net importers but net exporters like Germany or China prefer it. In
general, when the export demand is price inelastic, a depreciation of the home
currency of an exporter will not change his revenues in his home currency when
the exchange rate passes through completely. However, if export demand is
price elastic, it leads to higher revenues of the exporters due to either higher
demand owing to lower export prices or a higher profit margin in case of pricing-
to-market. Assuming elastic import demand, the home currency depreciation
associated with higher import prices induces lower import spending. As a result,
the country’s aggregate demand increases and improves its balance of payments.
This might give an incentive to manipulate the exchange rate to keep the value
of the home currency at a low level. To achieve this, the country’s central bank
has to engage in open market operations in the foreign exchange market, e.g. by
buying (currency value rises) or selling (currency value falls) home currency. The
most popular examples of such exchange rate policies are the People’s Bank of
China and the Bank of Japan.
Besides the effects of monetary policy (both conventional and unconventional),
the currency movements are driven by a variety of determinants, e.g. inflation,
current account deficit, public debt, terms-of-trade, political stability, economic
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growth, productivity, exchange rate transactions from international trading of
goods, services and financial assets, currency speculations, etc. All of these mea-
sures are affiliated with each other and dynamic, which indicates high volatility
of the exchange rates. As an important and volatile economic measure, the ex-
change rate is worth taking the role of the forcing variable of the exports as
modeled in sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and empirically investigated in chapter 8.
7.2 Exchange rate pass-through to export prices
There is no doubt that the exchange rate is a very important factor in inter-
national trade. However, its changes may affect the export prices and thus the
export demand and supply, in different ways. The extent to which the exchange
rate passes-through (ERPT) to export prices can be determined by the exchange
rate elasticity of export prices. The latter depends on many aspects, e.g. the
heterogeneity of goods, market power of the exporter, the elasticity coefficient of
demand and many others. Empirical evidence suggests that the ERPT elastic-
ity coefficient is between one and zero (see e.g., Choudhri et al. 2002, Knetter
1989). Numerous studies claim that German exporters price to market and ac-
cept shrinking profits in order to defend market shares (see e.g. Choudhri et al.
2002, Falk and Falk 2000, Gagnon and Knetter 1990, Ihrig et al. 2006, 1989,
Krugman 1989). Other empirical literature finds very low responsiveness of U.S.
import prices to exchange rate movements which is declining over time (see e.g.
Gust et al. 2006). Altogether, this empirical evidence incentivizes us to discuss
the effects stemming from differences in the exchange rate elasticity of the export
prices on the entry and exit decisions of economic agents.
The present section augments the general non-ideal relay model (see fig. 3.1
in section 3.1.1) by the effects of the exchange rate and makes the model fit
for the analysis of the special case of international trade where trade partners
have different currencies. By way of illustration, we again use an example with
German exporters and U.S. importers, meaning that the euro is considered as
the home and the dollar - the foreign currency. For the sake of simplicity, we
first assume that all relevant costs (variable and sunk costs) have to be paid in
the home currency, which is also the case in all previous chapters. This allows
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us to keep the price trigger values as well as the width of the individual bands
of inaction constant. In general, the relationship between the prices in home and
foreign currency can be formalized as follows:
pt = p
∗
t (ε) · εt (7.1)
here p denotes the price in euro, ε is the bilateral exchange rate in direct
quotation [e /$], t is a time index and p∗(ε) is the $-price function, which takes
the following form:
p∗t (ε) = α · ε−ηt (7.2)
α denotes a constant and η is the exchange rate elasticity coefficient of export
prices. Combining eqs. (7.1) and (7.2), the following general form of the e -price
function results:
pt = α · ε1−ηt (7.3)
The exchange rate elasticity of export prices can theoretically vary in the
interval η ⊆ [0; 1]. Thereby, the values η = 0 and η = 1 represent two limiting
cases of the ERPT - a case of pricing-to-market (PTM), namely the local currency
price stabilization (LCPS) and the complete ERPT, respectively. In the case of
PTM, the elasticity coefficient takes the value of zero and the foreign prices
remain constant despite the exchange rate changes:
p∗t (ε) = α · ε0t = α = p¯t∗ (7.4)
It follows from the foregoing that:
pt = α · εt = p¯t∗ · εt (7.5)
Eqs. (7.4) and (7.5) highlight that all of the exchange rate changes are ab-
sorbed by the exporters. More precisely, a firm now sets and maintains its export
price in dollar rather than adjusting the prices according to the exchange rate
changes (see Krugman 1986). Assuming that an exporting firm j practices the
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PTM strategy allows us to simplify the model to a two-dimensional one. Thus,
the price in euro changes proportional to the exchange rate changes and the price
in dollar remains constant.
The other limiting case represents the opposite to the PTM, namely the com-
plete ERPT. The exchange rate elasticity coefficient of export prices now equals
one (η = 1) and leads to constant prices in euro and thus constant marginal
revenues of the exporters:
pt = α · ε0t = α = p¯t (7.6)
Consequently, the exchange rate changes (as exogenous shocks) are now fully
absorbed by the foreign prices:
p∗t (ε) = α · ε−1t =
α
εt
(7.7)
As mentioned above, the exchange rate elasticity of export prices can vary
between 0 and 1. Fig. 7.1 illustrates the microeconomic hysteresis in international
trade for following values of the elasticity coefficient: 0, 1
2
and 1.
The upper part of fig. 7.1 has been presented in fig. 3.1 in section 3.1.1 and
captures the relationship between the output (Yj,t) in physical units and the price
in home currency (Pt). The lower part of the graph captures the relationship
between the prices in euro and the exchange rate (εt). Three iso-elastic price
functions represent different degrees of the ERPT and illustrate the relationship
between the price triggers and the exchange rate trigger values.
The linear price function is captured by the blue line in fig. 7.1 and represents
the PTM case with η = 0 (see eq. (7.5)). The price band of inaction (BoIpj,η=0)
equals:
BoIpj,η=0 = p
η=0
j,entry − pη=0j,exit = α · (εj,entry − εj,exit) = α ·BoIεj,η=0 (7.8)
Eq. (7.8) makes obvious that the exchange rate band of inaction (BoIεj,η=0)
is proportional to the price band of inaction (BoIpj,η=0). Therefore, the general
price-output model is 1 : 1 applicable in the special case of international trade.
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Figure 7.1: Microeconomic hysteresis in international trade with different ex-
change rate elasticities of export prices
This limiting case is therefore analyzed in further detail and integrated in the
hysteresis losses model in section 7.4.
The red line in fig. 7.1 represents the parabolic price function with the elas-
ticity coefficient of η = 1
2
. Thus, the relationship between the price and exchange
rate bands of inaction is as follows:
BoIp
j,η= 1
2
= p
η= 1
2
j,entry − pη=
1
2
j,exit = α · (
√
εj,entry −√εj,exit) (7.9)
Eq. (7.9) shows that when ε varies between zero and one, there is no propor-
tionality between the bands of inaction, or between the price and exchange rate
trigger values, meaning that the general model cannot be applied to international
trade without further ado. Consequently, one should take the relationship be-
tween the relevant bands of inaction (e.g. as in eq. (7.9)) into account to obtain
a more precise measure.
The vertical grey line in fig. 7.1 captures the price function in case that a
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complete ERPT applies (η = 1). Due to the constant nature of the price function,
the entry and exit price triggers will never be crossed, meaning that there is no
supply hysteresis in this limiting case. However, if we consider the demand effects
associated with foreign price variations, it is to be expected that e.g. the foreign
demand falls as a consequence of euro appreciation and thus higher foreign prices.
In such a case, the firms might either start to price-to-market to save their market
shares (this would lead to η > 0) or even leave the foreign market (or search
for the new markets) due to low demand, which is insufficient for covering the
production costs. More precisely, the firm will leave the market if the loss from
exporting exceeds the sunk exit costs.
7.3 Effects of changing the currency of costs
In this section, we will show how the currency of a firm’s costs (or part of them)
affect the micro and macro hysteresis loop and thus the extent of hysteresis losses.
7.3.1 Variable costs incurred in home and the sunk costs
in foreign currency
Within the scope of this chapter, there is one further aspect that we still need
to deal with. Thus far, we have assumed that the sunk entry and exit costs are
paid in the home currency, which induces a constant width of the price band of
inaction. However, it is entirely possible that exporters pay their variable costs in
the home currency, although the sunk entry and exit costs - e.g. for accumulating
information on foreign markets as well as establishing new market channels, or for
firing employees and resigning existing contracts between partners and customers
- need to be paid in the foreign currency. This makes the modeling of hysteresis
losses slightly more complicated since the width of the price band of inaction also
depends on the exchange rate. Fig. 7.2 illustrates the effects of home currency
depreciation on the width of the price band of inaction.
Analogous to fig. 7.1 the ordinate in fig. 7.2 captures the export supply of
firm j and the abscissa - the price denominated in home currency. As addressed
in section 3.1.2, the gap between pj,exit and the variable costs, cj, in the simplest
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Figure 7.2: Microeconomic hysteresis losses with sunk costs paid in foreign cur-
rency ($)
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2005.
microeconomic model without uncertainty and with the one-period optimization
problem equals the sunk exit costs, lj. The gap between pj,entry and cj in the
same model equals the sunk entry costs, kj. We now assume that both sunk
costs - kj and lj - are incurred in foreign currency ($). Thus, the entry and exit
price triggers are no longer constant but rather depend on the exchange rate due
to the conversion of sunk costs to the home currency. cj has to be paid in euro
and thus remains constant. Therefore, a depreciation of the home currency leads
to an increase in kj and lj expressed in euro.
As illustrated in fig. 7.2, this results in a lower exit trigger, p
′
j,exit, and a higher
entry trigger, p
′
j,entry. In other words, similar to the introduction of uncertainty,
we have an outward shift of the threshold values (compare figs. 5.1 and 7.2).
However, there are two main differences between the nature of effects of these two
cases. First, the introduction of uncertainty implicates an additive effect due to
which the individual triggers of each firm are shifted by the same extent u, which
quantifies the effect of uncertainty. In contrast to this, the exchange rate effect
on sunk costs is a multiplication - the exit trigger decreases by (∆lj = l
∗
j · ∆εt)
and the entry trigger increases by (∆kj = k
∗
j ·∆εt). This makes it obvious that
the exchange rate effect is the greater the higher the sunk costs. Second, when
the sunk costs are incurred in dollar, a euro depreciation induces a wider band of
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inaction, which - in contrast to the case of uncertainty - leads to higher hysteresis
losses (the area within the loop) at the microeconomic level. Since the losses are
measured in home currency, there are no additional exchange rate effects.
As illustrated in fig. 7.3, the outward shift of the individual trigger values
leads to a reallocation of the firms in the Preisach triangle. Due to the euro
depreciation, each firm has to be reallocated to the north-west direction. In
order to underline the difference of the exchange rate effects on the individual
trigger values, two firms are illustrated in fig. 7.3. Firm A is located closer to the
45°-line of the Pentry/Pexit diagram than the firm B, meaning that the sunk entry
and exit costs that it has to pay are lower than those of firm B. As mentioned
in the previous paragraph, the currency effect is lower in case of firm A and thus
the north-west shift of point A towards point A′ is of a smaller extent than the
shift of point B towards B′. When all of the firms in the Preisach triangle are
considered, it becomes obvious that this kind of shift of each individual firm leads
to a change in the firm distribution in the Preisach triangle, which previously
was uniform per assumption. After the euro depreciation and thus increased
adjustment costs, the density of firms increases, going orthogonal from the 45°-
line towards the ordinate. As discussed in section 3.3, this leads to an increase in
power of the functions capturing the up- and the downward-leading branches of
the macroeconomic hysteresis loop. Section 4.4 shows that increasing the power
of the hysteresis function leads to an increasing power of the hysteresis losses
function. Fig. 4.5 illustrates the aggregated effects on the shape of the hysteresis
loop and the hysteresis losses.
Whereas the effects of uncertainty and home currency depreciation look sim-
ilar in the non-ideal relay model, they are completely different in the macroe-
conomic Preisach model. Explicit modeling of uncertainty leads to a play area
that is generated due to an outward shift of the hysteresis loops and thus lower
hysteresis losses. A depreciation of the home currency leads to higher sunk costs
and more humped hysteresis loops, associated with higher hysteresis losses in
case of a later home currency appreciation. Hence, a home currency depreciation
has a twofold effect on the exporters: on the one hand, it leads to more foreign
demand due to lower export prices; while on the other hand, it induces higher
barriers to entry and exit due to higher sunk costs.
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Figure 7.3: Effects of euro depreciation on aggregation when the sunk costs are
incurred in dollar
A euro appreciation leads to an inward shift of the trigger values at the micro
level and less humped macro hysteresis loops. Consequently, lower hysteresis
losses are generated. In this situation, the entry and exit barriers as well as
foreign demand are low.
What this all amounts to is that if the sunk costs are incurred in foreign
currency, the band of inaction of each firm becomes variable and it is wider the
weaker the home currency, and vice versa. At the macroeconomic level, the
variations of the width of individual bands of inaction induce changes in the
curvature of hysteresis loops, which is responsible for the extent of hysteresis
losses.
7.3.2 All of the costs are incurred in foreign currency
In this section, we analyze the effects of exchange rate changes on the individual
price band of inaction when all of the costs of an exporter have to be paid in
foreign currency (e.g. dollar). This example represents a quite unusual yet a
possible scenario. Thus, we consider a firm that produces in a country that
uses U.S. dollar as its official medium of exchange - e.g. Puerto Rico, Ecuador
or Guam - and exports its production to the U.S. The registered office of the
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company where the consolidated financial statements are prepared is located e.g.
in Luxembourg, meaning that the currency used for the calculations is the euro.
The modeling of this case is quite straightforward. Since all of the costs have
to be incurred in dollar, the exchange rate does not play any role for the entry
and exit decisions of our exemplar firm j. Therefore, the supply function of firm
j (see fig. 7.4) is very similar to that illustrated in fig. 3.1. The only difference is
that supply depends only on the export price denominated in the foreign currency
(p∗).
Figure 7.4: Microeconomic hysteresis with all of the costs paid in foreign currency
($)
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
As illustrated in fig. 7.4, the extent of hysteresis losses is now measured in
dollar and it does not change despite the exchange rate changes. However, the
exporter j has to convert his write-offs to his home currency. Consequently,
the microeconomic hysteresis losses denominated in euro increase in case of euro
depreciation and decrease if the euro appreciates against dollar.
The aggregation procedure of such exporting firms and their losses is analo-
gous to those presented in sections 3.2 and 4.3. The aggregated output (export
volume) is only forced by prices denominated in foreign currency. Whereas the
exchange rate changes do not play any role for the output reactions, they are
important in capturing the hysteresis losses. As at the microeconomic level, they
are generated in dollar and have to be converted in euro. Consequently, a euro de-
preciation (appreciation) is associated with higher (lower) aggregated hysteresis
86 CHAPTER 7. HYSTERESIS LOSSES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
losses.
7.4 Hysteresis losses in international trade in
the model with PTM
For the first attempt to measure hysteresis losses in international trade and ap-
ply these considerations empirically, the limiting case of PTM (η = 0) will be
assumed. As shown in section 7.2, the individual price triggers are proportional
to the exchange rate triggers and therefore the general model of hysteresis losses
can be applied to the analysis of the special case of international trade. Since the
hysteresis losses indicator is only a measure of proportionality, these assumptions
are reasonable. The aim of this chapter is to develop a preferably simple theory
basis for an empirical investigation, which is executed in chapter 8.
A one-sided dynamic model with hysteresis is presented in the following. The
PTM assumption allows us to keep prices in dollar constant. Thus, under ce-
teris paribus conditions, there is no demand price reaction to any exchange rate
changes. Due to PTM, the market entry and exit price of an exporting firm j is
proportional to the exchange rate value:
pj,entry = p¯t
∗ · εj,entry (7.10)
pj,exit = p¯t
∗ · εj,exit (7.11)
For the sake of completeness, we assume that the variable and the sunk costs
are incurred in the home currency, which in our example is the euro.
Fig. 7.5 illustrates a hysteretic supply of an exporting firm j as a relationship
between export volume of the operational unit i (yj,t), price in euro (pt), the
bilateral e /$-exchange rate (εt); p¯t∗ captures the constant price in dollar and t
is a time index. In the quadrant IV , a linear relationship between the exchange
rate and the price in euro is illustrated, as well as the proportionality between
the price and exchange rate trigger values (see eqs. (7.10) and (7.11)). A euro
depreciation (increase of the exchange rate ε) induces higher unit revenues for an
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exporting ECU member country. Consequently, analogous to entry and exit price
triggers, the exchange rate entry threshold is higher than the exit threshold. The
quadrant I captures the export supply of firm j in the form of a non-ideal relay,
which is identical to what was presented in section 3.1 (see fig. 3.1).
Figure 7.5: Non-ideal relay model with pricing-to-market in the special case of
international trade
In section 4.1, it has been shown that the hysteresis loss (HL) corresponds to
the area inside the closed microeconomic hysteresis loop. Therefore, in our special
case of international trade, we can calculate the hysteresis loss - denominated in
euro - as follows:
HLj,t = ∆yj,t · (pj,entry − pj,exit) (7.12)
Combining eqs. (7.10), (7.11) and (7.12) the hysteresis loss can be formalized
in the following way:
HLj,t = ∆yj,t · p¯t∗ · (εj,exit − εj,entry) (7.13)
According to eq. (7.13), hysteresis loss is a product of firms revenue in dollar
and the difference between the exchange rate values that trigger firms market
entry and exit. As a result, hysteresis losses can be alternatively illustrated using
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two dimensions - as an area within the non-ideal relay loop in the exchange
rate-revenue diagram as shown in fig. 7.6, measured in euro.
Figure 7.6: Alternative representation of hysteresis losses in a model with pricing-
to-market
Source: Own representation based on Belke and Go¨cke 2001.
In contrast to the general case with price as the forcing and physical output
quantity as the dependent variable, the model of international trade uses the ex-
change rate as forcing and the export revenue in dollar as the dependent variable.
If we normalize prices in dollar to unity, the revenues in dollar correspond to op-
erational units and the number of active exporters on the market. The exchange
rate corresponds to prices in euro. Thus, the aggregation of exports and hys-
teresis losses can be executed again using Pentry/Pexit diagrams as illustrated in
sections 3.2 and 4.3. The outcome is quantitatively the same as shown in section
4.3, namely the euro appreciation generates disproportionately large hysteresis
losses compared to exchange rate changes, and these losses are proportional to
the area inside a certain closed macroeconomic hysteresis loop.
We modeled hysteresis losses in international trade for a certain world with
one-period profit maximization. As we know from chapter 5, uncertainty leads
to a more cautious decision-making of firms and thus lowers hysteresis losses.
However, multi-period optimization leads to higher hysteresis losses than cap-
tured by the area inside the hysteresis loop due to interest costs on the sunk
entry and exit investments (see section 4.2). If we do not ignore uncertainty and
interest rate effects at the macroeconomic level, we cannot argue that hysteresis
losses are proportional to the area inside the loop due to macroeconomic play
area that arises. All these factors complicate the interpretation of the hysteresis
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losses indicator.
Chapter 8
Empirical analysis of hysteresis
losses in economics
8.1 German exports to the United States
This section provides an example how to empirically test for hysteresis using the
play algorithm described in section 6.3, as well as how to calculate the hysteresis
losses indicator conceptualized in section 6.4. Whereas the empirical testing for
hysteresis has been undertaken many times in the literature, the empirical anal-
ysis of hysteresis losses - which entails estimating and calculating the hysteresis
losses indicator - is novel in the economic literature. Micro and macroeconomic
modeling of hysteresis losses in international trade - which is also novel in eco-
nomics - is discussed in section 7.4.
8.1.1 Motivation
As a first example of an empirical application of the hysteresis losses indicator,
we investigate German exports to the U.S. in selected export sectors. Our market
choice is based on many factors. First of all, we focus on Germany as an export
production site due to a very high openness of the German economy: according
to Eurostat, in 2016 more than 50 % of German goods and services were ex-
ported (measured in percentage of GDP). Second, given that the U.S. is by far
the most important trade partner of Germany, we selected the U.S. the as ex-
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port destination country. Since we aim to analyze the exchange rate effects, the
trade partners must have different currencies. For this reason, we do not select
the Eurozone as the export destination area, although this common market is
even more important for the German export sector than the U.S. Moreover, the
$/e exchange rate is one of the most observed and influential bilateral exchange
rates. The first criteria of selecting sectors of interest is their importance for
Germany in general. The second criterion is the importance of these sectors in
the bilateral trade relationship between Germany and the U.S. Since our aim is
to find hysteresis and calculate the hysteresis losses, the quantitative perspective
is not the only crucial criterion. The selected export sectors are also special since
the goods of depicted German exports are heterogeneous and thus exhibit rela-
tively low price elasticity (see Belke et al. 2015). In combination with high sunk
adjustment costs (e.g. for entry and exit), they might lead to hysteretic behavior
of exporting firms in their export participation decision-making.
8.1.2 Data characteristics
In the empirical analysis, we use the data that is aggregated on a quarterly basis
due to a lower likeliness of a measuring error. According to Canova and De Nicolo
1995, the likeliness of a measuring error is much higher if we use the monthly
data. Our sample ranges from 1995Q1 to 2015Q4. The original data is not
seasonally adjusted, although the seasonality is modeled including the seasonal
dummies into the regression (see eq. (8.1) section 8.1.3).
The phenomenon that we are willing to explain is the participation of German
exporters on the U.S. markets for mineral fuels, oils, waxes and bituminous sub
(HS27), pharmaceutical products (HS30), plastics and articles thereof (HS39),
iron and steel (HS72), articles of iron and steel (HS73), nuclear reactors, boilers,
machinery and mechanical appliances, computers (HS84), electrical machinery,
telecommunication equipment, sound and television recorders (HS85), vehicles
other than railway or tramway rolling stock (HS87), aircraft, spacecraft and
parts thereof (HS88) and optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring,
checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and accessories that will be
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abbreviated in the following as high-tech instruments (HS90).1 For all product
groups, the data is completely available within the whole sample. All of the
export time series are denoted in current euro, deflated by the German export
price deflator and measured in mill. EUR. The data stems from the Eurostat
database.
Fig. 8.1 provides an overview of the volume and the development of the
following time series: German vehicle exports to the U.S. (product group HS87)
and the exchange rate during the time span 1991 − 2015. The exchange rate
exhibits relatively high volatility, since it varies between 1.02 and 1.80 during the
depicted sample.2 During the period of predominant euro depreciation (1995 −
2002), the German exports were positively stimulated and thus grew strongly
and continuously. As the euro appreciation period started in 2002, the exports
stopped increasing and remained quasi at the same level as in 2002, until the
euro reached its absolute highs of the 21st century. This weak reaction of exports
to euro appreciation suggests hysteretic behavior of the exporters, leading to
permanent effects induced by exchange rate changes. Strong euro appreciation
since 2007 together with the financial crisis and the following recession of the
world economy induced a strong decrease of the exports, which fell to the export
level of 1997. The recovering world economy and strongly depreciating euro
stimulated German exports and contributed to the rapid and continuous increase
in German exports since 2009.
The explaining variable - which we call the forcing variable in the context
of hysteresis - is represented by the real $/e -spot exchange rates as monthly
averages. These time series are obtained from the OECD database.
In order to control for the local demand, the real U.S. GDP is used. The
nominal U.S. GDP in domestic currency ($) is deflated using U.S. GDP deflator.
The resulting real U.S. GDP is measured in mill. $. Both time series again stem
from the OECD database.
Prior to any analysis, the time series first have to be tested for stationarity.
The stationarity ensures that the expected value does not depend on time, the
1We use the Harmonised System (HS) Classification for traded goods.
2As in Belke et al. 2013, synthetic euro exchange rates are employed before 1999. They are
calculated with the DM exchange rates and the fixed DM/e exchange rate
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Figure 8.1: German exports to the U.S. vs. $/e exchange rate (1991− 2015)
Note: German export series are depicted on the left-hand-side ordinate and
measured in mill. e ; Product group: HS 87: vehicles other than railway or
tramway rolling stock; the exchange rate is depicted on the right-hand-side
ordinate.
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat 2015 data.
variance is constant and positive, and the covariance depends only on the time
distance but not on time itself (Greene 2008, p. 718-719). However, most eco-
nomic time series contain a trend and thus are non-stationary (Hassler 2003, S.
811). Integrated time series do not tend to fluctuate around a certain level, but
rather drift above or beyond each value (see Hassler 2003, p. 812). Hence, the
variance increases over time. Estimations based on the non-stationary time se-
ries can produce either spurious or nonsensical results (see Granger and Newbold
1974). Therefore, the data is often transformed into stationary time series (e.g.
using first differences or logs depending on whether the short- or long-run effects
are analyzed, or including trends in the regression). In this regard, the Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is employed. Tab. A.1 summarizes the results
of the unit root test for all of the time series used in our analysis. The results
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show that all of the time series are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first
differences, with only one exception, whereby the exports of iron and steel are
stationary even in levels. This implies that exports of iron and steel are of I(0)
and all of the other variables are of I(1) processes.
In the simple regression analysis, we do not transform the data and estimate
them in levels to ultimately interpret the results reasonably. We deal with the
non-stationarity problem by the specification of the model including a linear trend
into the regression.
8.1.3 Methods
The calculation of the hysteresis losses indicator (HLI) underlies a two-step
procedure. First, we test whether hysteresis is relevant for the market that we
are interested in. If this is the case, hysteresis losses become relevant and we
calculate the hysteresis losses indicator using certain estimated parameters from
the first step (the estimated slopes of the play and the spurt lines, α and α + β,
respectively, and the estimated play width, d). For our intention, we prefer
a method that describes the path-dependence of the system and is based on
“strong”3/macro hysteresis. There are only two of them thus far: the Preisach
approach described in section 6.1 and empirically implemented by Piscitelli et al.
2000, as well as the already-mentioned play algorithm (see Belke and Go¨cke 2001),
which is presented in detail in section 6.3.4 We choose the second approach to be
consistent with the logic of the indicator construction. Determining the export
market participation by means of the play-hysteresis approach allows us to solve
the problem of structural shifts of the system endogenously. The shifting points
(e.g. A, B, C or D in fig. 6.8) are determined by the historical exchange rate
and output realizations.
Thus, before we can commit ourselves to our ultimate target of calculating the
HLI, we first have to conduct a number of exercises as in Belke et al. 2013 and
3The definition of “weak” and “strong” hysteresis was introduced in Amable et al. 1991.
“Weak” hysteresis defines the microeconomic and “strong” hysteresis - the macroeconomic
phenomenon.
4For the translation of the algorithm into the EViews batch program, we refer to Belke and
Go¨cke 2001.
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Belke et al. 2014 to test for hysteresis as well as estimating the play width and
the slopes of the play and spurt lines that are necessary for the HLI calculation.
For this purpose, we run two linear OLS regressions and compare the estimation
results of both for each selected product group:
EXt = C + α ·RERt + γ · Zt + t (8.1)
EXt = C + α ·RERt + β · SPURTt(d) + γ · Zt + t (8.2)
Eq. (8.1) captures a simple linear regression, which serves as a baseline model
explaining the depicted German exports to the U.S. The regression specification
is kept simple and includes the following variables: German export values of
the selected sector as the dependent variable (EXt), the real $/e -exchange rate
(RERt) and other explanatory/controlling variables, summarized in vector Zt:
U.S. GDP (GDPt−1), the linear trend (Trendt) and seasonal dummies for the
first three quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3). The U.S. GDP is a proxy for the market
demand in the U.S. and is included in the regression with one lag (GDPt−1) to
avoid the reverse causality. The linear trend (Trendt) is included in the regression
due to the non-stationary nature of the data to eliminate the trend effects. The
seasonal dummies for the first three quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3) are used for the purpose
of seasonal adjustment of the model. From the regression in eq. (8.1), we expect
the U.S. GDP to have a positive and the exchange rate to have a negative impact
on the export values, since an increase in the exchange rate means an appreciation
of the euro.
The estimation results are regarded as stable if the residuals possess the char-
acteristics of the white noise processes. This means that the residuals must be
stationary and thus not autocorrelated, the expected value must be equal to zero,
the variance must be constant and the covariance must only depend on the dif-
ference between tn and tn+1, although not on time itself (see Greene 2008, p.
632). The white noise residuals are also normally distributed. These are the
central assumptions of all of the tests executed in this empirical chapter. The
windows-based econometric software Eviews enables us to test the residuals for
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normal distribution.
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In order to test for autocorrelation of the residuals, the Q-statistic and the
LM test are employed. Fig. A.2 shows the results of the Q-statistics for the first
twelve lags of the regression of vehicle exports (HS87). The correlogram has
spikes at lags up to seven. The Q-statistics are significant at all lags, indicating
that there is a significant autocorrelation in the residuals. The Breusch-Pagan
serial correlation LM test also rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Thus, both - the Q-statistic and the LM test - indicate that the residuals are
autocorrelated. Consequently, the OLS estimators will be inefficient and thus no
longer BLUE, albeit still unbiased and consistent (see Asteriou and Hall 2007, p.
137). Similar results of the diagnostic tests regarding the serial correlation apply
for all of the product groups.
The White heteroscedasticity test is employed to ascertain whether the vari-
ance of the residuals is constant over time. The null hypothesis states that the
residuals are homoscedastic and thus it is desirable not to reject the null. Table
A.5 summarizes the probability values of the White test of the regressions of all
of the product groups. The results indicate that with the exception of product
group HS30, the null cannot be rejected even at the 10% significance level. Thus,
the residuals are homoscedastic. In addition, all of the individual residual cross
products are also homoscedastic for all of the product groups except HS30.
Whether the error terms are normally distributed or not is tested employing
the Jarque-Bera test. The focus of the test is on the skewness and kurtosis. The
distribution of the error terms is considered as normal if the skewness equals to
zero and the kurtosis takes the value of three. The test results in table A.7 indi-
cate that the residuals are normally distributed in the regressions of the product
groups HS73, HS85, HS88 and HS90, although not in the regressions of the
remaining product groups. Although the results of the normality test are not per-
fect for all estimations, we consider them as satisfactory mostly for one reason:
our sample is relatively small and thus any statement regarding the normality is
very problematic. Every single outlier might have conduced the rejection of the
null. The graph of the residuals supports this proposition in the estimation of
the most exports. The fact that asymptotical Jarque-Bera tests pose difficulties
testing small samples has been demonstrated and proven in e.g. Mantalos 2010.
As an example, table A.12 summarizes the estimation results of the regression
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of vehicle exports (HS87). The second column refers to the simple OLS regres-
sion (see eq. (8.1)). According to t-statistics, only the estimated coefficients of
the exchange rate, lagged U.S. GDP and the seasonal dummies Q2 and Q3 are
significant. As expected, a euro appreciation against the dollar negatively affects
the German exports to the U.S., the increasing U.S. GDP indicates growing de-
mand for German products and thus leads to higher exports. The second and
third quarters exert a negative influence on the German exports to the U.S.
Eq. (8.2) captures a modification of the baseline regression, which is now non-
linear in its parameters and includes the structural shifts of the export supply
represented by the original exchange rate and the artificial SPURT variable,
which is generated by means of the play algorithm. The filtering procedure and
the derivation of eq. (8.2) are presented in section 6.3. The artificial SPURT
variable captures only large changes of the exchange rate leading to strong export
reactions, since the small exchange rate changes (movements in the play area d)
are filtered out. We assume that the play width is time-invariant and calculate
the most appropriate play width, d, in the following way: based on the exchange
rate time series, we define the interval that probably entails the appropriate play
width (d). The algorithm then identifies the switching points (e.g. A, B, C or
D in fig. 6.8) and generates the corresponding SPURT variable for each play
width from the defined interval. We assume that the most appropriate play
width is associated with the maximum R-squared of the regression specified as
formalized in eq. (8.2) (see Belke et al. 2013). Fig. 8.2 illustrates the resulting
R-squared as a scatter plot for the play width from the interval [0; 75]5 dividing
it in 75 subintervals and the regression of the product group HS87. The ordinate
captures the R-squared and the abscissa represents the play width. It is clear
from the graph that the R-squared takes the highest value of R2 = 0.81 when the
play width is d = 0.31. The lowest R-squared (R2 = 0.78) - which results when
d = 0 and d = 0.45 - equals the R-squared of the simple linear regression (see
table A.12). When the play width equals zero (d = 0), there is no hysteresis and
the results of the regressions (8.2) and (8.1) are the same.
The same one-dimensional grid search procedure applies for all of the product
5The choice of the interval is based on the difference between the minimum and the maximum
of the exchange rate in the depicted sample period.
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Figure 8.2: R-squared resulting from one-dimensional grid search over constant
play width d, product group HS87
Source: Own calculations.
groups. Table 8.1 summarizes the results showing the different play lengths for
different product groups.
Table 8.1: Estimated play widths associated with the highest R2
HS product groups
27 30 39 72 73 84 85 87 88 90
Play width (d) 0.39 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.12 0.57 0.57 0.3 0.57 0.31
Source: Own calculations.
The shortest play was estimated in the regression of the exports of the arti-
cles from iron and steel (HS73) and very large play widths were estimated for
the exports of the HS product groups 30, 39, 72, 84, 85 and 88. The differ-
ence between the minimum and maximum of the exchange rate is 0.776, which
is not much higher than the estimated highest play width of the extent 0.57.
This indicates a very low variation of the SPURT variable. It is possible that
the estimated play width is extremely high and the SPURT variable entails a
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one-time shift. In the latter case, the SPURT converges to a dummy variable in-
dicating a structural break.6 The results summarized in table 8.1 indicate a large
play width of the same extent for several product groups and this incentivizes
us to prove whether there is a structural break in these cases. A closer look at
the R-squared plots of the selected product groups made it obvious that without
any exception the maximum R-squared associated with the play width 0.57 is an
edge-maximum. This is illustrated in fig. 8.3, which depicts the results for prod-
uct group HS88. However, the SPURT variable does not entail a one-time shift
in any of the considered product groups. As fig. 8.4 shows, with some breaks
the SPURT falls in the time span 1997 − 2001, whereby an especially strong
fall is observed in 1999 as the euro currency was launched. From 2002 until the
end of the sample, the SPURT variable runs horizontally. Knowing that the
algorithm fails in differentiating between structural breaks and play movements
- meaning that the structural breaks overwrite the play dynamics - we select the
play width that is associated with the second-highest R-squared maximum and
run the potentially-affected regressions once again. The results are compared in
table A.10. From the logical perspective, the use of the second-highest R-squared
in estimating play width in those special cases leads to better results. We will
return to the interpretation of these results several paragraphs later.
In order to ascertain whether the selected German export sector exhibits
hysteresis, we run the regression from eq. (8.2) with the filtered SPURT variable
and test the null hypothesis (H0: β = 0) against the alternative (H1: β 6=
0). Rejecting the null hypotheses means that the SPURT variable significantly
contributes to the explanation of the export variability. Furthermore, we compare
the estimation results of eqs. (8.1) and (8.2) to be certain that eq. (8.2) produces
the better fit than eq. (8.1). From regression (8.2), we expect the U.S. GDP to
have a positive and the exchange rate - a negative impact on the export values.
Since the effects of the exchange rate now are divided into weak - represented
by the original exchange rate variable - and strong - reflected by the SPURT
variable - the common effects are decisive. Accordingly, the sum of the coefficients
(α+β) must be negative. The original exchange rate variable should ideally
become smaller and insignificant, since the coefficient of the original exchange
6For such examples, see Belke et al. 2013, p. 170.
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Figure 8.3: R-squared resulting from one-dimensional grid search over constant
play width d, product group HS88
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 8.4: SPURT variable calculated for the product group HS87
Source: Own calculations.
rate variable now reflects the output reactions in the play area. Moreover, the
effects of the SPURT should both be stronger than those of the exchange rate
variable in eq. (8.2) and the benchmark regression (8.1), since the SPURT is
associated with large output reactions taking place in the spurt area.
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The results of conducted residual tests for the regression from eq. (8.2) re-
garding serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and normal distribution are very
similar in deduction in comparison to the results of the residual test conducted
for the regression from eq. (8.1): the test hypothesis of no serial correlation must
again be rejected, but not the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. The normal
distribution of the residuals could only be declared for several product groups.
Moreover, as stated in Belke et al. 2013, the regression model in eq. (8.2) is non-
linear in its parameters, since the play width has to be estimated and thus the
switching points are not known a-priori. This leads to discontinuities and local
maxima in the likelihood function, especially in finite samples. All of these prob-
lems make clear that the use of any test statistics is problematic and we should
be very careful in making statements about the coefficients regarding their sig-
nificance and absolute magnitude. However, since there is no better method that
we could use for hysteresis testing, we have to be satisfied with this one keeping
it’s shortages in mind.
Table 8.2 summarizes the most important results of the estimated regressions
from eqs. (8.1) and (8.2) for all ten product groups. The results make it obvious
that only the exports of the product groups HS87 and HS90 exhibit hysteresis.
As expected, e.g. in the analysis of vehicle exports (HS87), the coefficient of the
exchange rate in the simple regression model (αsimple) is negative and significant.
In the regression with the SPURT variable, the coefficient of the exchange rate
(αspurt) becomes lower in absolute value and insignificant, because the coefficient
reflects the weak output reaction, which is represented in the play hysteresis
model by the play lines. In contrast to this, the coefficient of the SPURT variable
(βspurt) is highly significant, negative and much higher in absolute value than
αsimple, and reflects the slope difference between the spurt and the play lines.
The required condition of the negative common influence of the original exchange
rate and the SPURT variable is also satisfied ((α + β) < 0). The results of the
analysis of the high-tech instrument exports can be interpreted analogously.
As table A.10 shows, the export sector of products from the group HS39
(plastics) also might exhibit hysteresis if we use the play width associated with
the second-highest R-squared to solve the problem of a potential structural break.
Even if the common effect of the original exchange rate and the SPURT variable
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has an expected negative sign ((αspurt + βspurt) < 0), the statistical insignificance
of both coefficients means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no hystere-
sis. However, we are aware of the problems of our estimators regarding the use
of statistical tests. Thus, no definite statement can be made for product group
HS39 regarding hysteresis.
Therefore, we now only focus on the interpretation of the estimation results of
the exports that exhibit hysteresis, namely product groups HS87 and HS90. For
these exports, hysteresis losses become relevant and the hysteresis losses indicator
can be calculated as described in section 6.4.
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Table 8.2: Summary of the regression results with constant play in different export sectors
HS product groups
27 30 39 72 73
αsimple 222.96*** -1216.4*** -124.35*** -14.38 -432.27
αspurt 287.23*** -2023.62*** -181.46*** -96.09*** -461.89***
βspurt -197.94** 3543.52*** 250.70*** 358.69*** 543.53***
βspurt < αsimple yes no no no no
(α + β) < 0 no no no no no
R2(simple) < R2(spurt) yes yes yes yes yes
Hysteresis no no no no no
HS product groups
84 85 87 88 90
αsimple -1312.61*** -607.68*** -1386.44*** -1432.64*** -92.34**
αspurt -2066.59*** -813.09*** -930.91 -1580.66*** 109.39
βspurt 3309.86*** 901.72*** -4592.15*** 649.75 -442.90***
βspurt < αsimple no no yes no yes
(α + β) < 0 no no yes yes yes
R2(simple) < R2(spurt) yes yes yes yes yes
Hysteresis no no yes no yes
Note: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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In the following, we need to assess the goodness of fit of our two regression
models (see eqs. (8.1) and (8.2)) to judge which of the two regression models
is statistically better. Therefore, we use four statistics: R-squared, the overall
F-test, the root mean square error (RMSE) and the Theil inequality coefficient.
Table A.9 summarizes the test results. We start with the R-squared, which
represents a relative measure of fit of the model. Both R-squared and the adjusted
R-squared are higher in the regression with the SPURT variable in comparison to
the simple regression. For HS87, the estimated R-squared equals 0.81 > 0.78 and
the adjusted R-squared takes the value of 0.79 > 0.77. If we consider the product
group HS90, the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared take the value of 0.98 >
0.97. This indicates the better fit of the regression that includes the SPURT
variable. The overall F-test is used to evaluate whether the relationship between
the dependent and the explaining variables is statistically reliable. The null
hypothesis is that all of the regression coefficients are equal to zero. In both types
of regressions and for both product groups, the null hypothesis could be definitely
rejected. Consequently, no clear statement can be made regarding the better fit
of the regressions. Next, we assess the absolute fit of the regression model to the
data, indicated by the RMSE. This statistic represents a criterion for an absolute
fit of the model to the data and therefore depends on the scale of the dependent
variable. The value of RMSE is lower in the regression with SPURT than in the
regression without SPURT for both product groups. This again indicates the
better fit of the SPURT regression. Finally, the Theil inequality coefficient is
the last investigated indicator of the regression fit. It can vary between 0 and 1,
whereas 0 indicates a perfect fit of the regression. The comparison of its values
provides another argument that the fit quality of the regression with SPURT is
better than without.
At the micro level, a modified non-ideal relay model is considered to illustrate
hysteresis losses in international trade. The developing procedure and differ-
ences between this and the general output-price model are highlighted in chapter
7. Hysteresis losses are now proportional to the area inside the non-ideal relay
loop defining the relationship between export values in euro (or exporters rev-
enues) and the exchange rate in indirect quotation ($/e ). Positive exchange rate
changes are associated with euro appreciation against the dollar and consequently
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with higher export prices denominated in dollar. Developing the microeconomic
model of hysteresis losses in international trade, a pricing-to-market (PTM) strat-
egy of firms (in this example, German exporters) was assumed (see section 7.4)
to simplify the model to the two-dimensional hysteresis losses approach. As a
result, a euro appreciation can be interpreted as a decrease in the profit margins
of the exporting firms.
8.1.4 Discussion of the results
The hysteresis hypothesis was tested for German exports to the U.S. for the
following HS product groups: 27, 30, 39, 72, 73, 84, 85, 87, 88 and 90. The
hypothesis could not be rejected only for the product groups 87 (vehicles) and
90 (high-tech instruments). Estimation of different samples and use of different
initial situations in the play algorithm have proven the robustness of our results.
It begs the question of why these two among all product groups exhibit hystere-
sis. For one thing, both groups represent heterogeneous goods and thus exhibit
relatively low price elasticity, while for another thing the production and the
merchandising of these products are associated with very high sunk costs.
Table A.12 summarizes the results from the OLS regressions for vehicle ex-
ports. The first column of the table shows the results from the linear regression
without the SPURT variable. They meet our expectations: the exchange rate
is highly significant and exerts a strongly negative influence on the exports. The
influence of the U.S. GDP is positive and significant, albeit relatively moder-
ate. The second column summarizes the results of the regression with the ar-
tificial SPURT variable and here we have a completely different yet expected
and theory-conforming picture: the coefficient of the SPURT variable (which is
just a filtered RER) is significant, negative and higher in absolute value than the
coefficient of the exchange rate variable in the first regression; the coefficient of
U.S. GDP is positive again but becomes insignificant; and the RER is no longer
significant, since its coefficient represents only the slope of the play lines. Thus,
the SPURT variable overtakes the explaining power and improves the value of
the adjusted R2, making the second regression statistically better. Similar effects
are found for the German exports of high-tech instruments summarized in table
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A.13. Therefore, we conclude that the German export market for vehicles and
high-tech instruments exhibits hysteresis and the exporters experience hysteresis
losses in case of euro appreciation.
Fig. 8.5 illustrates the main results of the empirical investigation. It cap-
tures the development of the nominal $/e exchange rate (blue line), the artificial
SPURT variable (black line) and hysteresis losses indicator (red line) for vehicle
exports. During the whole sample, we cumulate the hysteresis losses as described
in eq. (6.26). The exchange rate fluctuates during the whole estimation period.
However, if we filter out the small fluctuations and consider only strong exchange
rate changes leading to strong reactions of the export volume (see development
of the SPURT variable), the picture becomes less complex. Following the black
line in fig. 8.5, we can distinguish four periods: the period of euro depreciation
and positive export reactions going from 1996Q1 until 2002Q1; the period of pre-
dominantly euro appreciation with heavy hysteresis losses during the time span
from 2003Q4 to 2008Q2, the period of fluctuating exchange rate but slightly de-
preciating euro from 2008Q3 until 2014Q4; and finally, strong euro depreciation
lasting from 2014Q4 until the end of the sample. Only the period of euro appre-
ciation is interesting for us, since we focus on negative dynamic losses caused by
sunk adjustment costs and taking place due to euro appreciations.
The shady parts of fig. 8.5 capture the four periods of increasing hysteresis
losses associated with euro appreciations and strong negative output reactions:
1995Q1− 1995Q2, 2003Q4− 2004Q1, 2004Q3− 2005Q2 and 2007Q3− 2008Q2.
As table 8.3 summarizes, in the time span 1995Q1− 1995Q2, the exchange rate
increased by 6% (0.08 $/e ) and resulted in an increase in the hysteresis losses
indicator (HLI) by 3.5% of the real export value from 2010Q1. From 2003Q4
to 2004Q1, the euro appreciated by 5% (0.06 $/e ) and this has led to HLI
increasing by 3.3% of the real export value from 2010Q1. The rise in the exchange
rate by 7% (0.09 $/e ) in the 2004Q3−2005Q2 time span resulted in an increase in
HLI by more than 7%. Finally, during the last shaded period (2007Q3 - 2008Q2)
a 13% (0.18 $/e ) increase in the exchange rate generated hysteresis losses to the
amount of more than 7.2% of the real export value from 2010Q1, whereas the
latter equals 3, 407, 697, 041 e . Thus, the 7.2% corresponds to more than 245
mill. e that were lost in one year. The fact that the euro appreciation by only
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Figure 8.5: German vehicle (HS87) exports to the U.S.: Hysteresis losses, ex-
change rate and the SPURT variable
Note: The exchange rate and the SPURT variable are depicted on the left-hand
side ordinate; hysteresis losses indicator is depicted on the right-hand side
ordinate which reflects the percentage of the real export value from the first
quarter of 2010.
Source: Own calculations based on the data from OECD (2016) and Eurostat
(2016).
0.09 $/e can cost approx. 234 Mill. e investments is an incentive to care about
the stability of macroeconomic fundamentals. However, it has to be mentioned
that the hysteresis losses indicator is not equivalent but only approximately (!)
proportional to the real hysteresis losses. Due to simplifying assumptions made
by constructing the indicator and due to approximation regarding the aggregated
dynamics of the system, we have to be careful in our interpretation. In other
words, the hysteresis losses indicator is not interpretable as value. It is more
reasonable to compare the hysteresis losses indicator with itself in the context of
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exchange rate development and the so called “pain (exit) thresholds”.
Table 8.3: Periods of increasing hysteresis losses caused by euro appreciation
Period −∆ε ∆HLI ∆εnominal
1995Q1 - 1995Q2 6% 3.5% 1.32 - 1.40 $/e
2003Q4 - 2004Q1 5% 3.3% 1.19 - 1.25 $/e
2004Q3 - 2005Q2 7% 7.1% 1.22 - 1.31 $/e
2007Q3 - 2008Q2 13% 7.2% 1.38 - 1.56 $/e
Note: −∆ε denotes the negative percentage change in the exchange rate (euro
appreciation); ∆HLI reflects increase in hysteresis losses indicator measured in
percentage of the real export value from 2010Q1; ∆εnominal denotes the interval
of nominal exchange rate changes in given period.
Source: Own calculations.
Thus to generate hysteresis losses, a large euro appreciation is required. This
can be a strong appreciation taking place during a relatively short period of time
or many smaller appreciations that sum up to a large exchange rate change, e.g.
during the periods from 1994Q1 to 2004Q1 and from 2005Q4 to 2008Q2. Fig.
8.5 makes obvious that “pain (exit) thresholds” exist that are typical for certain
periods. As illustrated in theoretical part of this manuscript in fig. 6.8, the “pain
threshold” (inducing market exit) is not a constant trigger level, but rather is
path-dependent, since the play lines are vertically shifted by movements along
the spurt lines (Belke et al. 2013). Our empirical results also let us conclude that
“pain thresholds” strongly depend on the recent development of the exchange
rate. For example, if we consider the first period of increasing hysteresis losses
(1995Q1−1995Q2) which is associated with the “pain threshold” of 1.32 $/e , we
observe previously volatile exchange rate development without extremely large
euro depreciations (the exchange rate was never lower than 1.12 $/e ). Before
the second period of increasing hysteresis losses (2003Q4 − 2004Q1) with the
“pain threshold” of only 1.22 $/e (significantly lower than the first one), we
observe a strong euro depreciation of an extent of 62% during the period from
1995Q2 to 2000Q4 when the exchange rate reached its all time lowest value of
0.87 $/e . This was a huge incentive for many German exporters to enter the
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market, even for the unproductive and less competitive ones. These exporters
are responsible for the lower pain threshold and high hysteresis losses due to
their relatively high sensitivity to the exchange rate changes. If we compare
hysteresis losses generated during the periods from 1995Q1 to 1995Q2 (period of
relatively strong euro without large depreciations in the recent years) and from
2004Q3 to 2005Q2 (period of relatively weak euro with large depreciations in
the recent years), we observe that an increase in hysteresis losses caused by a
1% appreciation of the euro is in the second period by 0.4% higher than in the
first period. And finally, if we compare two similar periods of relatively strong
euro without large depreciations in the recent years - periods from 1995Q1 to
1995Q2 and from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2 - we can assess a very similar exchange rate
effect on hysteresis losses indicator: in both periods an increase in exchange rate
(euro appreciation) by 1% accounts for an increase in hysteresis losses indicator
by 0.6% of the real export value from 2010Q1.
Fig. 8.5 also illustrates the remanence property of hysteretic system, showing
that despite the increasing exchange rate during 2002− 2003 the export volume
does not change: the SPURT runs horizontally, meaning that the system moves
in the play area (see fig. 6.8). Consequently, the hysteresis losses indicator
has the value of 0 and slightly underestimates the dynamic losses of exporters
(see fig. 6.7). The further on increasing exchange rate leaves the play area and
penetrates the downward-leading spurt in 2003Q4, passing the pain threshold of
the least efficient exporters, corresponding to the exchange rate value of about
1.19 $/e . These exporters probably entered the market during the times of
extremely low exchange rates (e.g. during 2000 and 2001) and made misleading
forecasts concerning the exchange rate development, or even became relatively
unproductive over the years due to e.g. lacking investments in the technology.
Fig. 8.6 captures the development of the nominal $/e exchange rate (blue
line), the artificial SPURT variable (black line) and hysteresis losses indicator
(red line) for the exports of high-tech instruments.
Our empirical results prove the theoretical considerations and illustrate the
over-proportional dynamic losses in comparison to exchange rate changes and
underline how harmful large economic fluctuations are for the economy. Strong
depreciations of euro incentivize both productive and unproductive German ex-
110 CHAPTER 8. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Figure 8.6: German high-technology instrument (HS90) exports to the U.S.:
Hysteresis losses, exchange rate and the SPURT variable
Note: The exchange rate and the SPURT variable are depicted on the left-hand
side ordinate; hysteresis losses indicator is depicted on the right-hand side
ordinate which reflects the percentage of the real export value from the first
quarter of 2010.
Source: Own calculations based on the data from OECD (2016) and Eurostat
(2016).
porters to invest and participate in the export market. The participation of un-
productive exporters leads to an inefficient allocation of resources. In addition,
such exporters are very sensible to exchange rate fluctuations and are the first
that exit the market if the euro appreciates. Consequently, additional resources
are wasted in the form of sunk entry and exit costs. The issues of economic policy
are discussed in chapter 9.
8.2. ITALIAN WINE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 111
8.2 Italian wine exports to the United States
This section is based on the following paper: Adamonis and Werner forthcoming.
This section provides another example of an empirical application of the hys-
teresis losses analyzing a product from a completely different economic area and
different country of origin than in the last section. In principle, the empirical
and methodological exercises undertaken here are very similar to those in section
8.1. In order to avoid becoming repetitive, in particular places in the text we will
refer to the latter section.
8.2.1 Data and motivation
As an agricultural example of an empirical application of the hysteresis indica-
tor, we investigate Italian wine exports to the U.S. The market choice is based
on many factors. First of all, we are interested in markets that exhibit hysteresis
on the supply side. Agricultural and commodity markets are typically associated
with relatively high sunk adjustment costs (in the form of investments and dis-
investments) that producers have to face after market entry or expansion, exit
or decrease in production intensity and other shocks, such as changing terms-of-
trade in case of international trade. Therefore, we expect the suppliers on these
markets to behave hysteretic. Being an agricultural good, wine has qualified for
our empirical analysis.
Second, the international wine trade has experienced considerable growth in
the past two decades, with the exported production of wine reaching 30% of the
global production in 2010 (see Mariani et al. 2012). If we consider the competitive
performance of wine producers, France and Italy increased the most in terms of
value, while Italy and Spain increased the most in terms of volume over the
2000− 2011 period (see Mariani et al. 2012).
Such an outcome is closely related to the wine export profile of the particular
country. If we compare the wine prices of the largest wine exporters over 2014−
2015, it emerges that Spanish wine is the cheapest (0,38e /l), followed by Chilean
(0,68e /l), Australian (0.70e /l) and Italian (0.72e /l) wine. French wine is the
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most expensive among the largest exporters and costs 1.75e /l, which is more than
twice as expensive as Italian wine (see Mariani et al. 2012). However, the export
profiles are changing over the years, as well as wine characteristics. For example,
global warming affects some sorts of wine grapes, leading to stronger wine than
in the past. This phenomenon is widely discussed among wine producers who
even integrate the global warming factor in their strategies (see Couret 2016).
Therefore, the underlying dynamics in the wine sector must be taken into account
when analyzing the wine market.
According to Eurostat, in 2008 Italy was the largest wine producer worldwide
by volume (ca. 46 M hl per year).7 Around 40 % of the whole Italian wine
production goes abroad, whereby more than half of all exports go to the U.S.
(see IWC 2016). Moreover, in 2012 Italy was confirmed as the leading wine
supplier in the U.S. (see Gusti d’Italia 2016).
The phenomenon that we are seeking to explain is the participation of Italian
wine exporters on the U.S. market. For our estimation, we use three time series:
Italian wine exports to the U.S. denoted in current euro and deflated by the export
price deflator; real U.S. GDP in mill. euros, converted based on the exchange
rates from 2000; and real $/e spot exchange rates as monthly averages.
All data is aggregated on a quarterly basis essentially for two reasons: first, the
monthly data is not available for all variables and the interpolation of economic
data is quite problematic; and second, quarterly data is used due to the lower
likeliness of a measuring error. According to Canova and De Nicolo 1995, the
likeliness of a measuring error would be much higher if we used monthly data.
The first two time series are seasonally and work day adjusted, and taken from
the Eurostat database (Eurostat 2015). Exchange rate time series stem from the
USDA (2014). Our sample ranges from 1995Q1 to 2013Q3.
Fig. 8.7 provides an overview of the volume and the development in time of
Italian wine exports to the U.S. and the real $/e exchange rate during the time
span 1991 − 2014. If we consider the development of these two time series, we
can clearly observe a negative relationship between the exports and the exchange
rate until 2002, as the euro strongly and continuously depreciated. In this pe-
riod, exports were stimulated by the weak euro. However, as the exchange rate
7The data for total production of wine is available on Eurostat until 2008 by now.
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development changed its direction in 2002 and the euro continuously appreciated
until 2005 (returning to the level of 1996), no significant export reaction can be
observed. The exports exhibit kind of seasonal fluctuations, although on average
they remain at the same level as in 2002 and do not fall back to the level of 1996.
Such a remanence of the exports incentivizes us to suggest hysteretic effects on
the export supply side. If we further on follow the development of the export
series in relation to the exchange rate, we detect negative effects of the financial
crisis in 2007 and the following recession. In 2008, the euro reaches its absolute
high with respect to the dollar and the exports slightly decline until the world
economy starts to recover and the euro depreciates again. As we can see, the
variability of the underlying bilateral exchange rate is high, which complicates
the trade between Italy and the U.S. and incentivizes applying certain pricing
strategies to permanently survive on the foreign market.
Figure 8.7: Italian wine exports to the U.S. vs. real $/e exchange rate in the
period 1991− 2014
Note: left-hand-side ordinate: Real Italian wine exports are measured in euro;
right-hand-side ordinate: real $/e exchange rate.
Source: Own calculations based on the data from Eurostat 2015 and USDA
2014.
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Prior to running an OLS estimation, we first have to test our time series
for stationarity. The background for this is explained in section 8.1.1. Table
A.14 summarizes the ADF test results, indicating that all of the time series
are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first differences and thus are of
I(1) processes. Similar to the previous empirical analysis, we do not use the
first differences or other transformations of the data and estimate them in levels
because we are interested in the long-term effects. Moreover, interpretation of the
results of the transformed data would ultimately be very problematic.8 We deal
with the non-stationarity problem by the specification of the model including a
linear trend in the regression.
The U.S. GDP and the Italian wine export time series (representing U.S.
Italian wine imports) are cointegrated.
8.2.2 Methods
The methods used for the empirical analysis are similar to those presented in
section 8.1.3. In order to test the hysteresis hypothesis, we again run two OLS
equations as formalized in eqs. (8.1) and (8.2). The regression specification is
further on kept simple and includes the following variables: Italian wine export
values as the dependent variable (EXt), the real $/e -exchange rate (RERt) and
other explanatory variables, summarized in vector Zt - U.S. GDP as a measure
for the market demand going into regression with one lag (GDPt−1) to avoid
reverse causation, a trend variable (Trendt) and seasonal dummies for the first
three quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3). From regression in eq. (8.1), we expect the U.S.
GDP to have a positive and the exchange rate - a negative impact on the wine
export values.
Eq. (8.2) contains an additional SPURT variable, which is generated with
the help of the play algorithm. The calculation of the most appropriate play
width is explained in section 8.1.3. Given the exchange rate development during
our sample, the interval for the grid search over constant play in this example is
set to [0; 0.80] and divided into 85 subintervals. Fig. 8.8 illustrates the resulting
R-squared values as a scatter plot for each play width from the defined interval.
8This point represents the problem on which the future research has to tie on.
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The graph makes it obvious that the highest R-squared (R2 = 0.945) is reached
when the play width (d) equals 0.22. The lowest R-squared (R2 = 0.914) again
corresponds to the R-squared of the simple linear regression (see table A.15).
Figure 8.8: R-squared resulting from one-dimensional grid search over constant
play width d, Italian wine exports
Source: Own calculations.
In order to ascertain whether the Italian wine export market in the U.S.
exhibits hysteresis, we again test the null hypothesis (H0 : β = 0) against the
alternative (H1 : β 6= 0). Rejecting the null means that the SPURT variable
significantly contributes to explaining the export variability. Furthermore, we
compare the estimation results of eqs. (8.1) and (8.2) to be certain that eq. (8.2)
produces the better fit than eq. (8.1). If the hysteresis hypothesis cannot be
rejected, hysteresis losses become relevant. The hysteresis losses indicator is then
calculated as described in section 6.4.
In the following the residual tests for both regressions are executed to check
whether the residuals possess the characteristics of the white noise leading to
stable estimation results. As in previous empirical analysis, here we test the
residuals for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normal distribution. In order
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to test for autocorrelation of the residuals, the Q-statistic and the LM test are
employed.
Tables A.3 and A.4 show the results of the Q-statistics for the first twelve lags
of the regressions of Italian wine exports without and with the SPURT variable,
respectively. The correlogram concerning the simple OLS regression has spikes at
lags up to five. The Q-statistics are significant at all lags, indicating that there is a
significant autocorrelation in the residuals. The Breusch-Pagan serial correlation
LM test also rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Thus, both -
the Q-statistic and the LM test - indicate that the residuals are autocorrelated.
Inclusion of the SPURT variable into the regression seems to solve this problem,
since the correlogram concerning the regression with SPURT does not have spikes
at any lags. The Q-statistics are insignificant at all lags, indicating that there is no
significant autocorrelation in the residuals. The Breusch-Pagan serial correlation
LM test cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, even at any
significance levels. Thus, both - the Q-statistic and the LM test - indicate that
the residuals are not autocorrelated.
The White heteroscedasticity test is employed to ascertain whether the vari-
ance of the residuals is constant over time. The null hypothesis states that the
residuals are homoscedastic and therefore it is desirable not to reject the null.
Table A.6 summarizes the probability values of the White test of the OLS re-
gressions with and without SPURT . The results indicate that the null cannot
be rejected even at the 10% significance level. Thus, the residuals of both OLS
regressions are homoscedastic. However, the OLS estimators of eq. (8.2) will not
be BLUE due to the non-linear nature of the model parameters and finite sample
properties. This issue is briefly discussed in section 8.1.3.
Whether the error terms are normally distributed or not is tested employing
the Jarque-Bera test. The test results in table A.8 indicate that the residuals are
not normally distributed in both OLS regressions. Although the results of the
normality test are not perfect, we consider them as satisfactory mostly because
our sample is relatively small and therefore any statement regarding the normality
is very problematic.
To assess the goodness of fit of our two regression models (see eqs. (8.1) and
(8.2)) judge which of the two regression models is statistically better, we use four
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statistics: R-squared, the overall F-test, the root mean square error (RMSE) and
the Theil inequality coefficient. Table A.11 summarizes the test results. We start
with the R-squared: both R-squared and the adjusted R-squared are higher in
the regression with the SPURT variable in comparison to the simple regression.
This indicates the better fit of the SPURT regression.
The overall F-test is used to evaluate whether the relationship between the
dependent and the explaining variables is statistically reliable. The null hypoth-
esis is that all of the regression coefficients are equal to zero. In both types of
regressions, the null hypothesis can definitely be rejected. Consequently, no clear
statement can be made regarding the quality of fit of the regressions. Next, we as-
sess the absolute fit of the regression model to the data, indicated by the RMSE.
The value of RMSE is lower in the regression with SPURT than in the regression
without SPURT . This again indicates the better fit of the SPURT regression.
Finally, the Theil inequality coefficient is the last investigated indicator of the
regression fit. The comparison of its values provides another argument that the
fit quality of the regression including SPURT variable is better than that of the
simple OLS regression.
Microeconomic hysteresis losses are proportional to the area inside the non-
ideal relay loop defining the relationship between export values in e (or rev-
enues) and the exchange rate in indirect quotation ($/e ). Positive exchange rate
changes are associated with euro appreciation against the dollar and consequently
higher export prices denominated in dollar. Developing the microeconomic model
of hysteresis losses in international trade, a pricing-to-market (PTM) strategy of
firms (in this example, Italian wine producers) was assumed (see section 7.4) to
simplify the model to the two-dimensional hysteresis. As a result, the increasing
exchange rate can be interpreted as the decreasing profit margin of the export-
ing firms. The use of this assumption is legitimate, since the PTM of Italian
exporting firms has been empirically proven in several studies: e.g. Fedoseeva
2014 found PTM in agricultural exports of several European countries including
Italy and Verheyen 2013 found exchange rate non-linearities in EMU exports to
the U.S. Ferto¨ and Balogh 2016 found PTM in Italian wine exports.
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8.2.3 Results
Tab. A.15 summarizes the results from the OLS regressions (see appendix). The
first column of the table shows the results from the linear regression without
the SPURT variable. They meet our expectations: the exchange rate is highly
significant and exerts a strongly negative influence on the exports. The influ-
ence of the U.S. GDP is positive and significant. The second column summarizes
the results of the regression with the SPURT variable and here we have a com-
pletely different yet expected and theory-conforming picture: the coefficient of
the SPURT variable (which is just a filtered RER) is significant, negative and
higher than the coefficient of the exchange rate variable in the first regression;
the coefficient of U.S. GDP is significant and positive again; and the RER is no
longer significant, since its coefficient represents only the slope of the play lines.
Thus, the SPURT variable undertakes the explaining power and improves the
value of the adjusted R-squared, making the second regression statistically bet-
ter. All of this prompts the notion that the Italian wine export market exhibits
hysteresis and the wine exporters experience hysteresis losses in case of a positive
exchange rate changes. Similar results were found in Werner 2015, in which a
different method of describing the path-dependence of the Italian wine exports
to the U.S. is used.
According the annual vineyard surveys of the International Organisation of
Vine and Wine (OIV), the vineyards in Italy are shrinking from year to year. In
2003 there were 868 thousand hectares of vineyard whereas in 2009 for example
there were just 812 thousand hectares and 705 thousand hectares in 2013. In
addition, the number of winegrowers in 2010 was smaller more than by half
compared to the year 2000. All of this is associated with market exits of many
wine producers and thus lost sunk (dis)investments that are relatively high in
wine production. These facts support our results captured by the hysteresis losses
indicator. It shows a continuous increase in losses in the time span from 2003Q1
to 2008Q1, captured by the dark grey curve in fig. 8.9. According to the OIV,
during 2003-2008, the area under wine-grape vines in production contracted by
more than 33, 000 ha. The blue line in fig. 8.9 represents the development of the
real $/e exchange rate, while the hysteresis losses indicator is captured by the red
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Figure 8.9: Italian wine exports to the U.S.: Hysteresis losses, exchange rate and
the SPURT variable
Note: The exchange rate and the SPURT variable are depicted on the left-hand
side ordinate; hysteresis losses indicator is depicted on the right-hand side
ordinate.
Source: Own calculations based on the data from USDA 2014 and Eurostat
2015.
line. The time series of the artificial SPURT variable is captured by the black line.
During the whole sample, we cumulate the hysteresis losses as described in eq.
(6.25). This time we want to show another possibility to calculate the hysteresis
losses indicator which does not represent a relative measure. In contrast to eq.
(6.25), we do not divide the cumulated measure by the selected export value and
do not multiply it by 100%. This way of measuring hysteresis losses indicator
only allows us to compare the indicator with itself.
The exchange rate fluctuates during the whole estimation period. However,
if we consider only strong exchange rate changes leading to some reactions of the
export volume, we can distinguish three periods: the period of predominantly neg-
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ative exchange rate changes (euro depreciation against dollar) and non-negative
export reactions going from 1995Q1 until 2001Q4; the period of predominantly
positive exchange rate development (euro appreciation against dollar) with heavy
hysteresis losses during the time span from 2003Q1 to 2008Q2; and finally, the
period of fluctuating but slightly negative exchange rate changes (depreciation
of euro) from 2008Q3 until the end of the sample. Only the period of predomi-
nantly positive exchange rate development is interesting for us, since we focus on
negative dynamic losses caused by sunk adjustment costs and taking place due
to positive exchange rate changes.
The shady parts of fig. 8.9 capture the three periods of increasing hystere-
sis losses: 2003Q1-2004Q1, 2004Q3-2005Q1 and 2007Q2-2008Q1. An additional
aspect captured in fig. 8.9 is that despite the increasing exchange rate dur-
ing the last quarters of 2002, the export volume barely changes: the SPURT
runs horizontally, meaning that the system moves in the play area (see fig. 6.8).
Consequently, the hysteresis losses indicator has the value of 0 and slightly under-
estimates the dynamic losses of exporters (see fig. 6.7). The further on increasing
exchange rate leaves the play area and penetrates the downward-leading spurt in
2003Q1, passing the pain threshold of the least efficient exporters, corresponding
to the exchange rate value of around 1.1 $/e . These exporters might have entered
the market during the times of extremely low exchange rates (e.g. during 2000
and 2002). Until 2004Q1, the exchange rate increased by 0.2 $/e and accounted
for increased hysteresis losses indicator by 0.15. The second period of hysteresis
losses increase starts in 2004Q3 and ends in 2005Q1, leading to the exit of a large
number of exporters and thus extremely heavy dynamic losses. A quite moder-
ate exchange rate increase by 0.1 $/e (only half as large as the previous shock),
this time inducing an over-proportionally large increase in the hysteresis losses
indicator by 0.2 (which is one-third larger than the previous increase). The subse-
quent negative exchange rate changes starting in 2005Q1 lead to a horizontal run
of the SPURT associated with exchange rate movements within the play area,
which can only be crossed in 2007Q2. Since the pain threshold of efficient firms
is passed (corresponds to the exchange rate value 1.33 $/e ), further exits take
place and additional losses are generated. However, the effect of this exchange
rate increase is far from the extent of effects caused by the two previous periods of
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exchange rate increase. Summing up, a rising exchange rate corresponds to small
hysteresis losses if the exchange rate has not yet reached an extremely high level
(e.g. 1.35 $/e in our example) at which only the most productive firms (namely,
those with high exit threshold values) can survive on the market. Since such a
level is reached, only moderate hysteresis losses are generated.
In the context of the sunk costs, it has to be mentioned that Italy and France
are strongly affected by vine diseases that lead to yield losses. The dead wine-
grape plants must be replaced by the new ones and this leads to lost sunk costs
for dead plants, as well as sunk investments into new plants. The costs for a
complantation (removal of the dead vine, hole digging, new vine plant, protection,
fertilization and 1st year plant care) are between 4.7-5.8e /plant. The costs
for regrafting account for 2.17-2.47e /plant and the curetage additionally costs
2.5e /plant (see Adrian et al. 2016). Diseases are associated with additional
sunk costs and higher uncertainty, additive to price or exchange rate uncertainty.
One way to improve our regression model would be to generate a new variable
capturing the vine diseases to account for this form of uncertainty.
8.2.4 Robustness and sensitivity tests
In order to check for robustness of the results, we used four approaches. First,
we changed the specification of the regression and excluded the trend variable.
The estimation results can be found in tables A.15 and A.16. The results proved
robust.
Second, we tested for sensitivity of the results to small changes in the esti-
mated play width. On the one hand, we allowed the play width to be slightly
below the original play width (d = 0.22). In case of a smaller play width, the
play search intervals are set to [0.21; 0.215] and [0.21; 0.219], and divided in ten
sub-intervals. Fig. 8.10 illustrates the procedure of search for the optimal play
width. We assume that the optimal play is associated with the highest R-squared.
Here, we can see that the closer the play width is to the original one, the higher
the R-squared. The upper limit of the first play search interval is 0.215 and the
upper limit of the second play search interval is slightly higher, namely, 0.219.
Both represent the estimated optimal play widths. The estimation results using
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Figure 8.10: R-squared resulting for different play widths using play search in-
tervals [0.21; 0.215] and [0.21; 0.219]
Source: Own calculations.
lower play widths are very similar to the results presented in table A.15, where
the original play width (d = 0.22) is used. The same applies to the resulting
SPURT variables, which are also comparable to our original spurt variable.
In case of a larger play width, the play search interval is set to [0.221− 0.23]
and divided in ten sub-intervals. The estimation results are again very similar
to our original results presented in table A.15. The same applies for the spurt
variable. As fig. 8.11 illustrates, the chosen play width d = 0.2219 is associated
with a slightly higher R-squared than the play width d = 0.22 presented in the
paper. The reason for this is that the underlying sub-intervals used for the grid
search are larger in the approach presented in the paper. The interval [0; 0.8] was
divided into 85 sub-intervals. Nevertheless, the estimation results using these
play widths are very close to each other and therefore the use of a more accurate
play width does not significantly improve the results. In sum, these tests show
that the results are not sensitive to small changes in the play width.
Third, we took some steps to validate the hysteresis identifying procedure and
replaced the SPURT variable with the white noise to investigate the rejection
rate of this random variable. To test whether the play hysteresis testing procedure
rejects white noise as non-hysteretic, we ran two Monte Carlo simulations. In a
first step, we generated 1, 000 white noise processes and put them into the model
8.2. ITALIAN WINE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 123
Figure 8.11: R-squared resulting for different play widths using play search in-
terval [0.221− 0.23]
Source: Own calculations.
instead of the spurt variable. In the second step, we generated 100, 000 white
noises and estimated 100, 000 regressions. Table 8.4 presents randomly-chosen
output of these estimations. We compared the number of such estimation outputs
and most of them were very similar. In about 90% of the estimations, the white
noise variable was insignificant at the 10% significance level. However, if the
underlying significance level is 1%, the white noise proves insignificant in more
than 99% of the cases.
The R-squared in the regression with the white noise instead of the SPURT
variable is never higher than the R-squared in the regression with SPURT . As
table 8.5 shows, the maximum R-squared of the regression with different white
noise processes equals 0.93, which is smaller than the R-squared in the regression
with our optimal SPURT , being 0.94 (see table A.15). The mean and the median
equal 0.91, which is comparable with the baseline simple OLS regression in eq.
(8.1).
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Table 8.4: Exemplary estimation results using white noise instead of spurt, num-
ber of replications is 100,000
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -119000000 45891352 -2.602679 0.0114
RER -63868240 13420119 -4.759141 0.0000
White noise 949491.1 1463541. 0.648763 0.5187
U.S. GDP(-1) 118.9817 19.05033 6.245653 0.0000
Trend 122828.9 340885.7 0.360323 0.7197
D1 -26189386 4727528. -5539764 0.0000
D2 -2380283. 4704240. -0.505987 0.6145
D3 -5657513. 4694994. -1.205010 0.2324
R-squared 0.914739 Mean dependent var 154000000
Adj. R-squared 0.905831 S.D. dependent var 46425587
S.E. 14246622 Log likelihood -1337.593
SSR 1.36E+16 F-statisitc 102.6885
Note: the U.S. GDP is measured in mill. e and the wine export series is
measured in euro.
Source: Own calculations.
The histograms in fig. 8.12 illustrate the distribution and frequency of the
p-values of the white noise variable in the regressions with 1, 000 and 100, 000
replications. Comparing these results with the test for hysteresis by Hallett and
Piscitelli 2002 who compared the Preisach-Piscitelli method and a former version
of the Go¨cke play-method regarding their ability to detect hysteresis, we conclude
that in this regard the play algorithm we use represents a decent instrument to
identify hysteresis.
Finally, we addressed the issue of searching for the optimal SPURT variable
based on the highest R-squared of the regression. As before, we replaced the
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Table 8.5: Descriptive statistics of the vector of R-squared values of the regres-
sions with white noise instead of the spurt variable
Number of observations
1,000 100,000
Mean 0.912263 0.912304
Median 0.911705 0.911729
Maximum 0.920060 0.930810
Minimum 0.911230 0.911230
Std. Dev. 0.001345 0.001491
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 8.12: Distribution and frequency of the p-values of the white noise variable
in 1, 000 and 100, 000 replications
Source: Own calculations.
SPURT variable with white noise, and ran 80 replications (as in the search for
the optimal SPURT based on the highest R-squared). We selected the equations
with the highest R-squared out of 80 and checked whether the white noise is
significant in those cases. Additionaly, we reviewed whether the other criteria
associated with hysteresis are satisfied. We repeated this procedure 25 times.
The results are summarized in table 8.6. The table is organized as follows: the
first column shows the number of the repetition; the second column captures the
highest R-squared of all 80 replications; and the third column shows the p-value
of the white noise variable, which is a strong criterion to conclude that the market
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exhibits hysteresis. The fourth column captures one of the additional conditions
that should be fulfilled for the existence of hysteresis. It is required that the
coefficient of the original exchange rate variable from the simple OLS regression
(αsimple) is lower in absolute value than the coefficient of the SPURT variable
(β). The logic behind this is that the slope of the spurt line should be higher
than the slope of the play line (see Belke and Go¨cke 2001 or Belke et al. 2013).
In other words, the output should react much more strongly in the spurt than
in the play area. Since the appreciation of the euro should be associated with
negative effects on the Italian wine exports, both coefficients – the coefficient of
the original real exchange rate from the simple OLS regression (αsimple) and of
the artificial SPURT variable (β) – must be negative, especially the SPURT
coefficient. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient β is reported in column five.
Although in the most cases the white noise variable associated with the highest
R-squared of the regression is statistically significant, the other criteria regarding
the direction and the magnitude of the influence of the variables are not satisfied.
We have highlighted in bold the unsatisfied criteria that induced the rejection of
the hysteresis hypothesis. Summarizing the outcomes of this test, we find evi-
dence that our estimation procedure is able to differentiate between the SPURT
variable and the white noise.
In the most cases, the R-squared that maximized the regression is below 0.92.
Although this value is higher than 0.914 (R-squared of the regression without
SPURT variable or white noise), it is much less than 0.945, which is the value
of the regression with the spurt variable. The following fig. 8.13 captures the
distributions of R-squared of an exemplary procedure (blue line). The red line
highlights the R-squared of the regression without SPURT and the green line
captures the R-squared of the regression with SPURT variable. As can be seen,
the R-squared of the regression with SPURT is much higher than any R-squared
of the regressions with the white noise.
As a result of all of these tests, we can conclude that the hysteresis identifi-
cation procedure based on the play algorithm is a decent approach.
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Figure 8.13: Distribution of the R-squared in the 6th estimation procedure with
80 white noise replications
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 8.6: Hysteresis identification procedure using white noise processes instead
of using the artificial SPURT variable associated with estimated optimal play
width
No. of repetition R-squared p-value of β | αsimple |<| β | β < 0
1 0.9183 0.0092*** no no
2 0.9163 0.0278** no yes
3 0.9184 0.0086*** no yes
4 0.9177 0.0131** no yes
5 0.9177 0.0129** no no
6 0.9149 0.0620* no yes
7 0.9196 0.0045*** no yes
8 0.9209 0.0021*** no no
9 0.9194 0.0050*** no no
10 0.9162 0.0304** no no
11 0.9185 0.0085*** no no
12 0.9179 0.0116** no no
13 0.9163 0.0294** no yes
14 0.9207 0.0025*** no no
15 0.9168 0.0211** no yes
16 0.9157 0.0407** no yes
17 0.9189 0.0068*** no no
18 0.9112 0.9815 no no
19 0.9164 0.0265** no no
20 0.9179 0.0117** no no
21 0.9167 0.0232** no yes
22 0.9169 0.0200** no yes
23 0.9190 0.0062** no no
24 0.9163 0.0285** no yes
25 0.9194 0.0050*** no no
Note: αsimpe denotes the exchange rate coefficient from the simple OLS
regression (see eq. 8.1) and β is the coefficient of the white noise variable from
the non-linear regression (see eq. 8.2). *, ** and *** denote the significance of
the coefficient β at 1%, 2% and 10% level, respectively.
Source: Own calculations.
Chapter 9
Discussion and political
implications
9.1 Theoretical reduction of hysteresis losses
The discussion about how the hysteresis losses can be possibly reduced starts with
some theoretical considerations about the effects of influencing the two most im-
portant hysteresis determinants, namely sunk adjustment costs and uncertainty.
9.1.1 Reduction of sunk adjustment costs
The microeconomic foundation of path-dependent behavior of firms is described
in section 3.1 and illustrated in fig. 3.1. In order to focus on the sunk costs,
the stochastic nature of prices is also ignored in this section. Thus, the band of
inaction of a certain firm j equals the sum of sunk entry and exit costs, which
is the hysteresis loss of this firm if a complete entry-exit cycle has been run
through, i.e. if the hysteresis loop has been completed. As stated in section 4.3
and illustrated in fig. 4.1, one certain firm j can be geometrically interpreted
as a point in the (Pentry/Pexit) diagram. All of the hysteretic firms are located
in the so-called Preisach triangle on the left-hand side from the 45°-line and the
distance (both - vertical and horizontal) from this line to the firm point is the
hysteresis loss. Fig. 9.1 illustrates how the location of a hysteretic firm changes
if the sunk entry and exit costs are reduced by the same extent.
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Point A0 illustrates firm A with its original entry and exit triggers (Aentry and
Aexit) and its hysteresis loss (hA) at time period t = 0 (see the left-hand diagram
in fig. 9.1). In t = 1, policy-makers take some specific measures to ensure that
the analyzed market becomes more flexible in terms of reduced barriers to entry
and exit for suppliers. Due to lower sunk entry and exit costs, the entry and
exit trigger values of firm A are shifted closer to point cA, which captures the
unit variable costs of this firm. New trigger values result (A1,entry and A1,exit),
inducing lower hysteresis loss (hA1). From the geometric perspective, the distance
from the firm point A to the 45°-line now is smaller, meaning that point A must
be reallocated to point A1 - shifted downwards by the extent of reduction in
sunk entry costs (∆kj) and to the right-hand side by the extent of reduction
in sunk exit costs (∆lj). The right-hand side diagram in fig. 9.1 illustrates
the same procedure with three different firms A, B and C to provide a view of
how the distribution density of several heterogeneous firms in Preisach diagram
changes lowering the sunk entry and exit costs. Such a policy measure leads to
a higher concentration of firms closer to the 45°- line than close to the ordinate.
If policy-makers could manage to preserve flexible markets with quite low sunk
adjustment costs, the distribution density of firms in the Preisach triangle would
decrease going from the 45°- line towards the ordinate. This would lead to a
narrower hysteresis curve with a smaller area inside it and thus smaller hysteresis
losses. In sum, lowering entry and exit costs reduces hysteresis losses directly at
both the micro and macro levels.
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Figure 9.1: Illustration of lowering the sunk entry and exit costs using Preisach triangle
132 CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
9.1.2 Reduction of uncertainty
In the following, effects of lower variations on the markets on the extent of hys-
teresis losses at both the micro and macro levels are identified.
If we think about the augmented non-ideal relay capturing microeconomic
hysteresis under uncertainty (see fig. 5.1), we can deduce that riskiness does
not affect actual hysteresis losses directly. Although the inclusion of uncertainty
into the model leads to a wider band of inaction and thus a larger area inside
the hysteresis loop, the extent of hysteresis loss does not change (see dashed
area in fig. 5.1 and eq. (5.8)). In this respect, uncertainty plays a role only by
interpreting hysteresis losses as part of the area inside the hysteresis loop. The
lower the riskiness, the higher the hysteresis loss compared to the area inside the
loop. For sake of completeness, it must be stated that microeconomic hysteresis
loss only in case of uncertainty is not proportional to the area inside the loop.
At the macro level (with and without uncertainty), the proportionality of both
is valid again.
At the aggregated level, we observe a different and quite interesting picture.
Eq. (5.11) shows that the inclusion of uncertainty lowers hysteresis losses in com-
parison to the area within the hysteresis loop. Such an outcome is quite com-
prehensible, since we know that economic agents even being risk-neutral behave
cautious (see section 3.4) due to the option value of waiting and maximization
of the expected value. Consequently, fewer firms enter and exit the market by
equal price changes, inducing “sticky” economic reactions at both the micro and
macro level in comparison to the case without uncertainty.1
Despite this outcome, supporting variations on markets is not what can be
recommended for the policy-makers. On the contrary, “sticky” economic reac-
tions mostly due to risk distort optimal allocation of scarce resources. On the
one hand, productive firms delay their entry too much and loose opportunities
through being inactive. On the other hand, unproductive firms that entered the
market in booms or became unproductive over time delay their exit, aiming to
avoid experiencing hysteresis losses and hoping for better times. Moreover, high
1That corresponds to uncertainty-dependent play area, 2u, in fig. 5.4, resulting from “de-
populated” part in the Preisach triangle in fig. 5.2 due to increased “band of inaction” as
showed in fig. 5.1
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variations on markets leading to non-stable profits make those markets unattrac-
tive for investors and potential suppliers. This builds a barrier for exhausting
possibilities and creating welfare for both - producers and consumers. In sum,
the reduction of uncertainty alone does not help to reduce hysteresis losses. How-
ever, combining both - lowering the entry and exit barriers and reducing market
risk leads to a “weakening” of path-dependence in terms of narrower hysteresis
loops and low dynamic adjustment losses.
9.2 Discussion and conclusions
This manuscript deals with economic hysteresis on the supply side caused by
sunk adjustment (e.g. entry and exit) costs. The aim of the theoretical part of
the thesis was to model and calculate the dynamic losses in the entire market
in case of price fluctuations. As a first step, a hysteretic dynamics of firm-level
reactions based on one-period optimization was presented (see chapter 3). Here,
the hysteretic behavior of one firm was explained according to the existing liter-
ature regarding hysteresis in economics (see Krasnosel’skii and Pokrovskii 1989,
Baldwin 1989, Baldwin 1990, Go¨cke 2002). Since the unit/marginal costs as well
as sunk entry and exit (dis)investments are firm specific, for heterogeneous firms
individual entry and exit price trigger values result, leading to a “non-ideal relay”
reaction pattern to price changes. The distance between these triggers/thresholds
constitutes a so-called “band of inaction” (see fig. 3.1) and is proportional to the
sum of sunk entry and exit costs. Thus, the area inside the non-ideal relay triggers
is proportional to the firm’s dynamic loss during a complete entry-exit cycle (see
sections 4.1 and 4.2). Considering that firms are heterogeneous, we applied an
adequate aggregation procedure to describe the aggregate supply hysteresis loop
of all heterogeneous firms related to price changes (see Amable et al. 1991, Go¨cke
2002). As an innovation in economics and the first novelty in this manuscript,
we showed how the hysteresis loss of the entire market is calculated based on
the aggregated hysteresis loop (see section 4.3). If the system passes through the
complete hysteresis loop, under certain assumptions the dynamic loss is graphi-
cally represented by the geometrical area enclosed by the loop (see e.g. fig. 4.3a).
Since this enclosed area is a cubic function of the price variation, hysteresis losses
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over-proportionally increase with the size of price fluctuations. However, the
size of this area depends on the curvature of the hysteresis loop: the wider the
loop, the larger the hysteresis losses. The curvature of the aggregated hysteresis
loop is determined by the distribution of firms in the Pentry/Pexit diagram (see
section 3.3). For simplicity reasons, we assume a uniform distribution of firms
in the upper-left area in this diagram. However, if most of the hysteretic firms
had low sunk entry and exit costs in their cost structure, these firms would be
more concentrated close to the 45°-line (which represents non-hysteretic firms).
Consequently, in this case of a more flexible market, the aggregated behavior of
hysteretic firms would be represented by a more “narrow” shape of the aggre-
gated loop and thus by lower hysteresis losses during a cycle. In an opposite
scenario of a very inflexible market where most of the firms experience very high
sunk costs for entry and exit, this would result in a distribution of firms with
a higher density in the north-west part of the diagram (“far apart” from the
45°line). Consequently, the result would be a wider (more “inflated”) shape of
the aggregate hysteresis loop, c.p. resulting in relatively large hysteresis losses
resulting from an entry-exit cycle.
In order to allow for the uncertain stochastic nature of the future price level,
uncertainty was explicitly included in the model (see chapter 5). Related to
the standard theory of hysteresis (in mathematics or physics), the inclusion of
economic option effects on the size of hysteresis losses is a second novelty of this
manuscript. Including stochastic effects results in “wait-and-see” strategies based
on option values (see Pindyck 1988, Pindyck 1991, Dixit 1989, Dixit 1990, Dixit
1992, Dixit 1995, Krugman 1989, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, Belke and Gros 1998,
Belke and Go¨cke 1999, Sarkar 2000, Wong 2007). Since a wait-and-see strategy
in a stochastic environment may prevent sunk entry and exit costs from actually
being written off, option value effects reduce dynamic hysteresis losses in relation
to the area enclosed by the hysteresis loop. This dynamic loss-reducing effect
was demonstrated for the microeconomic and macroeconomic level. Especially
for small fluctuations in the price level, option value effects result in a kind of
“play” (or “backlash”2) type of a sticky reaction of the market to price changes
and thus prevent the actual generation of hysteresis losses. Consequently, in
2For an illustration of friction-controlled backlash, see Visintin 1994, p. 15.
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a situation with uncertainty, only large price fluctuations will generate severe
hysteresis losses.
The model that we presented in chapters 4 and 5 is widely applicable. In the
presented version, the only forcing variable is the price, whereas other macroe-
conomic fundamentals per assumption remain constant over time. However, the
model can be modified to analyze different specific markets or focus on other
determinants of hysteresis, i.e. taking other economic fundamentals as the forc-
ing variables, e.g. exchange rates or interest rates. For example, in the case of
international trade, an appreciation of the home currency may lead to negative
profits of exporting firms. A firm that was active on the foreign market leaves
these export markets when its exchange rate exit trigger is passed, and will lose
the market entry investment it has spent in the past. On labor markets, due to
a recession firing staff will be associated with paying sunk firing costs and writ-
ing off former hiring expenses (e.g. for training and accumulating firm-specific
human capital).
The creation of a hysteresis losses indicator in section 6.4 represents the third
novelty of this manuscript. This measure allows us to examine the theoretical
findings empirically, which is done in chapter 8. Here, hysteresis losses theory is
applied to international trade. As a first example, we calculated the hysteresis
losses indicator (HLI) for the most important German exports to the U.S. First,
we checked the hysteresis hypothesis of the selected markets empirically by run-
ning two OLS regressions: one with and the other without the path-dependent
component (artificial SPURT variable). The existence of hysteresis was proved
only for German exports of vehicles and high-tech instruments. This induced us to
calculate the indicator for the hysteresis losses for these markets. In case of vehicle
exports, the HLI increase is measured in the following periods of e appreciation:
1995Q1− 1995Q2, 2003Q4− 2004Q1, 2004Q3− 2005Q2 and 2007Q3− 2008Q2.
To give an example, the third period is associated with a e appreciation against
the $ by 7% (0.09 $/e ) and the proximate HLI increment in the amount of 7%
of the real export value from 2010Q1, corresponding to approx. 234 mill. e . All
of these lost investments are associated with smaller wealth of investors, leading
to less intensive investment activity in the next period. At the same time, we
talk about closed or scaled-down factories, which are associated with firing staff,
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paying sunk firing costs and writing off the hiring expenses (e.g. for training
and accumulating firm-specific human capital). At the macroeconomic level, we
observe increased unemployment and public spending for social security as well
as a decline in tax income.
As a second example, we calculated the hysteresis losses for Italian wine ex-
ports to the U.S. In contrast to the first empirical analysis, this one deals with
the exports of an agricultural good and considers a different exporting country.
The existence of hysteresis on this particular export market made the calcula-
tion of the HLI relevant. The results show a continuous increase in hysteresis
losses in the time span from 2003Q1 to 2008Q2. According to Eurostat, the
vineyards in Italy are shrinking from year to year. In addition, the number of
winegrowers in 2010 was less than half compared to 2000. All this is associated
with lost sunk (dis)investments, which are relatively high in wine production.
These facts supported our results captured by the indicator. They illustrate the
over-proportional dynamic losses in comparison to exchange rate changes and
underline how harmful large economic fluctuations are for the economy.
Our analysis shows that due to the cubic effect of price changes of the relevant
economic determinants on the size of the dynamic losses, large economic fluctu-
ations generate disproportionately high adjustment costs. This may be part of
the problems related to large economic fluctuations in markets where substantial
sunk investments are relevant, with the “crises” of the last decade, with financial
market instability and recent oil price fluctuations (where many fracking oil pro-
ducers in the U.S. have to write off their investments due to low oil prices) being
examples. In the context of “large” fluctuations, it should be highlighted that
both directions of changes in observed macroeconomic fundamentals are harmful
to the economy. Large “positive” shocks, heating up the economy and resulting
in an “excessive” market entry may later on – after the positive shock has gone
by – end up in a market exit of the firms that have entered during the boom. As a
result, many resources are wasted only for sunk adjustment costs (this represents
a problem with e.g. a real estate bubble). From an economic policy perspec-
tive, in principle there are two ways to reduce hysteresis losses. The first one is
to reduce/prevent variations on markets via implementing stabilizing measures.
Thus, an active macroeconomic stabilization policy especially combating the oc-
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currence and the negative consequences of “large” economic shocks is advisable
to avoid the over proportional adjustment losses. Our argumentation shows that
smoothening macroeconomic variations strongly reduces the amount of hysteresis
losses. Examples of such stabilizing (dynamic loss-avoiding) policies could be: (1)
stabilizing exchange rates to avoid extreme de- or re-valuation, e.g. by (stable)
fixed exchange rates; (2) avoiding large fluctuations in (un)employment, e.g. by
effective short-time compensation schemes (as successfully applied in Germany
during the last recession); (3) by financial market regulations, preventing asset
bubbles as well as financial crises; or (4) policies reducing price variations on
international commodity markets, as e.g. two-price buffer stock schemes (though
with a wide ceiling and floor difference).
The second alternative is to preserve flexible markets, i.e. to reduce the sunk
costs as barriers for market entry and exit, leading to a “narrow” aggregated
hysteresis loop and smaller hysteresis losses. Aray 2015 argues that the reduction
of “institutional uncertainty” through information policies on the part of the
government (e.g. promoting the exchange of information among firms) would
reduce sunk entry costs.
Hysteresis losses should be taken into account because they increase welfare
losses in a way that has not previously been considered. Since hysteresis is an
empirically-proven phenomenon not only in foreign trade but also in other eco-
nomic fields like labor markets (e.g. Mota et al. 2012), the hysteresis losses
theory and the new indicator have many applications. The latter can also be
calculated for a very general case using price as the forcing variable.
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Table A.1: ADF test for integration, German exports to the U.S.
Time series Specification Levels First diff. Order of int.
Real exp., Intercept -2.072 -12.600*** 1
HS 27 Intercept & trend -1.958 -12.621*** 1
Real exp., Intercept 1.230 -11.161*** 1
HS 30 Intercept & trend -0.680 -11.531*** 1
Real exp., Intercept -0.057 -3.319** 1
HS 39 Intercept & trend -2.917 -3.340* 0
Real exp., Intercept -4.290*** - 0
HS 72 Intercept & trend -4.391*** - 0
Real exp., Intercept -0.925 -8.408*** 1
HS 73 Intercept & trend -4.237*** -8.361*** 0
Real exp., Intercept -0.823 -11.378*** 1
HS 84 Intercept & trend -2.254 -11.327*** 1
Real exp., Intercept -0.400 -11.046*** 1
HS 85 Intercept & trend -2.253 -11.038*** 1
Real exp., Intercept -0.641 -3.944*** 1
HS 87 Intercept & trend -2.000 -3.949** 1
Real exp., Intercept -1.623 -14.418*** 1
HS 88 Intercept & trend -1.908 -14.359*** 1
Real exp., Intercept 0.380 -10.130*** 1
HS 90 Intercept & trend -3.241 -10.142*** 1
Real exch. Intercept -1.737 -8.042*** 1
rate Intercept & trend -2.316 -8.002*** 1
Real U.S. Intercept -1.162 -6.722*** 1
GDP Intercept & trend -1.405 -6.778*** 1
Test critical values: 1% 5% 10%
Intercept: -3.501 -2.892 -2.583
Intercept and trend: -4.054 -3.456 -3.154
Note: * means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% level, ** at 5% and
*** at 1%.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Table A.2: Correlogram of residuals, German vehicle exports to the U.S. (product
group HS87), simple OLS regression
Source: Own calculations.
Table A.3: Correlogram of residuals, Italian wine exports to the U.S., simple OLS
regression
Source: Own calculations.
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Table A.4: Correlogram of residuals, Italian wine exports to the U.S., OLS re-
gression with SPURT
Source: Own calculations.
Table A.5: White test for heteroscedasticity of the residuals, German exports to
the U.S.
HS product groups
27 30 39 72 73
Prob. Chi-square 0.202 0.000 0.331 0.800 0.200
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.190 0.000 0.344 0.815 0.204
HS product groups
84 85 87 88 90
Prob. Chi-square 0.132 0.501 0.169 0.185 0.182
Prob. (F-statistic) 0.132 0.520 0.171 0.189 0.185
Source: Own calculations.
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Table A.6: White test for heteroscedasticity of the residuals, Italian wine exports
to the U.S.
Simple OLS regression Spurt regression
Prob. Chi-square 0.691 0.789
Prob(F-statistic) 0.753 0.868
Source: Own calculations.
Table A.7: Jarque-Bera test for normal distribution of the residuals, German
exports to the U.S.
HS product groups
27 30 39 72 73 84 85 87 88 90
Skewness 0.54 0.65 -1.11 -0.86 -0.40 -0.74 -0.19 -0.71 0.53 -0.04
Kurtosis 6.09 4.74 6.93 4.50 3.32 4.56 3.70 4.50 2.73 3.84
J-B 37.43 16.56 71.27 18.16 2.60 16.10 2.23 14.86 4.12 2.48
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.328 0.001 0.127 0.290
Source: Own calculations.
Table A.8: Jarque-Bera test for normal distribution of the residuals, Italian wine
exports to the U.S.
Simple OLS regression Spurt regression
Skewness 0.776 0.730
Kurtosis 4.676 4.861
J-B 16.305 17.478
Prob. 0.0003 0.0002
Source: Own calculations.
144 APPENDIX A. TABLES
Table A.9: Comparison tests for the fit quality of the regressions with and without
the SPURT variable, German exports to the U.S. (product groups HS 87 and HS
90)
HS 87 HS 90
Statistics Simple OLS +SPURT Simple OLS +SPURT
R-squared 0.782 0.810 0.972 0.977
Adj. R-squared 0.765 0.793 0.970 0.975
F-statistic 46.114 46.406 452.914 454.465
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RMSE 717.492 669.891 65.763 61.202
Theil 0.076 0.071 0.027 0.025
Source: Own calculations.
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Table A.10: Comparison of the regression results with constant play associated with the highest and a second-highest R-squared for HS
product groups 30, 39, 72, 84, 85 and 88
HS product groups
30 (d=0.57) 30 (d=0.05) 39 (d=0.57) 39 (d=0.30) 72 (d=0.57) 72 (d=0.11)
αsimple -1216.4*** -1216.4*** -124.35*** -124.35*** -14.38 14.38
αspurt -2023.62*** -4071.2** -181.46*** -54.52 -96.09*** -365.86***
βspurt 3543.52*** 2991.9* 250.70*** 146.26 358.69*** 409.47***
βspurt < αsimple yes no no no no
(α + β) < 0 no yes no yes no no
R2(simple) < R
2
(spurt) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hysteresis no no no ? no no
HS product groups
84 (d=0.57) 84 (d=0.12) 85 (d=0.57) 85 (d=0.03) 88 (d=0.57) 88 (d=0.18)
αsimple -1312.61*** -1312.61*** -607.68*** -607.68*** -1432.64*** -1432.64***
αspurt -2066.59*** -2644.89*** -813.09*** -1734.16 -1565.80*** -1580.66***
βspurt 3309.86*** 1582.57* 901.72*** 1154.92 182.04 649.75
βspurt < αsimple no no no no no no
(α + β) < 0 no yes no yes yes yes
R2(simple) < R
2
(spurt) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hysteresis no no no no no no
Note: * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. d denotes the estimated play width.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Table A.11: Comparison tests for the fit quality of the regressions with and
without the SPURT variable, Italian wine exports to the U.S.
Statistics Simple OLS +SPURT
R-squared 0.914 0.945
Adj. R-squared 0.907 0.939
F-statistic 120.762 163.129
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
RMSE 13.508 10.856
Theil 0.042 0.034
Source: Own calculations.
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Table A.12: Linear Regression of German vehicle export values to the U.S. with
and without the SPURT variable (product group HS 87)
Dependent variable: German export values
(vehicle exports, HS 87)
Without SPURT With SPURT
RER -3123.221*** -930.906
(552.547) (834.247)
SPURT - -4592.151***
(1368.084)
GDP(-1) 0.0034*** 0.00014
(0.00089) (0.00128)
Trend -19.464 35.388
(15.993) (22.197)
d1 -335.586 -319.406
(236.548) (222.250)
d2 -440.441* -463.028**
(236.602) (222.350)
d3 -497.872** -504.488**
(236.374) (222.044)
Constant -1386.439 -2188.403
(2510.132) (2587.223)
Observations 84 84
R-squared 0.782 0.810
Adjusted R-squared 0.765 0.793
S.E. of regression (df=77) 765.719 719.267
Note: the values in parentheses below the coefficients are the standard errors.
Following notation is used to denote significance of the coefficients: *p < 0.1;
**p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations with data from Eurostat and OECD.
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Table A.13: Linear Regression of German high-tech instruments export values to
the U.S. with and without the SPURT variable (product group HS 90)
Dependent variable: German export values
(high-tech instrument export, HS 90)
Without SPURT With SPURT
RER -92.340* 109.390
(49.079) (70.893)
SPURT - -442.901***
(119.436)
GDP(-1) 0.000675*** 0.000347***
(0.0000792) (0.000115)
Trend 3.266* 8.792***
(1420.522) (1.988)
d1 -50.330** -48.627*
(21.011) (19.467)
d2 -28.192 -30.497
(21.016) (19.476)
d3 0.465 -0.252
(20.995) (19.448)
Constant -1147.509 -758.467***
(222.957) (231.633)
Observations 84 84
R-squared 0.972 0.977
Adjusted R-squared 0.970 0.975
S.E. of regression (df=77) 68.01 62.99
Note: the values in parentheses below the coefficients are the standard errors.
Following notation is used in order to denote significance of the coefficients:
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations with data from Eurostat and OECD.
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Table A.14: ADF test for integration, Italian wine exports to the U.S.
Time series Model specification Levels First diff. Order of int.
Real wine exp. Intercept -0.863 -12.238*** 1
Intercept and trend -1.219 -12.172*** 1
Real exch. rate Intercept -1.818 -6.368*** 1
Intercept and trend -2.385 -6.342*** 1
Real U.S. GDP Intercept -1.451 -5.503*** 1
Intercept and trend -1.530 -5.610*** 1
Test critical values: 1% 5% 10%
Intercept: -3.520 -2.901 -2.588
Intercept and trend: -4.085 -3.471 -3.162
Note: * means the rejection of the null hypothesis at 10% level, ** at 5% and
*** at 1%.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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Table A.15: Linear Regression of Italian wine export values to the U.S. with and
without the SPURT variable
Dependent variable: Italian Wine Export Values
Without SPURT With SPURT
RER -66,031,297.00*** 29,668,428.00
(12,943,883.00) (18,954,038.00)
SPURT - -153,654,978.00***
(25,356,805.00)
GDP 118.11*** 51.98***
(18.92) (18.81)
Trend 145,930.40 1,382,115.00***
(337,574.10) (341,067.70)
d1 -26,585,933.00*** -25,577,587.00***
(4,667,843.00) (3,783,203.00)
d2 -2,557,228.00 -1,568,521.00
(4,676,287.00) (3,789,893.00)
d3 -5,555,623.00 -5,199,324.00
(4,672,343.00) (3,783,643.00)
Constant -112,000,000.00** -150,000,000.00***
(44,255,942.00) (36,369,913.00)
Observations 75 75
R-squared 0.914 0.945
Adjusted R-squared 0.907 0.939
S.E. of regression (df=68) 14,185,828.00 11,486,233.00
F-Statistic (df=6;68) 120.76 163.13
Note: the values in parentheses below the coefficients are the standard errors.
Following notation is used in order to denote significance of the coefficients:
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations with data from Eurostat and USDA (2014).
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Table A.16: Linear Regression of Italian wine export values to the U.S. with and
without the SPURT variable (robustness check 1: exclusion of trend variable)
Dependent variable: Italian Wine Export Values
Without SPURT With SPURT
RER -63,949,290.00*** 38,914,707.00
(11,943,498.00) (25,258,054.00)
SPURT - -133,000,000.00***
(29,650,400.00)
GDP 125.99*** 128.96***
(5.05) (4.52)
d1 -26,548,160.00*** -25,133,758.00***
(4,639,444.00) (4,117,800.00)
d2 -2,438,593.00 -428,342.6
(4,640,639.00) (4,131,156.00)
d3 -5,469,813.00 -4,321,421.00
(4,640,538.00) (4,114,647.00)
Constant -130,000,000.00*** -313,000,000.00***
(15,377,365.00) (42,957,056.00)
Observations 75 75
R-squared 0.914 0.934
Adjusted R-squared 0.908 0.928
S.E. of regression (df=68) 14,101,995.00 12,479,634.00
F-Statistic (df=6;68) 146.60 159.35
Note *p < 0.1;**p < 0.05;***p < 0.01
Source: Own calculations with data from Eurostat and USDA (2014).
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